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Eb;IAPJ) STETTIJHUS Ai:-lD 1'HE O?.IGINS OF 'l'IE ;_~ac;o CIT[ crnJF3~JC3 
.American leadership in the latter stages of :Jo:.cld ~Jar II 
enhanced the prestige and position of the United Stat~s ln inter-
national affairs. Unfortunately, while ~·Iashington attracted ITBny 
new frier.ds, certain old supporters ivere alienated. By the fall 
of 1944, strained relations with Latin America were of grave concern 
to Secretary Edward R. Stet tinius, Jr. and his State Department 
colleagueso Political, econor:ti.c, and social probler.~ of common 
American interest raised by the :·rar or foreseeable after the i·1ar 
. ~ . ; ,_ . d t• 1 Here pressing ior JOiri" cons::. era ion. The Pan American republics 
had not met since the Rio Conference of 191+2~ As time elapsed, 
such issues as the Du.11bartori Oaks proposals, the s t.:ltus of the . "-inver-
American security system, the isolation of Argentina, a:i.d the 
development of econorrri c tra!lsi ti on programs had emerged as de 1-: c•r~e 
points of Latin American interest. These lL'1attended controversial 
matters bred resentment among the South American nations toward 
their northern neighbor. To r:uintain hemispheric solidarity and 
overcome La tin antagon.ism, a consul.ta. ti ve meeting of the American 
republics was necessar'J. This urgent need to exchange views and 
reconcile differences eventually culminated in the i·lexico City 
Conference of 1945. 
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The talks at Chapultepec Castle are now overshado•ied by 
other surnmi t r:i.eetings such as Yalta and Potsda:n. Nevertneless, the 
Mexico City Conference, an important episode in the diplor..a. tic his-
tory of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, is worthy of 
further examination. An attempt is made herein to analyze ·the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Chapultepec talks against the back-
ground of the contributions of the United States' chief delegate 
in Mexico City, Edward R. Stettiniusr Jr. 
'---- --- -
LATI.l'l AMERICAN RE~'3ENTt·IE.1IT 
To understand the origins of the Chapultepec Conference, one 
must study the causes of Lat.in American resentment toward the 
United States in late 1944.. One highly debated theme within inter-
American affairs arose from United States involvement in planning 
a world organization. The "Big Four" (the United States, Soviet 
Union, China, and Great Britain) met outside Washington, D. c., at 
Dumbarton Oaks beginning AUo"USt 21, 1944 to formulate guidelines 
for an international peace-keeping body. The secrecy in which the 
conferees deliberated perturbed Iatin Americans, concerned as they 
. 2 
were over the preservation of the inter-American regional system. 
When the discontent. became too vocal, Cordell Hull, the~ Secretary 
of state, and Undersecretary Stettinius invited latin American 
diplomats in Washington to private briefings. 
2.. Jor.n Lloyd 
Sec''"'i ty 1808-1 960 ~_........,,. ... '_J ..... l ........ ,.,. __ ..:..:.;....._
1961) 7 P• 255. 
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By October, 1941+ the Dll:r.lbarton Oaks talks Here completed. 
American spokesmen endeavor-ed to play do~m the growing divergence 
of interests between the United Sta.tes and the ri..a tions south of the 
border. However, the Iatin American republics became increasingly 
apprehensive as it appeared that the United States was preparing to 
ta.1<:e a leading role in world affairs and cooper3te w:i.. th the great 
powers in allocating to themselves a domin.:mt position in the pro-
posed United Nati.ons.3 At a Columbus Day reception for L3.tin 
.American diplomats at the Blair House, Stettini.us soueht to assure 
the guests that the United States delegation to the conference had 
done ever.{thing possible to preserve the inter-American regional 
system. Referring to specific Dumbarton Oaks proposals regarding 
regional arrangements, Stettinius declared that the United Nations 
Security Council would encourage the settlement of local disputes 
through a regional system.4 At the same reception, President Roose-
velt stated that, 11within the framework of the world organization 
of the United Nations the inter-American system can and must play 
a strong and vital role. 115 
Despite assurances-by Stett.i.nius and Roosevelt, the other 
Pan American reoublics were not so sure that the proposals granted 
.... 
_the regional system an acceptable status. They wanted an opportu..'1ity·· 
3. Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-A:nerican Svster.i (Hew York: 
Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 129. 
4. 
p. 256. 
l·lecham, ar~cl I~1ter-~~~eric3.n 
-
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to excnange ideas at a general inter-American discussion of the 
Dumbarton Oaks resolutions. They favored a r.1eetir.g prior to Uic 
United Ilations conference scheduled for April, 1945 in San Francisco. 
\·iashington 1 s southern neighbors objected to the provision 
that no enforcement actions. could be taken by a regional agency 
without authorization by the Security Council. They saw in this 
6 the end of the inter-American system's autonomy. They also opposed 
having non-American powers reprc~cnted on the Security Council 
ruling on herrri.spheric matters. Iatin American~ cFiticized the 
unequal membership of the council. Five seats per~anently assigned 
to the five principal powers implied direct dictatio~ of world 
policy by first class power:'> only. Perhaps the most pronou."lced 
complaint of the Iatin Ar;iericans was that just the "Big Four" had 
planned the United Nations structure. South American arguments 
against the Dumbarton Oaks proposals centered around two rr.ajor 
points: 1) the great powers had been granted too much authority 
and would dominate the world organization, and 2) the inter-American 
system had not been given the important role it should enjoy.7 
Deeply concerned with the proposed plan for a world orga.Tli.-
zation, the southern republics desired a meeting of the rrri.nds ID. th 
the United states. They hoped to revise the objectionable provi-
.sions produced at Dumbarton Oaks. An inter-A."1erican conference 
rrri.ght also present the opportunity for latin America to restrain 
6. p .. 256 .. 
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ua·shington 1 s power and interv.::ntionist h:J.bit",s by building up a 
series of regional legal and political safegt:..:i::-ds. 8 J:·'rom ·(,he 
United States standpoint, a hemispheric r.!eetir.g ~·;ould allow 
Roosevelt's adari..nistration to gather solid bloc support for the 
forthcoming United Nations coni'erence. In addition, the State 
Department would be able to develop some kind of solidar-lty pro-
gram to keep Iatin American nationalists in line until such time 
as mu.ltilateral agreements cou1d get moving again. 
As long as Cordell HuLl 1·:as Secretary of State, however, 
there could be no •1artime inter-American conference. President 
Roosevelt was so preoccupied ~Ii th the war effort tr.at the State 
Department was given a free r.and in regulating foreign affairs with 
Latin America. Hull firnly opposed a meeting oi the hemispheric 
republics because he feared tr.at Argentina would further disrupt 
. . -~ . . . 9 inter-~merican u.'U.~y. Other State Department officials such as 
Brechinridge Long shared Hull's distrust of Argentina. Buenos Aires 
resented the hegemony of the United States and had been the main 
obstacle to hemispheric unity against Axis aggression. World War II 
fl..ad upset Argentina 1 s plan to make herself the leading power of 
South America. Fearing the European dictators, Iatin America r..ad 
drawn closer to her northern neighbor and thus isolated Argentina. 
During most of the war, Buenos Aires pursued a policy of neutrality. 
Her leaders expressed open adr:ri..:ration for fascism, particularl,7 
I , . ,.-1 ~·r 
, 
-o-
for Franco's Spa.in, and allo:,.1ed .Nazi agents co~1sider::.1bl~ i'reedom 
10 id thin their country. lat.in An:erica and the United s-:-..ates con-
demned Argentina for her failure to brea~{ rel..:l. lions Hi t.h the A.xi::; 
powers. 
Secretary Hull had desired more extreme n~easures against 
Argentina such as econonti. c sanctions. However, Great &-:i.. ta in was 
dependent upon Argentine beef and the United States could not af-
ford to h.tnder her ally' s food import..s. :fniJ.e t~nsion rr:ollilted 
between Washington ar.d Buenos Aires, nationalistic army officers 
staged a coup in Febrli.ary, 1944. General .&l.~LnLro J. Farrell 
headed the new .Argentine regime which proceeded to become more 
fascist and more repressive than its predecessor.. The United States 
retaliated by per~.uading the other Latin American republics not to 
11 
recognize the Farrell gover:1ment. Liter, 1:ashington decided 
to freeze Argentine assets within the United States. In October, 
1944 Buenos Aires requested a meet.ing of inter-American foreign 
ministers to examine its problems. Hull ".-1as not willing to discuss 
the Argentine case. He feared that Farrell might attempt to in.:.. 
tensify Ia tin American discontent. 
The Pan American repubJics were distlU'bed by Argentina's 
exclusion from hemispheric activities. Seek:L"lg to restore inter-
American harr.:ony 1 they supported Argentina's motion for a meeting 
to iron out differences.. Not ur1til the stubborn Hull was replaced 
by a more conciliator;,r Secretary was there a r;hance tha L the 
10. 
(New Yo::-k: 
11. 
Ale;(ar:der DeG :J!lde 1 :\ 1-Ii J to::.---.. t 
Scrioner1 1963) ~ P· ?lo. 
I '. ' ~·1 P• 717. 
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United States would alter its attitude toward. an in ter-Arneri can 
conference. When failing health forced Hull to retire from public 
. 
service, a flexible rr.an, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. became head of 
the State Department on November 27, 1941+. He and his Assistant 
Secretary for lat.tn American affairs, Nelson A. Rockefeller, were 
eager to repair the damage done to hemispheric solidarity during 
the preceding year. They desired.an equitable solution for the 
Argentine impasse. Thus, with a sh.:i.ft. in 1eader3(lip withLn the 
State Department, an attempt to cope with Argentine isolation 
became more conceivaole. 
Another critical issue which aggravated United States rela-
tions with Latin America involved economic matters. Considered 
a low priority area in the fight against fascism, Centrnl and 
South America during ~forld War II suffered from consumer shortages 
and the curtailment of development prograrr.s~ Although a certain 
amount of industry had been stiraulated by the war effort, the end 
of hostilities would mean not only the drastic reduction but pos-
sibly the eventual termination of the war-created demand for raT11 
11'.aterials.12 Latin Americans feared the economic consequences of 
peace. They were plagued by several vital questions. What i;.dll 
be done to overcome the ~.assive unemployment created by the tran-
si tion to peacd·in~ production? How seYerely :iill raw material 
industries be reduced? Uill the United States assist in substan-
tially raising the standard of livi_ng in 12.tin Ame.::ic.:.t? For the 
12.. tilecha:zt, T~1c [;~it,a•l Sta ~,..es a£:,:is~~~-=_,~;~:er·ico..n S~?~!i~Y!' 
p .. 258 .. 
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southern repubJics, an inter-American conference f-o lundle these 
postwar economic questior:s could not come too ::;oon.. Since the 
United States alone possessed the k~y to the :.;olution oi' their 
problems, obviously a mee t.ing must be convened to Nheed.le con-
cessions from the "Colossus o.f the North .. "l3 
Developments outside the Hestern hemisphere magnified the 
growing problem of inter-American economic cooperation in the post-
war period. During the final months of the war., the United States 
became increasingly aware of the treacherous ways of its Soviet 
ally. Washington felt tr.at the best defense against Russian ag-
gression in Western Europe Hould be through economic assistance 
prograrns. American po Ji cyma!-<ers began to .f o r:nula te plans to channel 
large amounts of rr.aterial and r.:onetary aid to the devastated war 
zones.. Witnessing a growing United States interest in Europ~<m 
reconstruction, some Latin Americans feared that all prewar and 
wartime plans for pos7~r,:ir: development projects tdthin the hemis-
phere would once again be relegated to obJivion.11+ The maintenance 
of Ia.tin America as a low priority area and the continued fixation 
with European policy by·the State Department could only serve to 
increase herrri.sphenc resentment toward the United States. As 
early as December, 1943 George Messersmith, American Ambassador to 
He;d..co warned: "we must not try hysterically to build up the 
economies of our e!1emies {Germny and Japan) after the war, but 
lJ. Ibid .. 
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must do what we can to build up the economies of our friends, 
i.."lcluding the republics of this hemisphere.1115 
By the time Stett.L."'lius succeeded Hull in November, 1944, 
the bonds of the Good Neighbor Policy had been grea.tzy ·:rnakened. 
The new Secretary bad to overcome the burden of persistent ·Iatin 
American resentment. Major policy questions associated with the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals had to be clarified. The Argentine 
problem had to be settled for the nc.ke of herni5pheric solidarity. 
Economic programs to sti::rulate inter-;\merican industry and agri-
culture required attent.i.on. Stettin:.us quickly perceived the 
urgency behind the Iatin American cries for a hemispheric conference. 
Before he could act, however, Ezequiel Padilla, the Mexi.can Foreign 
Minister forced the State Depg.rtment• s band. As Hull ~vas prepuring 
to step down, P3dilla circuL:i.ted among the Latin American republics 
a proposal to hoJd a hemispheric conference.. Ambassador Messersmith 
cabled Washington ivarning that the United States would seriouszy 
jeopardize Padilla's position in Mexico and probably undercut 
one of its strongest Iatin .American supporters unless it backed 
his proposai.16 The Roosevelt admlrri.stration thus decided in late 
November, 1944 to participate in an inter-American meeting and -
arrangements began in earnest for the Mexico City Conference of 
1945. 
16. ~., P• 167. 
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STATE DEPARTMENT PL~'JNING FOR Th'E MEXICO GITY CONFJ.•:RE~CE 
Although the Chapultepec tall<s became a concrete possibility 
in November, 1944, there were earlier events which foreshadowed 
the inter-American conference. The latin American countries were 
deeply concerned about the relationship between their regional 
system and the proposed world security organization. The State 
Department there.fore inaugur3. ted an exchange of views with the 
other nineteen Pan A~erican republics via a circular telegram on 
the problems of creating an international peace...;{eeping body. 
This diplomatic correspondence ivas issued on ,Ju..ly 11, 1944.17 
later, after the Dumbarton Oaks conversations began, latin 
American diploir..:i.ts attended briefing sessions during the months 
of August and September.. Stettinius's Blair House reception of 
October 12, 1944 began a series of meetings for the systematic 
but informal intercr.ange of views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposalss 
As soon as time had been allowed for comments from la tin American 
governments, anothe::- uBlair House Mee t.ingu with chiefs of the 
missions was held on October 26. Thereafter similar meetings 
. 18 
were held at the State Department. 
At a third meeting of Latin diplomats and American Foreign 
Service officers on November 9, a Com.....'"'Ii..tte~ of Coordination was 
annointed to su.~'!E.ri.Ze comments and suggestions made regarding 
. ~ 
17. 
18. 
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the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Membership on this body consisted 
of the Ambassadors from Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil 
and Norman Armour, Director of the Office of American Republic 
Affairs. After this conference, Stettinius, then Acting Secretary, 
publicly spoke of being encouraged by the support that the ·American 
republics were showing for the basic ideas embodied in the United 
Nations proposals.19 While in consultation with Senate leaders 
on November 21!- 1 Stettinius reiterated his belief in la tin American 
support for the world organization. He revealed that his first 
public statement had received the prior approval of the various 
chiefs of the missions in Washington. 
By the end of November. various strategy sessions projected 
that a meeting of the hemispheric foreign ministers might convene 
about Januar.r 10, 1945 if practicable. The Senate had just ap-
proved Stettinius' s appointment as Secretary of State. With a 
change in State Department leadership, the Padilla invitation to 
a consultative meeting was more readily acceptable. The nature of 
the desired meeting was clarified through a State Department memo-
randum. It was to be an inter-American conference to consider the 
problems arising from the present hostilities. Only those American 
republics which had participated in the war effort were to be in-
. •-..:! 20 VJ.. \lt:\J.. This stipulation prevented Argentina's attendance and 
thus avoided the possibility of an embarrassing confrontation 
between :·lashing ton a:;.d 3u~nos Aires. 
20. Ibid. 
-
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Following the meeting of ambassadors o"1 December 29, .1944, 
Secretary Stet~"lius noted that the diploi>a ~...ic channels were func-
tioning smoothly in preparing for an int.er-Americ.:i.n conference. 
Plans to hold such a meetLig became more definite as the new year 
began. On Januar-.r 13, 1945 He.xi.co City was announced as the loca-
ti on of the hemispher-lc taL"<s. A few days later, FebruarJ 21 
was confirmed as the opening date of the conference. Informal 
exchanges id.th the arncassadors continued and even intensified. 
Fi Ye rr.ore meetings :.;ere held ~d th L3. t.in Ail:eri can diploma ts on Janu-· 
ary 5, 26, Jl and Februar; 5 and 9 to further analyze the United 
Nations plan.21 
Under normal ci:r-ctrn1s t.ances, the Govern.in.:$ 2oard of the Pan 
American Union would have .formulated the agenda and completed 
arrangements for a hemispheric conference. Since Argentina was a 
member of the Union but was to be excluded from the Chapultepec 
taLlcs, direct diplorratic negotiations were employed to organize the 
meeting. B3.sed upon consultations with the invited governments, 
the host countrJ, Me:cico, submi. tted an agenda which closely re-
sembled the United States proposed subjects for discussion. On 
January 18, President Roosevelt approved the topics to be covered 
at the Mexico City Conference .. The rrain headings included 
1) further cooperatiYe measures for the prosecution of the war 
to complete victory, 2) problems of an international organization 
for peace and security, J) social nrobleci> of ~he Ar.:~ricas, and 
21. Ibid .. , p .. 401. 
-· 
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4)·other rr.atters of general and irr~'n~diate conc~rn to ti1e pJ.r-
t . . t" ~ 22 icipa ing goverr~~en~s. 
State Departrr.ent preparations for the Chapultepec tall..:.:s 
paralleled developments on the international level. On October 17, 
1944 department staff experts organized an advisory group for the 
consultations i;-.r.i.th I.atin American ambassadors. &lckground papers 
on inter-American problems were written and subr.ri..tted to a Policy 
Committee. RockefeD.er served as c1'.airrran of r,:-d.s body, ;;;ill.ch was 
composed of his assistants and the appropriate Foreign Service 
personnel from the Office of ;~~erican Repub1ic Affairs. These 
po1icy-rnakers met eighteen tines from January 17 through Feb-
23 
ruary 7, 1945. 
'l\·m other i·10rking groups uere created to lay the ground-
work for American participation in Me;d.co City. One committee 
collected data on Iatin American economic problems and reported its 
f:i.ndings to Assistant SecretarJ William Clayton, who was responsible 
for the development of United States policy in this field. The 
other body dealt with po1i tical issues like the strengtheni.."'lg of 
the inter-American system and its relationship to the world orga-
nization. Membership in this latter group included men who would 
later rrake significant contributions for the American delegation 
at Chapultepec Castle. Technical Experts Arvra Warren, Jolm M. Cabot, 
and Harley Notter met alr:1ost daily in the poll ti cal car.mi. ttee .. 
2J.. Ibid. 7 P• .403. 
-14-
Prior to the inter-American conference, the United States 
delegation met on February 13, 1945 for purposes of organi~ation. 
The delegation was broadly representative of the various govern-
ment agencies. Over one-third of its advisors and technical 
officers bad actively participated in preparations for the ~on-
24. ference. _ Foreign Service personnel Oscar Cox and Leo Pasvolsky 
were jaL"led by military men like Generals George V. Strong and 
Stanley D .. E~bid-< and Ad.':l:il'3.l CeciJ_ Train an the delegation. 
Congress sent Senators Tom Connally· (Democrat of Texas) and 
Warren Austin (Republican of Verrr.ont) and Repre~->entatives Luther 
Jobnson (Demo era t of Texas) and Edi th Nourse Rogers (Republican 
of Massachusetts) to Mexico City. To coordinate the acti~rities of 
this diverse party, the recently-appointed Secretary of State, 
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., was selected as the United States• 
chief delegate to the Chapultepec taL~s. For the businessrran-
diplo~at the Mexico City negotiations loomed as a critical test of 
_his abilities. Stettinius bad to overcome I.atin American resent-
ment toward certain Dumbarton Oaks provisions, the Argentine 
questiont and Washington's postwar economic goals.. How he con-
ducted himself at the Chapultepec talks would be a big factor i_n 
determining the United States' success in restoring hemispheric 
solidarity. 
24. ~., P• 405. 
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FRON GfilfERAL (·DTORS TO CHAPULTEPSC: TlG ::US3 02 
ED~'iAIID STETTINIUS 
Though the halls of Chapultepec C:i.stle and the con.ference 
rooms of General Motors have little in common, they are bot.h sig-
nificant places in the career of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. The 
chief American delegate to the Mexico City Conference of 1945 was 
a rr.an with imIJressive c::·edentials~ A cl':!Ver admnistrator without. 
much knowledge of foreign affairs, Stettinius tnrough his rnana-
gerial ability c:.nd business ac:1men nad ri::.>en fro:H a lowly stock 
clerk to the hig:iest State Department oi'f.:!.c~ in a mere t:,rnnty years. 
He was born in Cricago, October 22, l900, the son of a. partner 
in J. P. Horgan a11d Company.· Stettinius att8;:ded the Po~:1fret 
School in Conn.acticut and later the Un:i.versi ty o.f Virginia from 
1919 to 1924. Ar1 indifferent ~~chol3.r 7 ti:e future ciiplmrat failed 
to meet the requirements for a college degree. This flaw in aca-
der.ri.cs was minor in comparison to the wany successes he achieved 
at that time. Stettinius•s college days are characterized by an 
idealism which persisted throughout his life. Devoted to helping 
others, he became president of the campus Y .- H. C. A. and later 
founded a Student Self-Help Bureau to find ,jobs for needy students. 
In addition, he taught Sunday school and did missionary work among 
the :nountain people. In all his activitie~>, Stettinius displayed 
a remarkable energy and organizational wl.~:::t as ~fell a.s a friend-
liness and warmth for wnid1 he was la tGr 
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The young university student's extracurricular activities 
brought him to the attention of Virginia alumnus John Lee Pratt, 
a vice-president of General Motors. The business executive con-
vinced Stettinius to enter the field. of industry rather than the 
ministry. In 1924, the son of a Morgan financier began his first 
job in the stock room of the Hyatt Roller Bearing Company. As a 
clerk in a division of General Motors, his wage scale was forty-
four cents per hour. Within two year~;, Stettinius was promoted 
to special assistant to Pratt. This advancement er.abled him to 
demonstrate his innovative abilities. He created one of industr-.1's 
first group insurance programs, opened modern medical clinics within 
factories, and employed the new lA".adison Avenue advertising tech-
niques. In record time, Edward Stettinius overcame the handicaps 
of wealth and a brilliant father to establish his mm niche in 
the industrial history of the nation.26 .At the age of thirty-one, 
he became a vice-president of General Motors in charge of public 
and industrial relations. 
Moving on to the industrial giant, United States Steel, 
stetti.nius became a member of its board of directors and chairman 
of its finance committee in 1934. Again, his talents permitted him 
·-~~o rise quickly within the company hierarchy .. At the age of 
·-. 
thirty-seven, Stettinius was appointed chairman of the board of 
directors with an annual salar<J of one hundred thousand dollars. 
• .1. .1. t' - · n a , o+' ,... ,,..,.. ·~ -In his rapid ascen" "o n<:: pi. n c..:..e ... ..,u .... ~<..-~::. in the business 
world, the so-called 11wonder boy" ne'Jer lost those qu.ali ties of 
26. ~., P• 5. 
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compassion and warmth ·;-rhich were to s t.:md him in ;~oocl :..; tcad in 
27 later years. 
Al though associated Hi th traditionally conservative big bus-
iness interests, Stettinius held liberal social and political views. 
i·Iilling to experiment and innovate in a time of economic disorder, 
he shared in the optimism of Roosevelt's New Deal. :Jashington 
called on his services for the first time in 1932, when he was in-
vi ted to serre on the Industrial Ad'risary Board. As a liaison 
officer with the National RecoverJ Administration, Stettinius im-
pressed rra.ny with bis loyalty, sincerity, and boundless energy. 
Noted for his ability to ll.artt:onize and reconcile conflicting in-
terests, he was appointed to a munber of troublesome administrative 
posts within the federal governr.ient.. In 1939, Stettinius decided 
to devote his full time and effort to public service.. At that time, 
• - .. , 28 he became chairr;i.an of the \1ar rlesources noard. The following 
year, President Roosevelt asked him to serve on the AdvisorJ Com-
mission to the Council of National Defense in charge of industrial 
r..aterials. As the possibility of American involvement in World 
war II increased, Stettinius was selected as Director of Priori ties 
of the Office of Production :Managenent in JanuarJ, 1941. Eight 
th lat n'"' too'..r over the administration of the Lend-Lease man s er, v ~ 
program.. As coordinator o.f this militarJ assistance project, the 
former businessrran rr.ade his first contacts in the fie],.d of foreign 
affairs.. Convinced of the value of lend-1..ease, he t.ook time out 
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in ·the sprin.g and summer of 1943 to write lend-Lease: Weapon 
for Victor:ir. L~ this work, he explained the necessity for the 
program's con-';inuation possibly even after the A..'Cis defeat.29 
By September, 1911-3, another federal agency was in desperate 
need of bureaucratic innovation. The State Department was opera-
ting in a haphazard and confused manner. The diplonatic corp was . 
hampered by a bad press, low morale, and an inability to cope with 
increasing responsi biJ.i. ties. Various functions overlapped dif-
ferent offices and day-to-day decisions were often made wl th little 
regard for over-all policy. The Department was further handicapped 
by inadequate methods and hence lacked the machinery for a so\L~d 
' public relations program.30 The situation became intolerable as 
a result of the personality clashes between Secretary Hull and his 
chief assistant, Sumner Welles.. At the urging of adYisors 
James F. Byrnes and HarriJ Hopkins, President Roosevelt appointed 
Edward Stettinius to the post of UndersecretariJ of State on 
September 25, 1943.31 
The administrative troubleshooter approached hi.s new job 
determined to introduce ·efficiency, flexibility, and optimism to 
·the State Department. Hull welcomed Stettini us' s program of reorg-
anization, but considered him basically a bureaucratic harmonizer. 
The new Undersecretary attempted to improve the channels of communi-
cation with other executive offices and the Congress. He also 
31. WaL1':er1 The A:nerican Sec::et-3.ries o.£' State, p .. 3 .. 
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initiated a public relations campaign to restore the Department's 
prestige and clarify its role in the war effort. Stettinius created 
new offices and bodies with specific responsibilities to release 
his assistant secretaries from excessive papenrork. Consequently, 
the CommLttee on Postwar problems and the four geographic director-
ships were established. Some of the old Foreign Service officers 
were critical of the new ways. The J.!!:.~_1.9rk J.1~ remarked, however, 
uthat the Undersecretary brought a breath of fresh air to somewhat 
musty corridors ~ 1132 
Stettinius was at his best in coping id.th problems of rranage-
ment and organization. His role in the State Department took on 
new significance i'1hen failir.g health forced Cordell Hull to step 
dmm in late 1944. The Undersecretary was not t.he most likely can-
dida te to succeed Hull as the architect of Amer:i. can di. plorna cy. He 
was not experienced in the subtleties and complexities of inter-
national relations. But President Roosevelt intended to dictate 
American foreign policy through direct negotia lions with Churchill 
and Stalin. While the chief executive would make the high-level 
decisions, he needed a loyal assistant to oversee the smooth opera-
tion of the State Department's admi.nistrative rr.achinery. Thus; 
,Stettinius was promoted to Secretary of State on November 27, 1944. 
-._ 
Readily assenting to Roosevelt's determination to be the formulator 
of policy, he saw his mm responsibilities to consist of re-inforcing 
the Department, impler.ienting decisions, and serving as a two ~·my 
messenger between the Dapartr.ient and the President.33 
32 .. 
33 .. r.' ~·1 
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The selection of Stettinius as a "caret.::ll<er" Se~reta.rJ 1·ms 
acceptable to both leoosevelt and his Hhite House advi:.;ors.. Un-
like rr..any public servants, he i..ras not associ3. ted :d th party poll tics 
and had no intention of usurping Presidential power. Without 
formal training in i·/Orld affairs, Stettinius did a commendable job 
in keeping the chief executive weJJ..-informed on policy issues. 
He also advanced Hull's earlier efforts to obt.:lin bipartisan sup-
port for ~he world security organization. Consi3tent idth his 
"good·,dll to all attitude," the United Na ti ans dream eventually 
became his greatest goal.. AJJ.. other interests were subordinated 
to rr.aking the international peace~keeping body a reality.34 
During his tenure as Secrel:.3.rJ, Stettinius greatly utilized 
the infor:ral, persot".al approach in carrying out his duties. Side-
steppi!"'..g the rigidity of diplorr.a tic protocol, he rrade his office 
n:ore accessible to both his mm subordinates and forei~i. diplor.a ts .. 
Undersecretary Joseph Grew was ah;ays informed of the latest devel-
opments in foreign policy. It wi.JJ.. be noted later tb.at throughout 
the Mexico City Conference, Stettinitis daily cabled Grew to seek 
advice and to relay progress reports. The Secretary's quick smile 
and easygoing ways also helped to partiaJJ..y alleviate the resent-
Qent of Latin American ambassadors at briefing sessions on the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. As an expert in public relations, 
stettinius sought to improve their.age of.the State Department 
th.rough inform:i.l talks :r.i th leaders of r:atior..al op.inion-forming 
groups.. Congressional fi6ures an.d fell.0·:1 ca oinet :::embers ·.·iere 
34,. 
-21-
also cultivated to maintain a friendly basis for cooperation. 
"Big .Ed.11 as he was nicknamed, revitalized the State Depart-
ment through 'nis personal charm and inexhaustible energy. He 
and his "new team" of Assistant Secretaries, Nelson H.ockefeller, 
William Clayton, and Archibald MacLeish, conscientiously fulfilled 
the dictates of the Hhite House. Being a rranagerial wizard rather 
than an experienced diplorrat, the Mexico City Conference of 1945 
renresented a unique c!i..allenge for Stet tinius. Hiles away from 
the friendly confines of Washington, he would have to rnake on-the-
spot decisions of great significance. His goal ~-muld be to restore 
the Good lieighbor Policy to its past preeminence. Equipped only 
iri. th a personal zeal for ·.wrk, persistent idealism, and COi7:plete 
loyalty to President 1ioosevelt &nd the idea of a wo:-ld organization, 
Edward Stettini1.is thus prepared for the Chapultcpec taU;:s. 
CHAPTEH II 
DAYS OF OP .. GANIZATION AND FOLICY ~TAT8·Ei~TS 
FEBR.UA.P..Y 20, 1945 
The Inter-American Conference On The Problems Of Peace And 
War did not begin in a very auspicious way for Edward Stettinius. 
He arrived a day early on February 20, 1945 to become acquainted 
wi. th and help organize the opera lions of the Americ.:m delegation. 
A few hours prior to the completion of his journey from Yalta to 
Mexico, the Secretar'J paid a visit to the ruling .Junta of Guateoola. 
Filled with aspirations of restoring hemispheric solidarity, 
Stettinius encmmtered resentment in Gu.at.er.ala City.. He discussed 
political issues 1tl th strong men l'!arshall Javier Aranl"..a, Senor 
Guillermo Torriell0, and Capt..:iin Jacobo Arbanz who rev;;'.!aled their 
displeasure over American recognition of the new regime in El Sal-
vador.1 They believed that the United States had let them down 
in accepting the change in Salvadorean leadership. Fortunately, 
Stettinius was at the Crimean conference at the time of recogrli-
tion and could not be blamed for this diplorratic move. After his 
short conversation \fl.th the Junta, the Secretary rr:ade a brief 
statement expressing his respects to the rulers of Guaterrala and 
regret for the brevity of his visit .. 2 He also cabled Joseph Grew 
1. Edward R. Stettinius 1 Jr., Calendar .('Iotes 1 Feoruar.r 20, 
1945
1 
p. 3, Box. 285, Ed';.-ard R. Stettinius7 Jr .. Papers, Alderrran 
LibraFJr University of Virginia, Charlot.:Oesville, Virginia .. 
Herein cited as stettinius Papers. 
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in. Hashington, requesting him to obtain British and Russian con-
sent to deliver the invitations for the world org.::miz<ition conference. 
He wanted this approval no later than the opening day of the Cha-
pultepec talks .J This ivas an early indication of Stettinius' s 
preoccupation with the United Nations plan throughout the Mexico 
City sessions. 
The chief American delegate flew into the Mexican capital 
about 1:45 in the afternoon.. Another uncomfortable scene developed 
when Stettinius issued a statement to reporter::> at the airport. 
A typogr-aphical error in the text had substituted the word "own" 
for "friend." Consequently, the Secretary read the passage: 
"The United States looks upon Mexico as a good neighbor, a strong 
upholder of democratic traditions in this hemisphere and a cotmtry 
4 
we are proud to call our ovm. 11 Realizing the mistake, he gasped 
but went on with the speech. Although of no real significance, the 
minor slip denoted the extreme intensity of coverage given to every 
item at the press conference. 5 A Foreign Service officer immediately 
corrected the error, but the verbal remark had already been over-
heard. James Res ton of the New York Times and Time Magazine later 
1 . 6 published the textua mx-·up. 
4. 
Mouth," 
5 .. 
Box 285, 
6. 
Ibid., P• 5. 
James Reston, "Secretary's Error Puts Error in Stettinius• 
Na:.• York Ti:nes 7 FeoruarJ 21 7 1945r p. 2. 
stettinius, Calend.:1.r Notes, Febr..iary 20, 194-5, p .. 6, 
Stettin.ius Papers. 
Y 1 = Res ton, New orK 1..cmr-~s 1 
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P..ecovering from .his shakw 0ta.rt, Stet,t:,inlus W3S impressed 
by the cordiality of the correspondents ar.d the great µublic interest 
in his arrival. From the airport, the SecretarJ was taken to the 
Hotel Geneve, 11here he would reside for the duration of the con-
ference. This suburb3n lodging housed Stettinius 7 his chief 
advisors, and a secretarial staff. Huch of the speech writing and 
processing of documents ',vas to occur at the Gcneve. The central 
offices of the AmericJ.n delega t.i·.:>n :·1ere in another ho tel7 the .i!.di-
ficio Imperial. The conference itself Has to be held at Chapultepec 
Castle, on a hill. two hundred feet above the ca pl tal city. This 
ancient fortress was :;trongly linked to Mexico's heritage. It had 
been an Aztec palace7 a rrri.li ta:rJ school, I·!aximilian' s royal resi-
7 dence, and most. recently a national museu:n. Stettinius later wrote 
that its history and natur3.l beauty lent extr3.or<linilry dignity and 
t ' .L lk 8 a feeJing of perspective to ne ~a s. 
The SecretarJ held his first strategy session in the Geneve 
at 4:00 P.M. In attendance were Rockefeller, Messersmith, Special 
Assistants Leo Pasvolsky and Robert 1{t7lch and Technical E.~pert 
Hayden Raynor. Stettinius read the latest draft of his opening 
speech. Reactions to it were enthusiastic and only a few minor· 
changes were suggested. Afterwards, the size of the Ar.1erican dele-
gation was discussed. There were four cor.gressional advisors and 
7. Arthur P::es tor1 ~n.~i t,(1~:~r, L'J. ter'-_:\~~-ci_c:.=.~1_ 1\:.fr1i rs.. l 9h5 
c.ie~-r York: Colu;;;oia Uni'JRI'SiGJ-" ?n~S3r 1946), p. J~ 
s. Stettinius, Caler.d3.r !Iotes: Febrinry 20, 1945 7 pp. 8-97 
Bo:{ 285 7 Stctt-,,inius P3s>~-r~s,. 
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over one hundred State Derartr.:ent. perscnnel in ti1e grot~p. In-
eluded in the delegation •1ere h;enty-nine ;:cvisor::; four ;)pecial 
Assistants to the Secreto.r-;, t~·Jenty-two 1'3chnical offict:::rs, b1enty 
translators, press and ad:.ti.r..istra t.i ve aides, and twenty-four steno-
graphic and clerical people.9 Surprised at the composition of the 
United States party, Stettiri..ius became critical of the nwnber of 
people brought to Hexico City. Differences were reconciled when 
Rockefeller gave a vigorous del.'ense for the si::;e of the group. 
Of several decisions rr.ade at this meeting, the most important 
dealt with access to inforrration. The Secretary i:i.sis ted that not 
only pleri..ary sessions but also rrajor committee meetings be open to 
the press. With his high regard for public re lat.ions, he announced 
that daily conferences with American correspondents would be held 
if possible. It was also decided th.Jt the American delegation would 
assemble every day at 9:CO A.H. at the Bdificio Imperial for brief-
. 10 ing sessions. 
stettinius 1 s first opportunity to exercise his personal ap-
proach to diplomacy came in the early evening when he visited 
Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla. They discussed the close 
relationship between the United States and ~1exico. Padilla, like 
most I.a tin Americans, was concerned about economic problems. He 
stated that the youth today have a tendency toward com1nunisrn. 
The best way to combat it he felt ·,.;as not by i'orce, but by in-
I '.' ~ .. , p. 10. 
10. ~., pp. lC-11. 
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creased education, economic activity, and an improved standard 
Of li . 11 ving. The Merican Foreign Minister also reported that the 
Argentine situation was in hand. This delicate matter would be 
brought up at the end of the Chapultepec talks. Stettinius noted 
t.hat on his arrival, he had f01.md the Buenos Aires quest.i.ori boiling .. 
He was convinced that decisive action should be taken promptly to 
naintain the L"'li tia ti ve. If Argentin;:1 met certain conditions, the 
unity of the Americas could be insured., The Secretary beli.eved 
that nor!n3.l rel.3.tions >·iith Buenos Aires could be restored if she 
1) declared war on Ger;;:any and Japan, 2) adhered to inter-American 
defense measures, and 3) gave public notice of troop dispersions 
concentrated adjacent to the Brazilian and Chilean borders.12 The 
conversation between Stettinius and the strongly pro-American 
Foreign Minister lasted almost half an hour.. The whole spirit of 
the meeting was one of sincerity, cordiality, and complete agree- · 
13 
ment. 
With his first day in Mexico City drawing to a close, the 
United states' chief delegate met inforrr.ally with correspondents 
at the American Embassy. He recounted off-the-record his expe-
riences at the Yalta Conference. After.·1ards 1 he attended a 
.. reception for the Foreign Ministers of Brazilt Venezuela, Cuba, 
11. Report on 6:C0 P.1·1. Ezequiel Padilla-St3ttinius Con-
versation, February 20 7 19451 P• 2, Box 2S5, Stettinius Papers .. 
12. Argentine A.ffairs Report, Februar.1 20 7 1945, p. 1 7 
Box 285, Stettinius Papers. 
lJ. padilh-Stettinius Corn~r-sation, F_;b::-uary 20, 1945, 
p. 3, Box 285, Stettinius Papers. 
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Chile, Peru, Hexi.co, and Co.lumbL.l at the i~.::!for;:-a I:ot.cl. Outside 
of the embarrassment in Gu3. tema.la City .:i.:1d the typographical rnl:J-
take at the airport, the day's acti vi tics had coi:ie of.f ;:;rooothl.y. 
As expected, Latin America ;.;as concerned about the ,\rgentine 
question and economic problems. This was confirr.1ed at Stettinius's 
meeting with· Padilla. Though delicate issues ·.-1ere involved, first 
impressions depicted tf:e Secretary as a :.inirhrind of optir.d.sr:i7 
hoping to rrake the i·Ie:dco City Coni'erence as successful as the 
C . .i.~-1 14 nmean uo.l..:<:s • 
FEBitUAJY 21, 1945 
The .Argentine iss:.1e dorn:i..nateC.. !-,he openin6 of the Uexico City 
Conference on Febr1..:arJ 21, 191;..5. There ·..;ere b::i ~,i1 public .:i.nd pri-
Stettinius, like tne 0L1er deleg2.tes, ·.·;as c:~posed. Lo the tension 
created by Argentina's alier.ation. Journal entries reveal that 
throughout the day, from bJ.s attenc1ance at the preliminar:1 session 
until his evening composition of telegrams, the SecretarJ's 
thoughts were directed to the Argentine question.
15 
The morPing session of the conference steering committee pro-
vided the first opportu..'ii ty to debate the rotter of herrd.spheric 
solidarity. The chief delegates assemoled at 11:00 to orga::'lize 
subordinate co;r.nrl..ttees and approve the agenda.. Foreign Minister 
Acosta of Costa Ri.ca nolilin::ited Ezequiel Padilla i'o.: t,he presidency 
14. Rcston. 7 11Stettinius L3.nds Fo:- ;.:exi.ca 
February 21 7 J.91.;.5, p .. 11. 
'i'alks, 11 llew York 'I'"i-,,,~es 
-- -- •• 1 
stet ti.nius 1 pp. 1-8, 
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of ·the Chapultepec talk::;.. Stettinius in hi::> first. official act 
at the conference seconded the r.Jo ti on.. Padilla \~as t.:rwrrl.r.i.ously 
chosen president and proceeded to establish sb: study groups 
which would research and submit :::-esolutions to the conference. 
Because of his great interest in the proposed United 1Jations, the 
American Secretary was selected to chair the committee on the \'lorld 
security organization. Other groups dealt ~·rl.th further military 
efforts to win the war, the strcngtberLi..ng of the inter-·American 
system, economic and social problerr.s of the tro.nsi ti on period, and 
' . d . 1 . 16 pos~war econorm..c an socia issuesp 
Hith the comntl.ttet!s appointed, the next r::atter of business was 
to formalize the agenda. Not lll1expectedly7 the Cuban delegate pro-
posed that the Argentine issue be given preferential treatment by 
the conference.. Paraguayan Ambassador to the United St::ltcs 7 
Dr. Celso R. Velasquez, suggested that Argentina be discussed first 
rather than last on the age.naa.17 Padilla replied that the nations 
of the hemisphere had agreed otherwise in replying to the Mexico 
City invitations. This question was not scheduled to be reviewed 
until the end of the proceedings. The conference president pro-
posed that the delegates adhere to that agreement and debate the 
issue later with the "greatest amplitude and with absolute frank-
ness."18 This reasoning prevailed and the Velasquez r..otion ~·jas 
16. Coni'erence Steerin6 Coti'.r.ri. ttee Re_?or:., Februar-; 217 1945, 
p. 1, Box 235 1 StGttinius Papers. 
17. Jar.Jes ..'.leston~ "Di.Jpute is Put Of:.' ,\os~nce is D-~plored, 11 
New Yor~..: T:Lnes, .i?ebruary 22, 1945, P• l. 
18.. I':Jid. 1 p .. 11. 
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defeated. Thus, the awkward problem of Buenos Aires' isolation 
was not solved but merely postponed. An unknmm quantity at this 
point was the United States' Hillingness to discuss the issue. 
Though the Argentine question \·Tas temporarily shelved, certain 
resolutions were later related to it. In fa.ct, fear of the· Farrell-
Peron clique forced the Uruguayan delegate to conclude the prelir.tina.ry 
session with a unique proposal. He suggested the promulgation of 
a mutual guEn"8.n tee of territorial and poli tica:.t. unity within the 
Western hemisphere .. 19 
Following the stecrlng comm:i.. tteo meeting, SecretarJ Stettinius 
visited Me:icican President Avila Camacho. In this attempt to fur-
ther cultivate personal contacts, the American delegate had a 
friendly talk with Mexico's chief executive. Carr.o.cho stressed the 
importance of success at the Chapu1tcpcc Conference and asked how 
he could help achieve this. The Me:icican president later remarked 
that he and Stettinius had 11 clicked 11 at once.20 In two days, the 
Secretar-.t' s personal approach had reaped rewards. The Hexican 
leadership, . specifically Camcho and Padilla, i:..rere quite eager to 
cooperate with the. United States. 
Throughout the afternoon, various festivities celebrated the 
... opening of the He:icico City Conference. That evening, t:1.e first 
plena:q session 1,.;as convened at Chapultepec Castle. Several 
speeches reaching a high oratorical level ~·iere :r.3.de. Stetti:riius 
19. 
Box 285, 
20 .. 
Stettinius 7 Calendar Hates, Febru.:::.ry 21, 1%-5 7 p. J, 
Stettinius Papers. 
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gauged the value of each r.iessage by ho~.; qu.icl<:ly the photogr3phers 
-i-a d d t .._' .._ 21 "'' s.,-mpe e over o ..,ne ros1,rlL'TI. ine Secretary did not plan t.o 
address a plenary session until the folloning day. As part of the 
audience, he was content to take notes on the gathering. 
The keynote address was given by President Camacho. The speech 
reflected Iatin American concern for the pressing problems which 
!',ad stimulated southern resentment toward the United States. Camacho 
pointed out how important the 11spiri tml" help of even the weaker 
na ti.ans had been to the imr effort and the need now to discuss their 
post-.1ar problems. He rel'Y'arked that democracy was the best protec-
tion against the further infiltration of totalitarian propaganda. 
For this reason, it ~·ms necessarJ that democratic processes be 
protected and intensified withL"1 the American rt!publics. The 
ifaxican president tied poll tics o.nd economics together by empha-
sizing that democracy can only survive when economic and social 
conditions are sound. 11 We must create a world in which a minimtun 
standard of living is guaranteed and where there will be economic 
t . , 22 cooperation between coun nes.' In a subtle fashion, Carracho was 
appealing to the United ·States to assist in the elimination of eco-
nomic distresses within the hemisphere. Stettinius observed that 
the Mexican leader's most controversial co~~ents related to the 
United Nations and the Argentine issues. In a low-key rr.anner, 
Carra cha expressed his belief tl:i..a t if the peace should be based solely 
on the wisnas of the pm..rerful nations: the 11ar v:ou:ld fi.a'Ja be~n 
21 .. ~ .. , P• 4. 
22~ Ibid. 
-31-
fought in vain.23 He upheld the right of the ;\r.i~ric.:::.3 to help in 
the shaping of the international security program. Ho·t1ever, the 
"Big T'nree11 dictates at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks ha<.l conflicted 
with this herrd.spheric. right. Enthusiastic applause was evoked by 
the Hex:ican chief executive's rerrarks on the world organiza.tion 
and Argentina. In reference to the controversy with Buenos Aires, 
he deplored the absence of Farrell's country but still held a cor-
dial place for it in 11 his thought and in his affection. 1124 At. the 
expense of United States prestige, latin Amerlca sought reconcilia-
ti on with Argentina. 
After reviewing the day's activities, Stettinius spent the 
latter part of the evening working on diplorratic correspondence. He 
read dispatches and forwarded reports to Grew in Hashington. A 
cable from Argentina informed the Secretary that Buenos Aires would 
probably not declare war on Gerrrany. Civilian and rrd.li tary circles 
were pressuring the Farrell-Peron regime not to move against the 
Axis powers.25 This news must have cor.ie as a blow to. Stettinius. 
To restore relations with Argentina, he wanted demonstrations of 
good faith such as her involvement in the war and not unimplemented 
declarations. Luckily 1 Padilla had succeeded in postponing the-
Buenos Aires question until the end of the conference, giving the 
Secretar<J time to cultivate the inter-American delegations and 
'"' + "- • 1a ,...,a-a _..,....o :'°r..=i.=>'"' 1:1 i'.1"'Jbr~q.,...y ?1 191 5 p l ~3. Reporu on ri. ·Tl.. \., 1 • • .... ti 0 ... J ..... c1. ..... , .. 0 -· __ , - + ' • ' 
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hopefully come to some co~~Dn unu~rsto.nding. 
Besides the unfavorable Argentine ne~-1s, Stett.iniu.s received 
a negative report on the pla.'1...'!.ing of the s~n Franci.:>co Conference. 
Despite the efforts of the State Departr::ent, France had not yet 
expressed agreement with the Dumbarton Oaks proposals completed at 
the Crimean talks. France and Nationalist Chl.na had not partici-
pated in the final revision of the proposals. But the United States, 
Soviet Union, and Grea. t Bri ta:Ln had invited them to help sponsor 
the world organiza t.ion coni'erence in April. :ihile China had accepted 
these terms ir:mediately1 de Gaulle's Pro'lisional Government had not 
cornmitted itself y·:!t. Stettinius wired Grew t:r.at he \>ias in a deli-
cate position. He had been elected chair::ian of the United Nations 
committee and was thus responsible for studying the possible inte-
gration of the regional system into the proposed world organization. 
la.tin Americans realized that the Security Council would be the 
vital cog !'Ii thin the United Ha tions r.achlnery. They ~·1ere anxious 
to lmow its voti..r1.g procedures and operations. This iruormation 
could not be released, according to a Yalta agreement, until the 
invitations to the San Francisco Conference had been delivered. 
A vicious circle had developed whereby no invitations could be · 
issued until the sponsors had been deter:n.ined. The longer F'rance 
dawdled over the question of sponsorship, the more difficult became 
the Secretar:-r' s position. A reluctant France ~·rould only help to 
: .. tlden the creclibilit~/ gap bet:-.reen tl:e ';iOr ld. org;i~za ti on 3.nd IE~ tin 
.t'\merica. Stettinius ca.Oled ~Iashingtor1: 
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From the standpoint of .frank :i.r:d .f.::ilr d~alir.g 1 
I should ba a':Jla to discus3 .:ill :-ingks or the 
iwrld security proposals at i:.he ca~.U::s t pos~;ible 
moment. I still ho~e that between tills cvan.i.ng 
ar.d the following night, i1hen I ueliver my a.ddress, 
that Ar.ibassador Caffery will be able to cxpl:.l.in 
in Paris the fact that twenty reoublics '-ire meetinO" 
• 0 
to discuss the world organi:::a tion and that the 
French delay is n:ost embarrassing to the United 26 
States.. He ardently hope for prompt consent •••• 
Unfortunately, the problem of French sponsorship had just begun. 
Februar"IJ 21, like the preced!.ng day, was a time of orgoini-
zation and preparation for both Ed·11ard Stettinius and the He;d.co 
City Conference. Although the Secrct.J.r:/ rod esL:i.blishecl some per-
sonal contacts, he had also encotmtered ::;orne t.races of resentment. 
The delicate problems relatad to t,he United Nations, Argentina, 
and postuar eco~oll'iC policies had quickly c~.erged,. Greatly in-
terested in a sr.iooth t:r:msition to peace, L:l t.in Axed ca uas an:r.ious 
to know the United States' posbmr policy. Thu~, the ::;outhern 
republics looked forward to Stettinius's pronouncement3 of 
Februar'J 22. 
FEBRUARY 22, 1945 
By the second day of the Chapultepec talks, the delegations 
were ready to tackle the problems of transitional plan..>U.ng. With 
the opening forr.:ali ties completed, a pattern of cor..rrd.. ttee meetings 
and plenar-<; sessions iras established. At this point, Secretary 
Stettinius emerged as a key spok~srran for postwar cooper'.:! ti on and 
the Good Neighbor Policy. On Feo::1Y1:ry 22, 1945: he :·ras t..he center 
of attention i:i. He;dco City.. Eis introductory speech on Washington's 
26 .. ~ .. , p" 7-
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hemispheric policy highlight.ed th..:!se ea.:::.·ly cor ..ference p~·o,:eadings. 
Prior to deliveril'.g his policy ~essage, Stettinius spent. the 
early pa.rt of the clay rapping out s t.rategy Hi :-..h hi3 aides. !ie 
attended the 9:00 A.a. briefing of the United States tlelegation 
at the Edificio Imperial. These daily gatherings proved to be of 
great value. They provided a clearinghouse for ideas and an in-
f orrral means to cope with troubleson:e points. 27 Throughout the 
conference, the Secre t.a:r.71 a ttencled these morning sessions ' . .;hen his 
schedule perrrri. tted.. Ordir.3.rily, they were presided over by his 
chief alternate, 1lelson Rockefeller.. Stettinius lud long been re-
garded as a good rr.anagar of men rather tr.an as a substantial 
. . li 28 for:nulator of American po cy. He had a tendency to trans fer 
irnnortant resconsibilities to caoable aides. 3uch a case would 
.. . . 
be P..ockefeller's supervision of the daily delegation rr.cet.i.ngs. 
The chief alterri..ate received oral cor..mi.ttee reports and decided 
which ones should be rel.3.yed to the Secreta!"'J. 
The United States delegation gathering of Februar.1 22 revealed 
Stettinius's high regard for public relations. In attendance 
were representatives of American labor, agriculture, and business 
l ..... · s · rr· 
29 
as well as the usua .t'Oreign ervice o icers. These individuals 
27. Stettinius 7 Calendar Notes, February 22, 1945, p. 1, 
Box 285, Stettinius Papars. 
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not regularly employed by the S~te Depa:ct::1~nt. Here pri::w.rily cco-
nom:i.c advisors. They sy;nboli:.:ed the Secretary'::; att.,!1npt to ~-riden 
public participation in American diplo.mcy.. i\t this fi::-st 1:1eeting, 
the wethod of deliver;/ for Stettinius's aft~z-::ioon speech was dis-
cussed. It was decided that the Secretary would pause at the end 
of each major passage to per:nit a Spanish translation.3° 
After the delegation meeting, Stettinius began to prepare for 
his role as chairr.an of Commission II on the world organization. 
Knowi:ng that Iatin American involvement in the United Nations would 
be a touchy rratter, he had formed an advisory body on ~mrld security. 
This group included Leo Pasvolsky, General Strong, Congresswan Johnson, 
Hayden Raynor, and later Sena tor Tom Con.."'.3.lly. At a 10: 00 A .r1. 
meeting, they reviewed la.tin American attitudes toward the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals,. These advisors realized that the United St3.tes was 
bound by a gentler:ian's agreement not to negotiate the United :Nations 
resolutions with other states until the San Francisco Conference. 
However, Venezuela and Ecuador were already organizing a campaign 
1 t . . t• . . th 1 31 to compose a conference reso u ion cri icizing e proposa s. 
stettinius's advisorJ group had to disassociate the United States 
from any movement of this nature. But there were other threats to 
.the American position on the world organization. The Chilean dele-
gation wanted the membership of the Security Council increased from 
eleven to fifteen ';Tith the four additional sea ts going to L3.tin 
30. ~ .. 
31. ~., !?• J .. 
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American nations. Others desired a hemispheric lobby which might 
force concessions from countries of other r0gions.32 These ideas 
were intolerable to the Secretar'J • The si tU.'.l ti on was so delicate 
that the American delegation could not even afford to initiate its 
own resolution on the Du.'ll~rton Oaks proposals. Such a move would 
become the focus for all those wishing to express opposition to the 
United Nations.33 Foreign Minister Padilla's conception of a world 
organization resolution appealed to St.;ttinius. In other words, he 
sought a proposal which would be 1) an expression of the desire for 
a general international organization and 2) an endorsement of the 
Dumbarton Oaks resolutions as a basis for drafting the organiza-
tion 1 s charter.34 
Following a reception given by President Camacho nt the H<1tional 
Palace 7 the SecretartJ assembled the American ste~ring cor.mti.ttee. 
This group included his world security advisors plus m.lliam Clayton, 
Adolf Berle, and other Foreign Service officers. They fWlctioned 
throughout. the conference as Stettinius's chief consultative body. 
It· will be noted later that many of the crucial decisions rrade by 
the Secretary originated in this council. The steering committee met 
at this time to analyze resolutions to be introduced by the United 
states. All proposals were due for submission on or before Saturday 
.32.; James Reston, 11End of Censorshi-p In Air.ericas Urged," 
New York Times, FebruariJ 23, 1945, P• J.4.. 
33. Stettinius, Calendar Notes, FebruarJ 22,, 1945, p. J, 
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-37-
night Febrmry 24. In vie~-. of th~ fact that ClL.l.~fton, L:1e Assi;:,t.:.int 
Secretary for Economic Affairs h.:ld just J.:rriv2d, t!'lc cor..mittee decided 
to ask for an e.~tension of tioe until Eond.ay for cartain economic 
resolutions.35 Hith the Mexico City Conference in just its :Jecond 
day, nineteen proposals had already been introduced. Severr of these 
motions alone related to the. United Nations plan. One of the first 
resolutions that Stettinius's people planned to draft dealt with 
the abandonment of censorship regulations. The American delegation 
desired a freedom of inforr.ation clause which would result in all 
hemispheric countries providing correspondents with the right to 
gather information freely wherever they chose. In addition, the 
press would be allowed to transmit that inforrration abroad without 
control by official sources. The Se ere tar;/ i1anted the L:l ti...'"l Amer-
ican countries to do what they could to assure these two freedoms 
in the hemisphere and to secure the same advan~~ges elsewhere in 
the worlct.36 
Ui.th the day's strategy sessions behind him, Stettinius pre-
pared for his first major test at the Chapultepec talks. His 
policy statement at the·4:30 P.M. plenary session would probably 
set the mood for the rest of the conference. Since the United· 
states was the largest and most powerful heraispheric republic, her 
post'.-rar goals would directly affect Iatin America. Eajor economic 
and social advances in South .4.;:ierica could only be achieved with 
35. Tel~gr2.m 7 Stettinius to Joseph Grew 1 February 22, 1945~ 
p. 2
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Washington's cooperation. Therefore, i'i'r..:i t. rieveloo1rent oro;:-rar:lS the 
... ... .... .., 
inter-American nations hoped to obtain o. t. t.he i!exico Ci t7 Conference 
depended upon the concessions the United S-Wtes \·<as willing to rrake. 
As Washington's chief spokesman, Stettinius had to rea;;sure the 
southern countries of United Stat.es friendship and cooperation 
throughout the transition and postwar periods. 
Prior to Stet tinius 's address 7 Foreign Hi.ru ster Padilla opened 
the plenar-.r session ~vi th a brilliant extemporaneous speech. Setting 
forth the objactives which he hoped the Chapultepec Conference to 
achieve, he then stressed the need to preserve the unity born of 
war. The strongest part of his message and that which evoked the 
most ~·1hole-hearted response from the delegates described the dignity 
of the comrr.on man and the masses in the Americas to i'eel they had 
a stake in the preserva t.ion of 11en1Lsph~!.tlc: soli darl t.y .37 The Mexi-
can diplomat's cry for economic liberty so tr-.at "every rran will be 
able to feed his family and educate his children" was loudly ap-
, 1 38 plauded by the assemo y. 11It was vital for I.atin America to do 
more than just produce raw materials and live in a state of semi-
colonialism. The goal", he said "of an economic program in this 
hemisphere should be that of stable employment in trades and indus-
·tries which satisfy the demand of masses for goods.1139 United 
37.. John E .. Lock"1iOOd 1 PlenarJ Ses3i::n 2.~;9ort 1 Febrllilr'J 22 1 
1945, P• 2, Box 235r Stet.~inius Pa~ers. 
38. stetti:ii'..13~ Calc:1car :fotcs, f.~br-c:a!:f 22, 1911-5 1 p .. 5, 
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States capital would ba required to .'.rnbs tantiall.y r:1..i.~>e t.he :;tan-
dard of living and the purchasing po>•er of t.lic southern republics. 
Padilla warned of the ever-present ideologic.:i.l threat to under-
developed regions. He a::-gued that people turned desper:i.te by 
hunger would be attr.::i.cted to communis;n or fascism. Hence, democracy 
must fulfill its promise of steady work• f'a..ir :'/ages, and a decent 
40 home, Thus, playing upon Hashington''s increasing fear of Soviet 
subversion, the conference president appealed for united States 
support in moderniziri..g la tin America. 
After Padilla's fine orator'/, Secret.:ir.v Stettinius addre:.;sed 
the chamber.. He spoke in what was later noted as an even-ton~ ... 
and serious rmnner.41 The Sacret,arh anxious to rerr.ove any Latin 
American doubts about :-Jashingt~m•s desire to aid. its southern 
neighbors, stated: 
The United States Goverrune:it looks upon this 
conference in Hexico City as a meeting of decisive 
importance. Our unity Ii.as been :Jtrengthened by 
our wartime collaboration. Now it is our task to 
advance this unity still further, both for the war 
and in our poJitical, economic, and social collabora-
tion in the tasks of peace. I wish to reaffirm 
to the representatives of all Governments assembled 
here that the.United States Goverru:lent regards 
the Good Neighbor Poli~J and the further develop-
ment of inter-American cooperation as indispensable 
to the building after victorJ, of a peaceful and 
democratic world order. I ·wish also to reaffirm 
the belief of the United States that this democratic 
order i:lUSt be built by all nations, Hrge and small, 
' . ls ........ acting tog~tner as so·vereign equ:i • · 
40~ s~ettLl.i~..is, C:il_t~n(t"J.r fJotes, FefJ:-i,_~="J .22! 19lr5, p. 51" 
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This passage ivas warmly received by the Ia tin :1.meric.:in d~le~o. tes. 
Stettinius Has obviously also tr,;ring to soften t.h~ir n~sent;-nt:!nt. 
tm·ra.rd the proposed United Nations. The southern :rc::publ.ics had 
been angered by their exclusion from the Dumbar-ton Oaks taLl<s. Now 
the Secretary was calling for the ~'lorld corrununity, not just the 
"Rig Three·," to participate in the creation of the world peace. 
Stettinius continued by stating his purpose to reveal the 
United States• objectiYes at Mexico City and in over·all foreign 
p~licy. Hashington•s ir:unedio.te goal 1·1as to bring about the earliest 
possible defeat of the J\_.'cb powers. Besides deposing the dicta.tors, 
the Secretary felt tb.a t their ideologies must be eradicated.. Harn-
ing against possible Nazi and .Fascist infiltration, Stettinius 
an.'1ounced that: 
The people oi.' the United Swtes are confident-, 
that- the A:::erican P..epublics ·.•ill join in ·.;1hatever 
cooperative measures r.ay be necessarJ to stamp 
out utterly ever-J vestige of Nazi influence in 
this hemisphere. That must be our unalterable 
purpose • ·~ • • 43 
Turning to the world security question, Stettinius examined 
the relationship between the international organization and the 
inter-American regional system. He declared that the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals would create a peace-keeping body to prevent 
aggression and remove the causes of ii'ars. Totally committed to 
the concept of a United Nations, he stressed the value of the forth-
corrri.ng San fran::isco Conference. This April, 1945 !:ieeting would 
utilize the Du.:lbarton Caks proposals to preven C. 7-hi:; .fu t.u.:.~e use of 
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lawless power politics. The Secretary also ackno;·1l·~dged that the 
i..'l1.ter-Ameri.can system should play an import.:mt role in tne postwar 
period .. He reminded the dele0crates too of the valui=! in L. ,..,t" at· - - •• 1::gr l.:ng 
it within the framework of the Unitzd Nations. Consequently, the 
stronger we can ma!<e the inter-American system in its own s·phere 
of activity, the stronger the world organization 1.dll be and 
vice versa.44 
The last section of Stettinius 1 s message concentrated on the 
economic worries of Ia.tin America. His ref8rence to the necessity 
of raising the standard of living of the rasses ~vas particularly 
appreciated and timely, since it hit the same key:i.ote as the pre-
ceding Padilla speech.45 He depicted the United States as wilJing 
to contribute its vast economic 7 industrial, and techrri.C'.ll resources 
to the improverr:ent of conditions within the herrri.spheric republics. 
Washington would propose and support measures for closer cooperation 
in public health, nutrition and food supply, labor, education, 
science, and transportation. The Secretary remarked that as his 
countriJ helped to soften the economic dislocations of the transi-
tion period, collaboration in economic and financial measures would 
. 46 
achieve the "rising standard of living we all seek.11 
In concluding bis address, Stettinius spoke of the possible 
historical significance of this inter-American conference. A 
realization of the objectives he just set forth might place the 
41+· foi9: .. , P• 6. 
45. Lock:·;ocd, Plenary Session ~12port, February 22, 19h5, p .. 3, 
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Chapul tepee talks among the "great historic •~1ilcs ton;.-.!s on ti1e road 
to lasting peace."47 The Secretar'J cabled Gre:<1 that ni,~ht. re-<=> , 
questing his reaction to the :Jpeech. He beli8ved th::t t the dele,:;a t.es 
appreciated this outline of r::aj or po in ts o.f United s w tes poll cy 
and the choice of the Hexico City Conference as the forum for as 
important a declaration by this Goverru:ient.48 Although there were 
then twenty points marked by applause, Stettinius observed that the 
names of Stalin and Churchill had not be~n well .received. No con-
crete assistance programs iv-ere revealed in the American policy 
statement, nor was Argent.i.n3 covered. Washington's chief spokesrr.an 
i·1as not willing to comprorri.ise on the Buenos Aires situation. 
Canri.lle M. Cianfarra of the New York Tir.:es noted that crystal-clear 
proof of all-out collaboration in keeping ;·ri th (err.ocratic principles 
would be needed before Argentina would be accepted into the com-
. ... f A . t· l+9 muru.~y o merican na ions. The SecretarJ's address however did 
show tt-...at Washington was receptive to I.a.tin American pleas for aid. 
Speaking after Stettinius, at the ple:n.arJ session Cuer'/O Rubio of 
Cuba praised the "solid political, humanistic message" of the 
50 United states delegate.. This positive comment reflected the 
general sentiment of the hemispheric representatives. 
47. 
48. 
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· During the early evening, the Secrewr:r• ::> .i'i:-;:; t r:-njor con-
ference speech was <igaJ.,.v1 in the limelight. At i3:.JO p .i-1., he 
participated in a radio broadcast over the Blt:.t! nct•wrk. This t:Jo:< 
the form of a dialogue between the zmnouncar, Bd Tomlinson and 
Stettinius. They opened the program by reviewing the initial pro-
ceedings of the Chapultepec taL~s. The SecretarJ then outlined 
again the aims of his afternoon address. Tomlinson asked questions 
about Yalta 7 which Stettinius tried to associ::i.te with the Mexico 
City Conference and the in tar-American sy3 t .. '-!m. The final broad-
cast rema r:'ks dealt with the Dumbarton Caks proposals and at tempts 
51 
to raise the world standard. of living .. 
Thus; the second day of the Chapultepec talks featured imper-
tant speech-making. li'oreign Mini::; t.er Padilla b.:J.d voiczd the La tin 
Ar.ierican desire for econoraic liberty. The southern republics looked 
to the United States for support in their struggle for technical 
and industrial independence. Ed:.zard Stet.t.inius had identified him-
self and the United States with their cause. His plenarJ session 
address had advocated peace, international security arrangements, 
and postwar cooperation in hemispheric problems. The American 
Secretary had reassured Iatin America of Washington•s dedication 
to the Good Neighbor Policy. With the milit...arJ, economic and social·· 
di t + .... o be.st;n. Stettiru.· us wired President P..oosevelt: scussions ye "'... . 
52 
"The conference is off to a good start .. 11 
51. Ibid •• P• 8. 
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CHAPTER III 
A CIDSE-UP ON PUBLIC RELATIONS MID TflS :roRLD 0~1.}ANIZ..\'l'ION 
FEBRUARY 23 7 19~5 
As the five conference corr.missions develooed committed oraa-
• D 
nizat.ions, Secretary Stettinius prepared the agenda of his world 
organization group and held his first Chapultcpdc press conference. 
Prior to these acti vi.ti~s, howev·~r., the chi~f Ar:!erican d~lega te 
began the day on the telephona with :·lashing ton~ Joseph Grew called 
hi:n to review the Fr:!nch sponsorship issua and his opening confer-
ence message. They agreed to issue the inv1tations to the san 
Francisco Conference on Tuesday, February 27 Hith or without France,. 
The Acting Secretary also congra cula ted Ste ttini t:.3 on his great 
job th~ d3.y before with the pl<.~n.ary s~ssion,. Grew con::side::-ed it 
"one of the finest, r.iost foreeful~ important st..J.te1aent.s that had 
1 
come out in the war." H~ infor:ned his bos3 that American news-
papers had given the message considerable prornL'1ence and space. 
The New York Times had carried a front page stor'J on it and had 
devoted three and one half columns to excerpts. The Washington 
~ regarded the speech as the "first review of American foreign 
2 
policy since the Yalta Conferance." The Phil:ldeluhia Inauirer 
used superlati•1es to describe it. An Inouirer editorial labeled 
it a rr.astarful address and stated: "~1r .. St~ttinius said the right 
things in the right pbces and in a tone of h~J.pf'ulrn!SS and rea.s-
2., ~ .. , p .. 6. 
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Suran.Ce r.n th.out 'oom'o· ast.ft3 u· l t\ L' \ l' 
"-'- ¥· .-.e .1.:: sou.vn~rn repu?J.....:.c::;, the J\;;ier-
ican press had welcomed Stettinius ts rerr.ar!\:s. 
At the daily 9:CO A.H. r.:eeting of th~ delegation, t..h~ Sec:ceta:r-y 
discussed the status of American resolutions. Up to th.i.;:; point, 
only two United States proposals had been submitted at. the confer-
ence. One dealt with the removal of censorship barriers and the 
other with the strengthening of the inter-American regional system. 
After Stettinius asked for cor..:ni ttec progress r~port3, Harley Not tar 
read the text of a possible resolution on Dumbarton Caks. The 
drafting of resolutions ·~:as b8in5 conducted smoothly e:<cept in the 
economic field. latin American an;dety over indust:dal and tech-
nical r...atters dictated a slow, cautious approach to economic 
proposals. Rockefeller infor;:icd the delegation that Ar;ierican reso-
lutions in this area nri.6ht not, rr.~et the Saturday :mbnd.s::;lon deaclline.4 
Eager to get his o·..m commission off the ground, the Secretary 
convened the world organization committee at noon. This body had 
the delicate task of relating the inter-American system to the 
proposed United Nations. Stettinius opened the meeting expressing 
confidence that the deliberations about to occur would prove as 
invaluable to the world of the future as had the results of the. 
Dumbarton Oaks talks.5 At this particular gathering, the delegates 
had to elect officers and establish guidelines for discussing rele-
3. stettinius, Calendar Not.as, Febrt.:arJ 26, 1945, p. 1, 
Box 285 1 Stettinius Papers~ 
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vant· issues. The Secretary invited nomi.na tions for the posi ti.ans 
of vice-chairman and cor.,rn:i.. ttee reporter. Ambassador Guillermo Belt 
of Cuba and Foreign Ministar Para-Perez of Venezuela were elected 
respectively to these posts. Intense interest in the regional sys-
tem's relationship to the world organization was reflected by the 
committee's immediate consideration of five reoolutions relating 
to integration. To avoid unnecessary debate, Stettin.i.us proposed 
a sub-commi.ttee to analyze the re$olutioru; and report its findings 
to the full. comr.rission. para-Perez was selected to head tha sub-
com:ni.ttee. This srraller body compiled all the Iatin American 
opinions on the United Nations and eventually produced the comrnis-
6 
sion's position paper on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In order 
for the Venezuelan Foreign Hinister' s group to sum:r.arize t.he world 
organization recommendations, it was important to know how far the 
United States would go in permitting s~estions. Stettinius as-
signed several top aides, especially Leo Pasvolsky, to protect 
American interests at these sub-committee meetings. Other American 
delegates assigned to Commission II included John Cabot, Hayden Raynor, 
Harley Notter, Senator Tom Connally, and Congressman Luther Jo.hnson.7 
While the Secretary's world organization group met, other 
committees were in session. Commission I on the war effort debated 
the question of jurisdiction. Unsure whether its interests covered 
just the war or also the transition period, it decided to seek the 
6.. Developr.:ents of February 2.3, 19L,5, P• 2, Box 285, Stet.tinius 
Pape.rs. 
7,. stettinius
7 
Calendar l'Iotes, February 2J, 1945, p .. 3, 
Box 285, Stettinius Paper3. 
,,.., 
-•.i.(-
advice of the conference steering committee. \·Ji tirin Commission TII 
on the strengthening of the inter-American systcc1, Gc.!'T·~ral uniqu'=! 
proposals were presented. The Uruguayan dell:!gJ. t.:ion ~l~ppor-ted a 
hemispheric security pact. Columbia al;;o sougbt some kind of Pan 
American non-aggression treaty. Raversing the a~ci~nt doctrine 
tbat the United States should be kept from intervening in any dis-
putes below the Rio Grande, the Colurnbian resolution asked for a 
general guarantee of all Aiiliffican boundaries against any aggressor 
8 
within or without the hemisphere. This meant that :Jasbington and 
its soutber·n neighbors would consider iJ.ny atta:;1pt against the terri-
torial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of an 
A • ' t n • • t •t lf' 9 
.nmer:t.can state as an ac 01 aggression aga:i.ns , :i. se $ Columbia's 
unprecedented request was destined to play a ~ajar role at the 
Hexico City Conf,~rence.. Unll~rn the intcr-Americnn study group, the 
economic comm:i. ttees did not produce any drama tic proposals. Com-
mission DJ met briefly and discussed what subjects would be proper 
for the Chapultepec talks to consider and iibat topics should be 
. 10 
held over for the Ju.'le technical conference in Washington. In 
the Commission V meet.ing, Peruvian Foreign Minister C..allagher sug-
gested that raw materials contracts with the United States be 
ll 
extended or renegotiated. 
11u · · · Paac"' Sough~ :\ t Par leJ'-." 8. James Eeston, .. emspneric ~ ,~ -.. , 
New York Times, February 21.i., 1945, p .. 1 .. 
9. Ibid., P~ 7,. 
10.. Telegram, stettinius to .Joseph Gr~~1r11 Februar-;,r 2J 1 1945, 
P• 3, Box 287: Stettinius Pap~rsp 
· of February 23: 1945r p .. 2, Box 2S5, ll. Develapr::enr.s 
Stettinius Papers. 
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· At 1:30 P .. N. at the Edificio l:::.peri.:il~ ;:)t,3t.ti'ci.us held hi::> 
first press conf~rence.. He called the :rieetlng to b~corne acquaintc..><l 
with representatives of the Herican press and t,;) review the activi-
t . f th A . d 1 • · 12 ies o · e ·men.can e egaw..on,. Always ::-ealizing the value of 
good public relations, the Secretary hoped to establish friendJ.y 
contacts among local journalists. He noted th.at the opening days 
of the conference bad brought satisfaction and encouragement to 
all people., Commenting on Nexican leadership, he st.a ted: 
In the splendid addresses of P!"esident Avil.'.1 
Gama.cha a.nd Dr • .Padilla we b..>ve hea:"'i n<'.!w and 
inspiring expres3ions of the ideals of friend-
ship and cooperation that have been t.ha tradition 
of the American Republics,, and which He now 
seek to t!"anslate into greater welf.:ire for all 
people.13 
After this introduction, he shifted to the central issues he 
wished to discuss,, llei tera ting one of the themes of his plenary 
session address, Stettinius stressed the value of the regional 
system in creating world peace. He observed that: 
Neither victory nor peace can be won without 
the full support of the American republics and 
the effective and continuing collaboration 
among ourselves and the rest of the world. 
That sacred obligation we must repeat and 
recognize here in Mexico City • • ,. • JJ+ 
The Secretary, in empr.asizing the new world's potential to improve 
the status of rnanld.nd, also acknowledged the importance o:f a United 
12. stettinius 7 Calendar ;Iotes, Feoruar;/ 23, 191+5 1 p ... 3, 
Bo;{ 285, Stetti11iiJS P3.pers. 
1.3.. stettin.ius, Press Conferznce Statement, februa.:r.1 23, l945, 
P• 1, Box 285, stetti:ti11s IJ.::ipers .. 
14. Ibid., p .. 2~ 
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Nations. As a strong advocate of the intern.:1t.ion3.l peace-keeping 
body, he sought regional integration ~nd declared: 
The United States Govarn.m~t believes t:,bat the 
stronger we can rralce the L'1ter-. .;meric:rn ~wst,'!m 
in its own sphere of activiti:'!s, the stronger 
the world org:.:mization will be ..... 15 
He revealed to reporters that the American delegation's first two 
Chapultepec resolutions had been drafted with the purpose of 
strengthening the inter-,Amcdc.."ln arr~1.ng8mcnt. The first proposal 
sought the free exchange of and access to infor;;;.-3. t.ion through the 
aoandon;nent of censorshl?• "If '.Ie J.re to have enlightened public 
opinion," Stettinius rer.arked, "infor:ration en current events and 
trends of thought should be readily available to the pu'olic .. 1116 
.According to Iati:n. ·American circles 7 this resolution 1·;as not C..."C-
pected to rr.eet opposition even r,:iough the rr.ajo.r.it,y of th.;;! southern 
• ·i·i. d liti 1 ". l7 'l" republics had stnct rm...!.l.~ry an po "'ca censorship.. _ne 
Secretary and bis staff had overlooked one fla·.i1 in their proposal. 
They had weakened the draft by not calling for the immediate aban-
donment of censorship. As a result, those rulers i.;ho utilized 
censorship to strengthen their autocratic gover:i.ments could get 
around the freedom of infor:ration concept. 
Stettinius next outlined the Ai1lerican recom.~endations to 
strengthen the regional system's administrative rr.achLJ.ery. Wash-
ington was attempting to buttress the Good Neighbor Policy. A 
15 .. _foid ... , p .. •) _., 
Ibid .. 1 P• 2 .. 
--
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possible secandar-J motive o.f tb~se proposal::; uight. l~::i.ve been to 
allay latin fears that the United s:.at3s ·,.;as becoming too preoccu-
pied with the world security organL:::.ation. 'foe J;:nerican dr-...:ii't 
suggested tr.at heor:Lspheric conferences be held at regular interval::> 
of four years to consider broad proble~~ of common i~terest.and 
that meetings of foreign mi.nisters be convened annually to resolve 
major problems of more immediate concern. It also sought to broaden 
the functions of the Pan A:::e.dcaa Union and creat~ an economic a~d 
social council u."lder the auspices of the Union's Governing Board. 
Finally, Stettinius's program called for the esta.bli::;hrn.ent. o.f .:U"1 
inter-American education.al and cultural co;nr;ri.ssion and further 
efforts to more effectively correlate the Tll.L.":lerous cxis ting inter-
A . . 18 men can agencies .. 
After completing llis forml statement, the Secretary held a 
short question and answer period. On t,~.,o pressing issues, Argentina 
and postwar economic planning, he refused to cor.unent, feeling any 
discussion of these r..atters premature. Eex:ican reporters ques-
tioned him about the United Nations and Security Council procedures. 
He replied that as soon as negotiations with France and China were 
completed, invitations would be issued and operations clarified. 
The SecretaT'J also revealed that he did not anticipa.te any serious 
obstacles in attempting to coordinate the goals of the inter-
1d . t• 19 American system with those of the wor_ orgamza ion .. Hoping to 
19. 
I 
Ibid .. , p .. o .. 
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s ........... eak with local r-eport,:i.r-:: ·t.'n~ follo•,.rJ.·~0~ •·,·e.:>k-. ·.~ r,-' d c· - - - - - .. -~ ...... • v , z.,; .. ~ .. ~ue ·'-'::e press 
conference around 3: 00 p .H. 20 
Throughout the latter part of th~ afternoon, Stcr,tinius had a 
few appointraents Ni th magazine cor!'espondents. He also completed 
arrai.'1.ger:lents to reside at a count!"'J estate near Cuernavaca ·for the 
weekend. The 5 :JO plenax-.f sassion i·as his last conference meeting 
of the week. Although not as dramatic a meeting for him as the 
preceding day, the 3ecreta.ry still r;ade a significant contribution 
to the session. He presented a message of ;;re.::ting from President 
Roosevelt. The American chief executive declared that: 
The assembling of the Conference of American 
F.epublics on the Probler.is of v:ar and Peace 
move me to send cordi::i.l salutJ.tions to you 
and r;iy felicitations to the Govzrm;cnt 3.nd 
people of M~xico as hosts to this sif~'1ificant 
meeting. Hill you ple<i~e co,r.r.n.w.i~tc to the 
del3gates r.1y greetings a:-id confident antici-
pation o.f notable accor.iplish:;ient. 
Since the days of their independence, the 
American Republics have t.irel~ssly explored 
ever<J pathway to human freedom, justice and 
interr.ational well-being and today the cowr..on 
men of all oeace-loving nations look to them 
and you for- light on the arduous road to world 
peace, secu..."'"ity, and a higher level of economic 
life. 21 · 
Another noteworthy item at the session was a Peruvian delegate's 
appeal for the establishJnent of an international court of justice 
in association wi. th the D·mnbarton Oaks proposals. A re pres en ta t.i ve 
l · .1.. d the ne"'d 1··or U:uted States m0 cb'"'ru· cal from Honduras a so C:t ue • - - ~ ......... 
20 .. Ibid.J D .. 5 .. 
- . 
;Jtct~ini.~1s, February 23 ~ 
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equipment and instruction in scientific r.iethods of agriculture, 
mining, commerce, and transportation.22 
Stettinius's day concluded with the reappearance of t.-10 nag-
ging issues. From Argentina came word that Juan Peron might succeed 
Farrell and that the Columbian delegation to the Mexico Cit.y 
Conference had been asked to pl.3:y "Godfather" to Argent:i.ne attempts 
at rehabilitation .. 23 The question of French sponsorship also still 
persisted,.. The Secretary recci·re<i c::~ c;;;iJ..egram frora President 
Roosevelt regarding the United Nations conference.. The chief execu-
tive left to Stettin.tus the final decision on delivery of the 
San Francisco invitations; but he acknowledged that March 1 was his 
preference.24 The Secretar-J still had to hear from the French Pro-
visional Government and so this iratter could not be 0ettled ye:;. 
Although the Buenos Aires and French sponsorship problems were 
unresolved, the chairman of the AmeriCJn deleg3.tion had had a pret,ty 
successful day. ti.is world organization corr~'ilittee was now function-
ing. The United States had submitted two resolutions which suggested 
Washington's strong interest in the plight of Latin America. Finally, 
Stettinius had established good rapport T;,ri th the local press. In 
reviewing the day's activities, he cabled Joseph Grew: 
I feel that the work of the com.'lti.t~ees got 
under way with dispatch. The com.'lD..ttees have 
now been set up, proced:ires ~efined, 2and I believe that the atmospnere is goodM 5 
22. stcttinii.:...s, CJ.lendar ffotesr Februar-J 23 1 191~5 ~ p .. L.., 
Box 285 7 Stettin:i.us Pap.;;rs .. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
Box 287, 
Ibid .. , 
-
p .. 5 .. 
r. 
Ibid., ..__,., o, .. 
--
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Relaxin.g at Cuernavaca for the 1.1eekecd, Stettinius left his 
capable assistant Nelson Hockefeller in cbarge of the i\merican 
delegation. The Secretary's r..apers do not reveal his reasons for 
withdrawi...'1.g fror;i. the center of confcrenct! ;.ictiv5 ... tics 7 but 3.gain 
key aides directed ~,iashingt::m ~ s policy rather than he.. Al though 
it was true that f8W negor,ia:-ions and no plenary ;;essions were 
scheduled du.."":Lng these t· .. 10 days, Stettinius, the 3taunch adyocate 
of the United Nationsr did miss a meeting of his own Corn:nission II 
on the world organization. His only official acti vi tics on Saturday 
c1~ntered arou."1d bis participation in an e·1ening radio broadcast; 
on Sunday, he concentrated on solving the French ~ponsorship 
problem. 
On Saturday, the American delegation studied the Columbian 
proposal for a non-aggression pact. The goals of this resolution 
included the consideration of any attempt against the -territorial 
integrity, sovereignty, or poli.tical independence of a.~ American 
state as an act of aggression against oneself. Another provision 
called for constiltation with each nation and agreement. on measures 
deemed necessar'J to deal with any case oi' aggression or with any 
state planning aggressive action. A third clause reco:-:-"'1endad t.he 
following measures be taken ag3.iz-1st ail aggressor: r-3eall of 
'"a-'-; ~r""" diploma tic repres9n'"'" ..,_ ~...,, Gev~ra.:ice of consul::ir 2.nd diplorr.atic 
relations, 
:forces to 
-5J- !EU£"'"' mmeue1ts1&1aaua;; 
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1 . 1 repe, af"fiZ-r>eS"'"On. Gen°ral n ' • l d ' + ' 
- o.._.- ..,.._ . • ~ l~lllOl.C.K re3. :1 3W._e:nent from t:-ie joint 
chiefs of staff approv:Lng the Colwnbian I=<J.Ct. ;-;ince i:, '.·iOuli cor..:::; U-
tute a regional agreement that c::>uld be built into the 1-iorld 
2 
security system. He went on to point out tlJ..'lt the world organi-
zation nright or rrri..ght not succeed and if it did not, the solidarity 
of the Americas ivas es sen t.ial to the de.f cnse of the United States .3 
After listening to the r.rili tarJ aspects of thi3 non-aggression 
treaty, Pasvolsky reca.:·ked that its l'S-13. lions.hi. I> to t,~1e wor l:l organ-
ization from econoirrl.c and political points of vie~1 \·1as more 
compl.ica.ted.. Rockefoller suz,gested !:.bat Embick study tbis matter-
further and discuss it \-tlth the Secretary early t~e following wee!< .. 
At this point the State Depart::nent. person..'1al decid.:!d to seek 
Uruguayan support of the Columbian proposal bec~1use resolutions 
from both these cou.1.tries were quite ~i!rri.lnr. A lrny question 3.rose 
in reference to the security pacts i1hether the United States 
could take immediate action in the event o.f Argentine aggression 
against a neighbor. Pasvols~.r noted tr.at paragraph .five of the 
Moscow Declaration made it nnndatory that the United States consult 
with the signatory powers before taking r.ri.litarJ action. But 
General Ernbick interpreted this passage as relating to only the. 
present w·dr. 4 The issue was temporarily shelved after both Embick 
1. 
Ne~-1 York 
2. 
Box 285, 
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and Pasvolsky agreed that the Columbian security pact might re-
quire the ratification of the Senate .. 5 
Turning to other war measures, the Americ:m diploma ts agreed 
to support the creation of a permanent inter-American Defense Board. 
This Nerican proposal sought to build the rrachinery for unified 
milita!"J action against aggression from inside or outside the hernis-
phere. A body composed of representa.tives from the various general 
staffs would draft joint defcn.:::e plans. Defor:.;; the AmericJ.n delo-
ga tion adjourned, Rocke.feller revlewed the activities of the 
conference. He observed that the press had treated the sessions 
favorably. He reported, however, that cer~in Argentines were 
attempting to destroy the solidarity created by the Chapultepec 
6 
talks but. were ma.king no headway. 
Only Commission I on the war effort nnd Cor..mission II on the 
1.·mrld organization met on Sa tur::iay. The forr.:er convened only briefly 
to set up its sub-committees. The latter assembled to receive the 
progress report from Para-Perez's study group on Latin American 
attitudes toward the United Nations. The Foreign Minister of 
Venezuela suggested that his group compile a minimum rather than 
a ma..."Ci.mtL~ statement of views concerning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
from each country and produce one large sumrr.ar'J. Dr. Salaya of 
Cuba supported this motion. He indicated that a series of speeches 
0 :';.,.,; 0 ns on the world organization would waste reflecting -various ~.......,_ 
5. 
Box. 285, 
1 · ~r0 te~ Fe'.:lruar.y 2!+. 1%.5, p .. 4: Stettirri.us, Ca enaar l• " .:.>r , 
StettiniUS Pap~rs. 
6 .. Ibid,., P• 5· 
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the .commission's ti ....... e .. 7 T'1us i· n '-h,,. ·1' ., c-. · · · · • · 
... • , .. i... •• " '· OSf:nce ~.ll •. 1v\.!\,i;J.n1.us, ·cne 
corr .. rnission decided to allow a study group to clo r::oat ·.if :ne dr.::i.ft.ing 
of the United Nations resolution. 
!fr~li"! the Ame.,..;can d~lP.gation "nci th;:- •· · · · 
.rHJ.. - ..... • - - "" - 1.,,.;o cornmLJ:.>l.ons were in 
session in Hexico City, the Secretary rested at Cuerr1avaca, awaiting 
his 8:00 P.H. address on the NBC radio network. 'l'his ::;peech was 
indicative of Stettinius' s desire to r0sto:re t.l1e presti3e of the 
State Department. Odginat.ing in ~·ia:::;rungton, D. c., t.he broad-
cast was the first in a series of six ~'1eekJ..y programs on the creation 
8 
of a ~'lorld peace. Dean Acheson and Arr::hibald ~·'.3.cLli~h were to 
participate in the broadc.?.st from the United States capitol. The 
top American diplorrats Here attempting through thest! progracrs to 
ckrify to the public their role in tcrrrri.r:.:rting the hostilities a:td 
stabilizing the postwar world .. 
The final text of Stettinius's r:lessage represented :Jeveral 
attempts by Foreign Service personnel to obtain a consansus on the 
rr..atter. Technical Expert Wilder Foote composed the first draft. 
This was cabled to 1i'iashington on Thursday evening with Stettinius's 
request that Assistant SecretarJ MacLeish try his hand at preparing 
thi di ".f .L 9 some • ng I eren~. Hhen no new draft bad been received by . 
St t .L • ru· us ts s+ "ff 0f':fOt '-.·Jashin0aton on the pn' 011~ Fri.day afternoon, e .,i """ _ 
and l'i...ad the Nacleish text dictated to them. E:J.yden naynor discussed 
8.. Stett.inius, Cale:::dar ?Iotes 1 Fe:')r"WJ.r;;.' 2L 1 l<)l,.), n. 2 7 
Box 285, Stettinius Papers .. 
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this· new draft with Pasvolsky 7 Gn~en l!::ick~o:-tl~ ( ~1:-.! d3loga tio;1h> 
legal advisor) and Michael !.JcDerr..ott (the c.:-::!ss :s•)crot:lrJ). 'fh.Jy 
all agreed that Nacleish' s work did not cont..J.i:t .:mough subs t.ance 
and 't , ta •t..i~d ta' . 10 wna suos nee i uJ.. con in was inacc•.i.ra te. It was al30 
inappropriate with its very li terarJ style. 11 
Under the leadership of Pasvolsky, this :Jmall group of ad-
visors wrote their own version of the speech. They presented it 
to the Secretary prior to his departure for Cuer:IBvaca. He read 
it aloud to those who happened to be in the hotel room (I?aynor, 
Foote, Ma.jar T-Json, and Ilobert L.ynch). Th~y all felt tbat this 
new draft was an improveraent over the r·IacLeish text, but. one or 
12 
two comments indicated tta t it dragged. Foote, ho.,.ever, liked 
the speech from Washington and hoped it i·;ould be ut.ili:::.<:!d w:i. th the 
inaccu...""3.cies corrected.. Stet,tiniu.s finally decided to r..ave fu3-
vol3ky a..~d his group revise th~ir draft that Friday evening, 
telephone it to Washington, and deliver it to C uerna va ca on 
turd.a . 13 Sa y morm..ng. 
Pasvolsky, F..a.ynor, and McDermott worked on the speech u.."ltil 
1:00 A.M. After completing their editorial project, P..a.ynor for-
warded the latest composition to Washington. At 6:45 A.M., MacLeish 
telephoned from the State Department highly excited, telling R:lynor 
14 
that the new version was "perfectly dreadful. 11 Trfi.ng to calm 
10. ~· 
11. ~-
12. Ibid. 
-
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the Assistant Secretary, Ibynor expl.1:Lned tba t th:.:: :; pt!c')Ch 
basically on the Dumbar t.on Oaks proposal:.3 and that l:e ·,re.ls oblig3. ted 
to allow the world security <:!.dvi:.wrs to revise t.he ~·;ashl!!gton t 0 xt 
as ·t..h.~y so a'c=!C:].·r- 0 • ..--l. rrll~e m , • l ~ ... ... ll - -~ - --· lH E'!CGIUCa ~cperv evanvlW. y ;.igreed to 
present both drafts to Stettinius, ~vit.h an cxpl::l.nat:i.on of Maclcish's 
views.15 
At breakfast P.aynor and i-lcDer:nott revie;..red the situation and 
decided to go back to the i·!acL:Ji.3~'1 Jdd.:-::!ss 1 ·.mr'.-:i.:1g to use as much 
" . ... . bl 1.' ~ h . . 16 OI lv as pOSSl e, correcving l~.e inaccur3.cies. They cello.borated 
i·li th Hackworth and Technical Expert Harry Frantz to produce a fourth 
version of the Sa tu..-i-d.ay night speech. This fir.al combined form was 
sent to Cuernavaca around l:JO P.H. 17 After three clays of ~-1riting 
and editing, the Secretary's Dum:)3.rton Caks t3lk was ready to be 
given. 
Unknown to Stettinius as he spoke over HOC radio, a breakdown 
in broadcasting facilities permi tt~d his voice to be heard only 
west of the Mississippi. Archibald HacLeish, reacting quickly in 
·washington, read the revised draft to the other half of the 
United states. The Se ere tary opened the program by noting that it 
was appropriate to initiate a series of broadcasts on the building 
" M • 0 c;ty He observed th.at: 
of the peace 1rom l'lexic ..... • 
15. 
16 .. 
17. 
Delegates from the American Republics are 
assembled in this beau~iful cl ~y o~· He;cico to 
St,...8 )'1,,. .... ,,"'n frate:r:-:al tics deve.Lopeu through r..any .... J.""'C:) t..i:~·-
~Ibiq~ 
Ibid .. 
-
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decades and to ir:iprove the intcr--A:;:iedc3.n 
system of relations. They are e:1.;;J.g~d in tha 
serious business of considering l1ow t!<eir 
friendship and wity of purpose r:<J.y ;Jest con-
tribute to a world for peace, s~curity, r.tnd 
a better way of life.18 
Stettinius went on to stress the hardiness and determination 
of the new world. Ar.iericans were accustomed to unprecadented work 
and would not listen to the counsels of despair. They had tamed 
a i::ri.ld land and: 
fostered a spirit of neighborlindss, i·1hich :Ls 
indispensable to a new society of r..a.nkind. '.Ie 
P..av·e good r:~ason, therefore, ~car auoro.:ichln~ th·e 
grea t~s t labor of human history (a· ~·1orld pe~ce 
enforced by the United Nations) Hi th such high 
hopes, with such unshakeable deterrnina lion. He 
have not li2tened in the past and ·.-1e '.~ill not 
listen in the future to voices of frustration 
and defoa t 'ilhl ch tell us vie cJ.nnot rlo what •~e 
perceive ue must do .. 19 
As the Secreta:r;; reveal~d the will of the :fostern hemisphere to 
build a new peace, he also reviewed the ef.forts of the "Big Three" 
to create a world security organization. He acknowledged the value 
of the upcoming san Francisco Conference in building the machinerJ 
for an international body. To offset an.y resentment that lesser 
powers might hold toward the "Big Three11 for their planning the 
United Nations by themselves, Stettinius played up the equality of 
+· na::.:i..ons. He remarked that: 
The sovereign equali t;r o.f nations large and 
sir.all is a b.asic princi9le under}.:ring the (Dumbarton 
Oaks) proposals. T~ose ~rop?~als n? t o~~y embrac~ 
_.. ·np so•r"'r"'i ""D eGJ.1al.J..tTr 01 na t..ions, out vne.'f also in-v~ - -- ~ o .... " 
18. st0 tti:-iiu:1 1 }1'1.dio Spc~echr F::!orWJ.Y;;l 2l+, 194.5, pp .. 1-2, 
Box 285, Stettinius ?aperz. 
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te.n.d that the po:.,.er of all r:.a tit.::n3 .:>i:.:ill b~ 
used in the ~Bteres ~,3 of ~iorld !Jc.'1C~ 7 ~;C:!curi ty, 
and freedom,. 
While appeasing the smaller nat .. i..ons, the s~cretary cont.inued to 
skirt the issue o.f, votinz procedures in the Security Council. He 
hinted that these procedures recognized the b;o essential clement3 
of u.."1.ity of action and equality of sovereignty. Yet five days after 
his arrival, the French sponsorship problem still prevented him 
from revealing all the opera t.ions of the council. 
Stettinius closed his address by restating the purpose of the 
broadcast series.. He hoped the programs stir::ulated the Ameci.can 
people to study, discuss, and reflect on the proposals to create 
the United Nations. All the facts wust be placed before the country 
in accordance with the democratic rr:ethods of freedom of thought, 
speech, and action.. The Secretary tied the people's right to knm1 
to J:iis censorship resolution. In his final staterr.ent, he declared 
that: 
Here in Me;dco City, we J:i.ave sought to support 
that democratic oethod by offering a resolution ~-1hich 
declares the right of people to have free access 
to ini'orma tion. In this way, and only in this way, 
will truth,_ the enemy of .tyranny, assert itself' 
for the freedom and security of rrankind.21 
stettini.us's radio speech indirectly referred to one of the 
most persistent problems he encountered during his first ;ieek in 
• F h "' onsorshio qu0 stion r..,tin 1:\.memcan dele-Merico City, tne renc ;,p • - • .. ,,._;.;. ........ _ 
gates at the Chapu.ltepec tal..'L:s were a.rnd.ous to know the operations 
?o T ' . ct' 
·-· . ..::-~· 
21 .. T •. rl ~ .. , p .. J .. 
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of the Secu....""'i.ty Council. ~·ii thout a F:rl!nch co:::m:i. t!.-.ent oa ::;ponsor-
ship, the Secretary could not reveal this :i..n.for-rntion.. He was 
bound by a Yalta agreement not to divul 3e any c.lata relat:i.:ig to t.l~e 
council u...-1til sponsorship had been established nnd invitations 
issued. 
Just before delivering his address on NEC radio, StettLl'li.us 
had reason to believe that the sponsorship problem was almost re-
solved. That Saturday r::orning 7 Joseph Grew had telephoned Hayden 
Raynor in :Mexico City. The Acting Secretar<J relayed a telephone 
conversation batween Assistant Secretar:r James Du..'1.i.'1 and the American 
Ambassador to Paris, Jefferson Caffery.. Dunn :•as inl'ormed tr.at 
France iwuld accept the invitation to o.tt.end ::ind al30 to sponsor 
the San Francisco Conference.. Ho~·1ever, de Gaulle rs GOVer:ncent 
wished to rrake a reservation to be aLlo;..;ed to present. amendments 
1 f ., t.i . Sa . . 22 to the Dumbarton Oaks proposa s . or consiaera ,on in n Francisco. 
Grew felt this was a strange request. because everJ countr-J had the 
ri~ht to submit amendments. In the interest of good relations, he 
0 
and Dunn believed the United States shoUld accept the reservation, 
but before doing so, notify the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and 
China.23 After bis conYersation with Grew, Raynor phoned Cuerna-
vaca to acquaint Stettinius ~Tith the most recent developments in 
the sponsorship rr.atter. The Secretary apprond of the State Depart-
But '"'O Pasvolsk;7, his top United l'fations adYisor. ment responses. ....., , 
22. stettinius, Cal-endar Uor,es 7 F,~brtll:r-y 24.r 1945, p. 3, 
Box 285
7 
St~t.t,i:r.i:.;s P.:i.p~;:s .. 
23 .. Ibid. 
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was .not comfortable with the reservat.ion.. .. f lt :10 e , t!-:a L the psycho-
logical effect would be to open up the ~3.J.n F:-::i.nci.::>co Gon.f'3rence to 
too rrany additional ~rnggestions and r:iake the .;;r~ation or the world 
organization more difficult.24 
FEBRUARY 25, 1945 
On Stmday, the twenty-fifth, hopes for French sponsor:Jh.ip 
changed abruptly.. Arou.Iid noon, Dunn phoned Pas v-olsky to report 
tr.at 1.~ritten confirmtion fi..ad been received from Paris. But the 
situation was not the same as depicted in the earlier conver::>ation 
with Caffery. Apparently the French ~·anted their arr.enct.-;:en ts pL1.ced 
on the table at San Francisco on an equal basis ... nth the Dumbarton. 
Oaks proposals.,25 The "Big Three" had outlined the world security 
organization gradually through a series of talks and Gtrategy 
sessions. Now de Ga1ille:s regir:ie felt it could si:aply create its 
own conception of the United Nations. Grew and Durm recomr.:ended 
that the reservation not be accepted on tnese terms. PasvolskiJ 
for.varded this news to Cuernavaca and Stettinius approved of 
. 26 
Hashi:ngton•s suggestions. 
The state Department cabled the latest developments on French 
sponsorship to Moscow, London, and Chungki:ig. ~·la.shington also 
informed its allies about its refusal of the reservation. Since 
further negotiations with Paris would greatly delay the issuance 
2 Ea~·dan P..ay:;:ior7 Frsnch Sponsor::>hi.p 4. .:J •.•• 
19.45, p .. 2, Box 285, steGt.lIU'.lS Papers .. 
26. roid. 
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of the san Francisco invitations~ (.he Secr~ta.::-;/ reluctantly G.ecid0d 
')7 
to send them out by Varch l.'-
;·iith the French problem still botharing hi:n,'.:itettiniU3 asked 
Raynor late in the afternoon to see if he could devi::;e ::;ome formul:l 
by which to reduce the consultation period with Paris. The· chief 
filr&ri.can delegate even suggested sending a personal note to de Gaulle.28 
The Technical Expert arranged a 6:30 P.N. meeting in !·1e:d.co City 
id th Pasvolsky, HcDermott, and riotter to study the whole problem. 2 9 
This strategy session produced no fo:r:nul.:i. for a quick solution 
to the sponsorship dilerr..rra, The Secretar;1 s advisors, however, did 
support his idea of a private cable to Pari3. Stettinius d..""ai'ted 
a note but never sent it. The po t.anti:il correspondence ::; ta ted. that: 
I p·~rso:nally ~;oUld deeply ~·rnlcom-3 the accepwncE;; 
by the French of sponsorship since thi3, ~Y dear 
G 1 "'d . ' . . c• -o s.l.. . .I.. on n t.' enera. 1 i<-Ot.w.. oe a <3rumng .. e .. , n vra vl or · ne re-
a:::;sumot.ion by .France of her place as a great ~o·..;er 
and of her disposition t.o act in full cooperation 
with the other g::-ea t powers in carr;:Lng out the 
high respansibili ties which repose in nations of 
that rank and iniluence.30 
Around midnight, Grew wired the -Secretary from ;·Iashington. He 
reViewed the state Department's responses to the day's events.3
1 
As it stood, the San Francisco invitations would be issued on 
P.arch 1. Hopefully, tbe position would be explained fully and 
··--.. 
27. stettinius, Calend3r rlotes, Feb.n.iar:f 25, 1945, p .. 1 7 
Box 285, StettiIJ.ius Papers. 
28,. Ibid .. 
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syr:ipathetically by the Ar;;erican t;overnrr.ent. !Ii th the po::;sibilit,y 
of French sponsorsliip now almost completely destroyed, Stettinius 
was confronted by a new problem - how to prevent other na !:.ions 
from im:i.. ta ting Paris 1 ex.ample. 1'hus, hi::> first ueekend in r-Iaxico 
City ended on an unr.appy note. 
These two days, the twenty-fourth and tha t:~enty-fifth, re-
flected the Secretar-.r's ability as a caret.:iker diplorr.'.lt. ~·O.thdra·11n 
from the focal.. point. of wr~iga a.i.':r.'ai.r3, he bad per:ni t bd hi3 aides 
to coordi:r.ate American policy.. Indeed he r.ad :r.ade the final deci-
sion on-m .. cuiy issue;:;, but the ideas and suggestions for policy 
responses bad not originated with him but with hi::; staff. In 
Mexico City, Rockefeller had directed the Ar.ierica:i delegation and 
its support of the Columbian ni:m--rtggression r,act.. MacLeish had 
been instrumental in. drafting the radio o.ddre3s. Grew and Dun."1. 
bad recommended the refusal of the French reservation. P.aynor, 
Pasvolsky, and McDermott .b.ad rrade vital cont!'ibutions to several 
policy issues, from the NEC program to the· San Francisco invi ta-
tions. Edward Stettinius, the capable manager of men, had employed 
his advisors well. 
FEBRlJARY 26, 1945 
Upon his retu..""'Il from Cuernavaca on Hond.ay morning Februar.r 26 1 
the French sponsorship pz-oblem still plagued the Secretary. After 
meeting his wife's plane at the i·!exico City airport, he went to 
the Hotel Gene·1e and telep?1on~d ,rar::es Dvr ... --i at, the State Department. 
They reviewed the controversy with the ?ro-:risional C-ovcrnr.:ent 5..n 
Paris. Dunn advised 3gainst s::~:,.-t::.ng a personal note to de Gaulle 
-6.5-
and ·emphasized the seriousness of the sitU.3.tion.. Slc.ri:.t.iP-1.us Loo 
ims fearful of the implications arising from French o.~ri.~sion as .'..\ 
sponsor. He speculated about how r..any countries would be cli:3-
posed to fallow the Parisian r..odel. The Assistant Sucre tarJ bell cved 
that France .had taken the position of not :·ranting to support the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Consequently, he noted: "that rrakes our 
decision clear-cut, that there is no possibility we can accept her 
.... . ' . J2 
as a sponsor on ... r.w..s oasJ..3 •11 Before ecdi!"lg the conversation, 
the chief American diplomt suggested tr.at a .final alternative might 
e;dst.. They could ask Anthony Eden, the Bri tL;h ?oreign Secret.:1::-J, 
to intervene and expedite the whole rr.atter. This bst id.e..a was 
t .ly· ' 1 d 33 emporari sne ve • 
After his phone callp Stettinius ::;ent a cable to .Joseph Grew 
outlining the procBdur~~s for r:akin,5 a .simultaneous cmnouncer:ient of 
the San Francisco invitations.. At noon on r~rch 1, Grew was to 
publicize that the United states government was transrnitti:ig invi-
tations to the United Nations conference on behall" of the sponsoring 
powers. At the sarne time, the Secretar; would issue a ~ratement. 
from Mexico City, commenting on the Security Council voting powers 
agreed to at Yalta. This interpretative remark from the Chapuitepec 
talks was to be considered as just a news release from a diplomat 
. . 34 
on an official rm.ssion. 
32. Statti::tl'..15, C:ilec.d.:1.c ~Tot,~s, F~'oruary 26 7 19l;.5, p. 4 1 
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sponsorship problem. J\ ri1essa.::e ~eri.~. by ~"'""'1...; ~· 11 n ~ \. d ~, - w "'··'-' _c-.... ,,;:ica.::;:;;.:i · or 
James Uir.ant from london described a r.:eeti11g bt.!b•een Sir Ale.:c C::idogG.n 
and French officials.. In answer to the French ins.is tence on amend-
men ts to the proposals, Cadogan had expbined that the text: as it 
stood afforded an ample opportunity for submi. tting further recom-
mendations durir..g the forthcoming conference.35 Georges Bidault 
of the Provisional Government stated, however, that a triple in'li-
tation had been received in Paris. The three sections included 
a request l) to participate in the conference, 2) to join in the 
sponsorship of the conference, and 3) to partake in prelir.ti.nary 
consultations to establish a trusteeship !>ystem. The first poln!", 
was satisfactor/ to the French; but as for the ::;ecor.d, ilicbult. 
remarked that the "Big Tnr.,;e" h::id i"orr::ulated the Dur:1barton Oaks 
plan. wi. thout mentionLng or accepting Paris 1 desire for amendr.'.ents .36 
Therefore,. the de Gaulle regime could not accept sponsorship of the 
San Francisco Conference. 
Between his conversation with Dunn and the arrival of the 
Winant dispatch, Stettinius attended a 10:30 A.M. session of the 
conference steering committee. This meeting was highlighted by 
talk of breaking off relations :dth Spain .. Dr. Padilla was critical 
of the pressure ex3rted by certain groups to pass a conference 
"• ~ 1 5 .:.ocnm0 He stated tb~t the Me~...;co resolution isola 'w..ng l' .1.a.nco ... "o-'' ~ • ........ 
35.. Telegro:Jr StettL"liU3 to ,Joseph Gre':Tr 
n ') Bo""" 28~. Stettinius ;).:ipers • • • -1 ..... /. . 
36. stettinius
1 
Co.l~nd.:1.r Notes, Fe'orJ::i:-,y 26, 19li5, :p .. 5, 
Box 2S5. Stetticius ?aper5. 
1945, 
-67-
City Conference should not deal with r..at7.ers which do not involve 
the continent..37 An Urllbruayan delegate o.rose o.nd ~!1nounced his 
support of a proposal walcoming the establishme!1.t of a democratic 
system L"l Spain.. He decla;-~d that Spanish affairs were of interest 
to the American republics because of their origins and Madrid's 
proximity to the war zone.38 A representative from Peru challenged 
this argument. He supported Padill:J.'s case against a Spanish reso-
lution and rer.arked tr.at the Cha.pultepec tall(s did not have the 
right to dictate a nation's political philosoph,y. The Uruguayan 
delegate replied tr.at after the exp.;u'ience of this 1.,;ar, it would 
not be possible to perr:Ii.t the existence of a Nazi or Fascist gov-
ernment anywhere. For tris reason, he wanted a !3tatement issued 
by the conference stressing the desirability of a dewncracy in 
Spain.39 As the ;;;eetin.g progressedt diplomts from Honduras, Peru.1 
Panaw.a, and other Latin American stat.es voiced their support of 
Padilla 1 s position. Against this stiff opposition, the Uruguayan 
representative requested his suggestion be withdrawn from con-
sideration. The Secretary did not reveal his position on the 
Spanish resolution, as he abstained from the debate. 
In the early afternoon, the Auerican steering committee as-
sembled at the P..efor:ra Hotel to brief Stettinius on the importance 
of hemispheric solidarity and the Colurnbia."l non-aggression pact. 
37,. Ibid. 
-
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General Embick, Dr. Pasvolslw, and Judge Hackworth e:np!~.asized the 
necessity of inter-American cooperJ.tion from poll ti cal, cconorrd.c 1 
d "lit.a . -'- ~ . 40 an nu. ry poin..s o!. view .. A discussion ensued as to how to 
make the Columbian security proposal ir.unediately applicable w-lthout 
be~ng hampered by congressional debate and ratification. ftdol! Berle, 
the American Ambassador to Brazil, was asked by the Secretary to 
aid Pasvolsky and Hackworth in resolving this matter. Nelson 
Rockefeller then reviewed the status of con.f erence resolutions. 
He observed that seventy-four proposals r.ad already been submitted. 
The United States itself was planniP.g to L"1troduce ten resolutions 
on various topics from censorshi.p to economics. Hockefeller also 
announced that Assist..-int Secreta~J Clayton :~ould be ready to issue 
the next day a stater;;ent of principles underlying inter-.!\merican 
. . 41 economic relaw.ons.. Ll.ke Stettiniusts first plena~J ::>ession 
address, I.atin American interest in this speech was mounting. 
Long after the Farrell regime passed away and the Argentine prob-
lem was forgotten, and years after the debate aver voting 
procedures in the Security Council was resolved or shelved, the 
southern republics feared that their poverty would remain.42 They 
hoped t:b..at the upcoming Clayton message would reassure them of· 
Washington's· economic cooperation and financial support. 
Throughout the day7 the conference committees resumed their 
work after the weekend break. The SecretarJ' s Coimnission II on 
40. 
41. 
42. 
Box 2851 
Ibid. 
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the world organization however did not plan to r.ieet until Harch 1, 
the day the San Francisco invitations were to be issued. This 
postponement of commission hearings gave Para-Perez's sub-committee 
time to collect and summarize la tin American views on the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals~ 43 The delay also gave Stettinius the opportunity 
to study developments within other study groups. Harley Nottert 
John Lockwoodt Joseph Jolmson,_ and Dudley Bonsal were among the 
~any Foreign Service personnel who provided the Secretary with 
progress reports from other committees. For example, the chief 
.American delegate was informed by I.ock1•ood that Commission I 
on the war effort was working on several resolutions. Arr~ng pro-
posals tba t had been drafted were the United States recoaunend.'-ltion 
on eliminating the remaining sotirces of subv-ersi ve influence within 
the hemisphere. 1Uso u.."lder consideration 1·1as a resolution to place 
arnaments production directly under the control of each national 
government. In Commission III,discussion centered around Washington's 
suggestions for strengthening the inter-American system. Senor 
Nieto del Rio of Chile felt that the American idea to hold annual 
meetings of the foreign.ministers was too cwnbersomet expensive, 
and urmecessary. 44 Other delegates like Garcia Salazar of Peru. 
agreed with this. Another recommendation to buttress the regional 
arrangement, expanding the political functions of the Pan American 
Governing Board, was also criticized. These negative attitudes 
113 .. James Reston, ".L-1tin American Needs Dominate Conferenczr 
11 
New Yo6: ~, Fab!'llary 25, 1945, P~ 
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though, dealt with only minor provi3ions of the Co;nmi.ssion III reso-
lutions. 
Like the weekend activities, the t"Wenty-sixth found Stettinius 
concentrat; ng much of his tima and energy on the French sponsorship 
issue,, Devoted to the United Nations cause, he wanted the .San Fran-
cisco Conference to successfully establish the machinery for preserving 
world peace. Within the Chapultepec sessions, the proceed.L"l.gs were 
moving along smoothly.. The A;na:ric.:m resolutions had not really been 
hindered. The Secreta:rJ had a cordial relationship with the press .. 
His first conference speech and radio broadcast had br:!en well-
recei ved. But the Hexico City Conference 1-Jas now at a critical 
juncture. Post•~ar economic plar..ning had bean delayed as long as 
possible. Latin Americans were anxious to hear of concrete technical 
aid and development programs from the United States. Tne Stettinius 
plenary session address had been partially reassuring, but now the 
herrd.spheric delegates wanted to hear economic expert William Clayton• s 
statement of specific projects. 
CHAPT~R V 
ECONmuc ISSlJtt:S, DUMBARTON OAKS PRJFOSAIS ;.:rn 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RESOLUTIONS 
FEBRUARY 27, 1945 
By the middle of the second week, proceedings at the Cb.apul-
tepec talks were in high-gear. The drafting and refi..'1.ing of 
resolutions filled the time span between the Clayton address and 
the issuance of the San Francis co inn ta tions. Like the other 
delegates, Stettinius responded to the conference's fast pace by 
adhering to a full schedule. Pressure on him mounted as the day 
to discuss the Security Cotmcil voting procedures approached.. New 
issues joined the U>'U'esolved French sponsorship problem to increase 
the Secretary's burden. He had to ~~ld resolut.:Lons to fit A~erican 
foreign policy.. Proposals like the herrd.spheric security pact r.ad 
to be adjusted in order to r..ake it immediately applicable to the 
United States. He also had to coordinate the activities of the 
American delegation, keep Hashington informed, and attend various 
press conferences and plenary sessions. 
Although stettinius directed most of his attention on the 
twenty-seventh to events surrounding the econonti..c speech of WilJiam 
Clayton, the recurring headache of French sponsorship demanded his 
interest in the morning. Du..ring an early telephone conversation 
with James Dunn, the Secret..'lry decided to contact A..rithony Eden 
about possible British intervention in the sponsorship affair. 
When reached in London, Eden ~;as surp.1..:..sed to hear o.f the de Gaulle 
1 · h<>ck be San l"rancisco invitations.. He government• s refusa to ~ ..... · 
·-71;_ 
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sympathized with Stettinius's delic:lt.e tas!{ of rcgubting the 
curiosity of eighteen la tin Arilerican foreigr1 mini~ters. .2den prom-
ised to take the matter up immediately o.nd do everyt.hlng in his 
power to obtain a favorable decision.1 To give London a chance to 
negotiate with the French, Stettinius sent out a circular telegram 
in the afternoon, ordering the chiefs of missions to delay releas-
ing the invitations. In the meantime,he received a cable from Grew 
which suggested the rationala behind Paris• position.. The Act.i...""lg 
Secretary agreed with a Neli York Times article that de GauJ.J.e could 
not accept sponsorship because he felt that 1) amendments were 
necessary to rr.ake the Dumbarton Oaks proposals compatible T:1i th a 
Soviet-French alliance and 2) the prior approval of the Secu.."'ity 
. . 2 Council for regional arrangements was an objectionable provision. 
Replying to the Uashlngton dispatch, Stettinius ::;tated that: ".from 
the standpoint of frankness and barrr.ony it is most ir:rport.:mt to the 
great cause toward which we are working for the invitations to be 
issued on .LJ.arch l.';3 Although willing to let the British make one 
last attempt to gain French sponsorship, the Secretary was determined 
to publish the invitations with.in two days. 
Preoccupied with plan .. "'ling the San Fr3.ncisco talks, Stet tinius 
· d + ~ th dail:y delegation briefing and the conference r.n.sse mosv o~ .e _, 
steering coamtl.ttee meeting. Hockefeller as his chief alternate 
1.. stettiniusr Calendar .Notes, ?e'o.rt::..-lry 27, l945r p. 4, 
Box 285, Stetti!lius P.:lpcrJ .. 
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presided for him at both gatherings.. L-i an optiG1.istic r.anner, 
Rockefeller told the United States diplo1r.at3 at the deforrra Hotel 
that the work of the conference poi::ited to auspicious results for 
the governments and peoples of the countries invol7ed.L' He also 
reminded the delegation tbat William Claytcn•s policy statement 
would be delivered at ll:JO A.H. before a joint session of the eco-
nomi.c commissions (IV and V). Professor William Benton of the 
University of Chicago suggested that the presence of a large press 
corps be utilized to clarify any confusion derived from the Clayton 
speech. Adolf Berl~ and others proposed that American represent.a-
tives from business, labor, and agriculture be present at the two 
scheduled press conferences (at, 1:00 P .. H. and 3:30 P • .M.) to properly 
interpret the key economic message. Thus, Stett.inius's afternoon 
raeetings with reporters would take on further value. Turning to 
the subject of resolutions, Rockefeller declared that they should 
be confined to issues associated with inter-American action.5 Hat-
ters of world concern should be subrrd.tted to the San Francisco 
Conference. Observors assigned to the five committees reported 
that the drafting of resolutions was progressing for the most part 
at a satisfactor"/ rate. Only in Commission III were deliberations 
at an awkward stage. A strong Mexican proposal calling for the 
creation of a roving political body within the regional system had 
been introduced to this study group- The United States opposed this 
1 d T'el~~., t; on '-1,~etin° ;:i_.,....,orf- F 0 b-uar:v ?7 4. John E .. LoCieiiOO , ,) v_::;....... ..... l.~\# ... c~ .... i..-.t-J ·~r c; J. ... c. - 1 
1945, p, 1, Box 235 1 stettinius P~per3. 
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motion. It wanted to strengthen the present Pan A:::icrican Union 
rather than weaken i· t . .,1· th thi"' over, ~ · o ~ · · 6 ,·\ ~ •• , ., ..1..<..1pp.:i.ng rec :nmenua1:.-:i.on.. .~ 
the delegation meeting ended, it was decided to contim.i.e the prac-
tice of daily briefings for consultative purposes.7 
From this gathering of the American diplomats Rockefeller pro-
ceeded to the lO:JO A.M. conference steering committee session at 
Chapultepec Castle. stetti..."lius was engaged at that moment in a 
telephone conversation with Anthony Eden over the French sponsor-
ship issue and could not attend. Two unusual recommendations were 
debated at this meeting. The first one was a Cuban proposal for 
the conference to recognize the traditional boundaries of Polnnd. 
An Uruguayan delegate contested this suggestion on the grounds that 
the subject matter was of no concern to this hemisphere~ Others 
agreed that the Polish resolution was outside the scope of the 
conference. Thus, it i-ias id thdrawn from con.sidera tion. The dip-
lonats then discussed the Chilean proposal to invite Canada to 
became part of the Pan American Union. Led by P..ockefeller, the 
representatives from Honduras, UrtlocruaY and other cotmtries also 
questioned the propriety of this recommendation. The Assistant 
Secretary declared that such an invitation would be an embarrass-
ment to Canada, the Urited States, cu"l.d Great Britain because of 
the Pan American Union's regulations excluding nations which form 
6. Lodowod, Delegation r~eeting H.eportr Febt"J.3.ry27~ 1945, 
P• 2, Box 285, stettinius Papers .. 
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part of a kingdom. 8 The Chilean delegate argued that his propos.:i.l 
was derived from the belief that the Canadian goverrn:!ent would \'lel-
come an invit::ltion to membership. He indicated willingness however 
to submit the resolution to whatever modifications might nake it 
acceptable.9 
As the conference steering committee ended its morning session, 
Stettinius completed his exchanges with London. With the sponsor-
ship problem now temporarily in the hands of A ..11thony Eden, the 
SecretariJ was able to attend the joint meeting of the economic com-
missions, where around noon Clayton began his policy address. He 
noted tr.at over the past four and one-half years the United States 
had purchased five billion dollars worth of goods from the American 
republics. "These transactions had been abnorr:ial in size and char-
acterj they had been entered into with the purpose of defeating a 
powerful and ruthless enemy, intent upon the destruction of our 
. 10 liberty and yours." The Assistant Secretary observed that Iatin 
America's first concern now dealt with the sudden termination of 
procurement contracts and the resulting shock to their postwar 
markets. He assured the delegates tr.at American policy would seek 
an orderly, gradual withdrawal from wartime commodity demands. 
-.. 
we will continue as in the past to give appropriate 
notice of the curtailoent or termination of pro-· 
curement contracts. We will confer freely with 
8. John E. 1ockr.·1ood, Conference Steering Co::-ni ttee l?.eport1 
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you ;n reference to such reductions and the 
necessary adjustments which they will involve. 
We will consider and cooperate with you in 
measures designed to effect these adjustments 
with the least possible shock to your 
. . ll 
econorm.es • • • • 
Clayton felt that the southern republics' second w~jor in-
terest was related to the dollar balances they had accumulated in 
the United States during the present hostilities. He warned them 
against draining off these balances at the first opportunity through 
the purchase of luxury goods abroad. The Assistant Secretary de-
clared that it ~ds in the best interest of the hemisphere that a 
substantial portion of these dollars be utilized for the sound 
development of latin American industrial, agricultural, and mineral 
resources.12 Consequently, the inter-American standard of living 
would be raised and continental production increased.13 
vfnen Clayton got down to the prospects of Washington• s sup-
plying its southern neighbors with the needed goods to stimulate 
their economies, he i-ra.s not too optimistic. With reference to 
the availability in the United States of tools, wach.inery, and 
equipment which were required to implement their postwar policy of 
economtc modernization, he told the diplomats that this was a dif-
ficult problem.11+ The Assistant Secretary defe.~ded his nation• s 
Wa.rtime record on this score by pointing out that even United states 
ll. ~ .. , p .. 5 .. 
12. Ibid., P• 9. 
-· 
13. Ibid .. 
14. David Green, The Cont::i.inment of latin Af.1.e:.:-ica (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1971), p .. l?J .. 
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industries had managed without vital replacements. During the 
transition period, the hemisphere would be hard-pressed to obtain 
capital goods, but i·lashington would endeavor to satisfy this cru-
cial need.15 
Attempting to remove any pessimistic feelings, Clayton revealed 
that Congress bad increased the capital accounts of the Export-
Import Bank in order to make larger loans for latin American 
d l t . ' 16 eve opmen prOJec~s. He also endeavored to allay fears that 
Europe would receive the buLl{ of Washington• s foreign aid and thus 
hinder the economic adva.."'lces of Central and South America. He 
pointed out that a rehabilitated war zone would provide the south-
ern republics with a market for their goods.17 
The Assistant Secretar'J summed up his views by stating that the 
United States was defi..'1.itel;f committed to a postwar policy whl.ch 
18 
sought a substantial expansion in the world economy. It recog-
nized the interdeoendence of nations in matters of economics and 
... 
proclaimed that labor standards and social conditions could be 
improved only through the removal of trade barriers and the adher-
. ' 'rt f th '~ . 1119 ence to an "Economc Cna er o e ""1encas. This American 
statement of principle would seek such objectives as equality of 
15. Ibid., n. 174• 
- . 
16. Clayton, Econonri.c Policy Statement,. February 27, 1945, 
P• 7, Box 285, Stetti..rrlus Papers .. 
17. Green: 'l'he Contain ... "!'lent of l.atin :\merica, p .. l75. 
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access to raw r:aterials, elim:i..na tion of the excesses of econo:nic 
. 20 
nationalism, and promotion of private enterprise. 
Stettinius, sitting in the audience, felt that the economic 
address made an excellent impression. He noted that while the .first. 
reactions of I.a.tin American representatives indicated disappoint-
ment that Clayton had not made more substantial commitments, a more 
considered vlew crystallized and the moderation and balance of his 
statement were worth far more than rhetorical bombast ... 21 It soon 
became clear to less biased observers that the United States approach 
at the Me::<:ico Gi.ty Conference was to stress advice rather than assis-
ta..~ce and recommendations rather than commitments. Some of the 
advice and some of the recommendations were intended to r.iollify 
I.a.tin American resentment over past problems by implying future Amer-
. •t t 22 ican comau. men s. The only concrete program outlined by Clayton 
had dealt with the Export-Import Bank. The Assistant Secretary bad 
really given little comfort to the delegates by his general assurances 
of United States cooperation in the transition period. Unfortunately, 
stettinius did not perceive completely the superficiality of the 
Clayton address. Without clarifying such pronouncements as the 
desire to remove,trade barriers, the delegates could interpret cer-
tain passages w:i th the wrong connotation.. They could depict a 
20. John tifecham, The United States and Inter-American Se-
curity (Austin, Texas: University oi' Texas Press, 1967), p .. 266., 
21. stettL'lius" Calendar {Iotes, Febru.ary 27, 1%5, p .. 7, 
Box 285, Stettinius Papers~ 
22 .. 
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dic_hotorcy between the economically "colonial" Latin America and 
the economically mature United States, in which the older, more 
efficient industries of the North took advantage of the;, South's 
newly-developed resources.23 
After listening to Clayton's policy statement, Stettinius spent. 
much of the afternoon reviewing it with journalists. He held two 
press conferences. At the 1:00 P.M. briefing, American represen-
tatives of labor and industry expressed their endorsement .of the 
message. Because of a luncheon date, the Secretar"J cut this session 
short, but asked reporters to reconvene at J:JO P.H. at the Edificio 
Imperial. This later gathering was highlighted by a discussion of 
American assistance during the postwar adjustment period, progress 
towards strengthening the inter-A1.1erican system, and measures to 
. . h . h . t 1 ' • • .t:>• 1t t• 24 insula~e t e herru.sp ere agains 1~"G..s in~i ra ion. 
Stetti.'11.ius opened the second press conference with the obser-
vation that a spirit of fine and excellent cooperation permeated 
the Chapultepec :tall<:s. This friendly environment he noted, had been 
aided by Glayton•s statement of postwar assistance. This speech 
represented a mature conclusion as to the practical methods of ad-
vancing the development of the American republics for the benefit 
of everyone.25 
23.. Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs~ 1945, p .. _ 13,. 
24. stettinius, Calendar Notes, Februar".J 27 r 1945, p .. 8, 
Box 285, StettL'lius Papers8 
25. stettinius, Press Conference St.3.tement~ February 27 1 1945, 
P• 2, Box 285, stettinius Papers. 
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Following his comments on the econoilci.c address, the Secretary 
stressed the importance of a strong regional arrangement to achieve 
th 1 t 1i . ti f . 26 e comp e e e IIIl...."'13. on o Nazism from the hemisphere. 
Before fielding questions from the journalists, Stettinius 
introduced Clayton. In reference to economic solutions for.post-
war problems, the .Assistant Secretary stated that: 
I don• t think that. I have anything much to add to 
what I said this morning. A ver-J prominent gentle-
man from one other American reoublic said to me 
just a few minutes ago: "That. '-ras a very nice 
speech you made. Now the question is ta turn it 
into .facts .. " I don't anticipate any difficulty in 
that direction. We have tried to undP.rstate rather 
than over promise • • • • I don't believe we will 
have any difficulties in turning into facts and 
deeds things we promise down here • • • • I have 
been tremendously impressed by this conference. I 
think it will turn out to be a very useful and con-
structi Ye one, and I am very optimistic regarding 
relations between the United St.ates and the rest 
of the hemisphere • • • • 27 
At the conclusion of Clayton's optimistic remarks, the Sec-
retary proceeded to answer questions from the press. Some reporters 
touched on the delicate issues of Argentina and French sponsorship. 
The chief American delegate refused to comment on the status of 
the Farrell regime in relation to the Mexico City Conference.28 
He also withheld bis opinion on releasing inv:Lta tions to the San 
Francisco conference. Stettinius did reveal that his Commission II 
was in the process of su.rr.marizing Iatin American views toward the 
29 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals .. 
26. Ibid. 
-27. ~., pp .. J-'+ .. 
28. Ibid,., p .. 6 .. 
-
29. ~ .. , P• 7 .. 
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The press conference ended in a unique fashion. The Sacretary 
had always sought to improve the public's ir.ipression of the State 
Department. To restore prestige to his agency, he felt that the 
Ame~can people should understand, and at times, participate in 
the operations of the Department. For this reason, he had brought 
representatives from labor, industry, and agriculture to Me.xi.co City 
to serve as advisors. Stettinius now introduced these individuals 
to the press and allowed them to issue statements. Union leader 
George Mea."'JY declared that: "this conference represents to AmeriC'.ln 
labor an opportunity to give expression to some of its real ideals 
and hopes. Uow from a practical point of view we see the conference 
as a step in the direction of a permanent peace.1130 .Meany also 
stated that he was in complete agreement with the wording of the 
Economic Charter of the Americas and the rest of Clayton's speech. 
Eric Jolmston of the American Chamber of Commerce voiced his approval 
of his delegation's econonri..c program and proclaimed that: "as one 
of the greatest creditor nations of the world, the United States 
was responsible in no small measure for the economic balance of the 
world and particularly Latin America.1131 Other non-diplomats who 
spoke at this time included David McDonald of the CIO, James Patton 
of the National Farmer's Union, and Alfred Goss from the Hational 
Grange.32 
JO. ~· 
Jl .. Ibid .. , P• 8. 
32. Ibid.,, PP• 8-12 .. 
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While Stettin.:i..us was holding his briefings with the press, 
other American delegates were developing conference resolutions at 
afternoon committee heari_ngs. The deadline for all but the economic 
proposals had been Monday, February 26. W.:i.. th the last economic 
recommendations .introduced on the twenty-seventh via the Clayton 
address, the Chapultepec talks now had to act on a total of one hun-
dred and fifty-five resolutions. Of this number, eleven had originated 
with the Americ:m delegation. The United States was concerned about 
such topics as strengthening the inter-American system, free access 
to information, cooperation in health and sanitation, surrender of 
ri-a.r criminals, and the Economic Charter of the Americas .. 33 
Commission I met as Clayton was giving his policy statement 
and after a full discussion approved two resolutions entitled "The 
Establishment of a Perma.Jient 11ilitar'J Organization" and "The Control 
of Armaments."34 Stettini.us•s world organization group continued 
to postpone :i.. ts hearings because the swnII'ariza tion of Dumbarton Oaks 
views had yet to be completed. 
The most interesting developments occurred t-rl thin Commission III. 
This body supposed:I;r assembled to observe the Domini~ Republic's 
independence day. After the appropriate speeches, Luis Anderson 
of Costa Rica suddenly brought up the subject of Columbia's pro-
posal for a mutual guarantee of territorial sovereignty. Because 
33. Telegram, Stettinius to Joseph Grewt F.ebruar<J 2'!, 1945, 
P• 1, Box 285, Stettinius Papers. 
J4.. John E .. I.oc~<;~"OOdr Cornmi.ssion I Report, Febru.ar:y 27,. l945 1 
P• 3, Box 285r stattinius Papers. 
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o~ the ir.iportance of this resolution, he ~·.anted it 1.1.bt!led 11Decl.:.lration 
of Chapultepec" and approved by acclamation of the corr.mittee.35 
This created an embarrassing situation for the American .r:iembers of 
the group, as the resolution contained certain provisions iihich they 
were not prepared to accept. Among the objectionable clauses was 
the obligation to intervene militarily to prevent aggression in cases 
where a majority of the A~~rican republics voted for such a measure.36 
Sen.a.tor Warren Austin opposed Anderson's motion for the United States 
by pointing out that in the absence of an English te..""Ct, more tir.ie 
lJas needed to study the recommendation. He also mentioned the de-
sirability of awaiting Senator Tom Connally's arrival the next day. 
Commission III agreed to delay its decision on the question of accla-
!T'ation u.."1.til ll:OO A.H. the next day.37 
Stetti...-.Uus•s people on the inter-America..'1 study group met twice 
on the twenty-seventh after the corrmi.ssion hearing to plot strategy .. 
In the early afternoon, Austin told his colleagues that the Anderson 
motion had come as a 11bo~bshell" to hir.i.38 He pointed out that the 
proposed non-aggression pact required congressional approval, which 
could not be obtained before the next committee session. Dr. Pas-
volsky suggested asking P..oosevelt to utilize his special presidential 
war powers to make the 11Declaration of Chapultepec" ir..mediately 
35.. John E,, Lock:vood, ??IT'~ssio~ ~II Report, February 27, 
19~5, PP• 3-4, Box 285r Stet~izu.us Pa~~~s$ 
36. ~ .. , p .. !+-
J7. ~· 
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applicable to the United States.39 Once hostilities were concluded, 
there would be plent.y of time for Cofioaress to draft a perma.."1e.11t 
treaty. After arriving at this solution, the rr.eeting ended. 
In the early evening, Rockefeller, Austin, ar.d Technical Expert 
Dudley Bonsal met \dth the sub-committee of Commi.ssion III.· Hi th 
the security pact question hopefully resolved, they turned to another 
troublesome issue. Me..uco had introduced a resolution to substi-
tute the Governing Board of the Pan American Union with an ambulatory 
council consisting o:f ad hoc representatives meetL"'lg every si:<: rr.onths 
in a different capl. tal. Rockefeller urged them to move forward and 
not backwards as the case would be if the present set-up were 
scrapped. 40 A compromise was reached after some r:rinor revisions 
were made in the membership o.f the Gover:ling Board. The delegates 
agreed to rotate the office of chairman and hava the board composed 
of diploll'ats other than the inter-American Ambassadors to Washington. 
Mexico found these 1:1easures satisfactorJ and withdrew her resolution. 
stettinius later noted that: "there was a tendency to propose the 
creation of a variety of new agencies rather than to consolidate or 
build upon the exist.ing·bodies."41 
February 27 ended i-ri. th many matters still in flux. Depending 
-upon Eden's efforts, French sponsorship might still be achieved., 
Ibid .. , P• 4. 
- -
40. Dudley Bon;;;al: Comnd.ttee III Subcor.m-rl.ttee 2 Report 11 
February 27, 1945, P• 1, Box 285, StettLJ.ius P3.persfl 
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The full effect of the Clayton address had yet to be gauged. Now 
that the American economic policy statement had been issued, 
Commissions IV and V could finally take on a full load of work. 
Stettinius•s world organization group had yet to fL"lish its task 
of sw..marization. The "Declaration of Chapultepec" also had to be 
completed. Thus, the Secretary and his delegation still faced a 
heavy schedule of conference activities. 
FEBRUARY 28, 1945 
Wednesday, Februar.r 28 marked a full week of He::ci..co City ses-
sions. Within this time span Edward Stettinius successfully filled 
the role of manager of men. He and his staff had manipulated the 
conference age..'1da in accordance with the goals of American forei&'ll 
policy. The Clayton address had partially reassured the latL'1 
Americans of postwar United states cooperation and yet left the 
door open for American aid in the reconstruction of Europe. The 
hemispheric security pact was in the process of becoming conditionally 
applicable to the United States. And the Pan American Union was 
being strengthened rather than tom apart. The only dif;t;iculty the 
'secretary had encountered was the matter of French sponsorship. He 
spent much of the twenty-eighth negotiating over the San Francisco 
invitations <L"ld analyzing press reaction to the conference. He also 
welcomed the initial appearance of Senator Tom Connally, Cbairr;)an of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at Chapultepec. And finally, 
stettinius witnessed the first dissension withL"l Cor." .. -:U.ssion II OV·3r 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 
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WashL"1gton1 s chief spokesrran began the d.ay by presiding over 
the 9:00 A.H. delegation rr.eeting. He received the usual comrai..ssion 
briefings and reviewed the previous day's actb'ities. Senator Austin 
noted in his report that each nation associated with the hemispheric 
non-aggression treaty was bound by constitutional limitations~ He 
remarked that the United States as well as the other republics would 
endeavor to overcome legal obstacles to join the pact. 'By invoking 
such measures as the president.ial war powers he and Pasvolsky were 
maki..ng the Columbian proposal applicable to the United States for 
the duration o.r the conflict with the A.::cis powe:r-s. Irockefeller com-
mented that the "Declaration of Chapultepec" reflected a fear of 
aggression by neighboring countries from Argentina, Peru, the 
· · bli d H . t• 43 F llo . g 11 -'-h k Dorm.mean Repu Cr a....-1 ai i. •o Wll1 a "' ese rerrar. s, 
Ambassador George Messersmith i;arned the delegation against reso-
lutions designed to form regional blocs as these were usually authored 
,f 1 • t 41+ by those not friendly to ~~as.tung on. 
Throughout the morning, Stettinius examined studies of press 
and public reaction toward the Chapultepec talks. He also scheduled 
short intetJiews with correspondents Heston and Lara of the 
New York Times and Elliston of the Washington Post. On the home 
front, American interest in Ia.tin America was greater than at a.'1.y 
time si..."lce July, 1944• Commentators tended to vi~w the conference 
42. stettiniusr Calendar Notesr fe'ortiar-J 2dr l945 11 p. l, 
Box 285, Stettinius Papers. 
1.+3.. Ibid .. 
G' n 
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as.a "dress rehearsal" for San Fr:mcisco n~d pointed out trat a 
success in Mexico City trould strengthen the An:eric~.m r;osition at 
the upcorrd.ng United Nations r.ieeting .. 45 '.i'he Argentine question and 
economic problems received most of the emphasis in various periodi-
cals. In reference to the controversy with Buenos Aires, the 
Associated Press, Christian Science Monitor, Business ;-reek, 
Walter lipprnann, and Charles Pergler were among those skeptical of 
any concili.atory moves by that nation.46 Former diplomat Sumner Welles 
was among those in the minority, who favored recognition of the 
Farrell-Peron regime.47 
The other focal point of interest, the Economic Charter, received 
a mixed reception. The Baltimore Sun and Gabriel Heatter enthusias-
tically praised it, while the Hew York <Tournal of Commerce and 
P.aymond Swing criticized it because of an absence of more concrete 
suggestions for the irnplementa tion of freer trade within the hemis-
phere. 48 1A.any leading newspapers including the Uashi.Igton Post, 
the P:hiladelphia Ino,!;!irer, and the Nation agreed with William Clayton 1 s 
statement that the United States would help soften the shock of 
economic dislocation within the hemisphere during the postwar period. 
on other subjects such as the inclusion of representatives from· 
Congress, labor, and business within the United States delegation7 
45"' survey of American Press Reaction, .?ebruar.1 28, 1945, 
p 8 1, Box 285, Stetti..."lius Papers. 
Ibid. 
-
48. Ibid,, 
-
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tl1:e press voiced its approvai .. 49 Stettinius ::iust have been natis-
fied when he read these studies. T'ne American people y1ere closely 
following his actions and were .for the most part supporting his 
hard line toward Argentina and his promises of economic assistance 
to lat.in America. 
In the early afternoon, the latest chapter in the French spon-
sorship story began with a phone call from Joseph Grew in Hashi.ngton. 
The Secretary discussed idth his second--in-comma."ld the absolute 
necessity of rnaintai..'1.i.ng friendly relations with Latin America in 
light of the delicate situation with France.50 After a few other 
remarks to Grew, he got James Dunn on the phone for a strategy ses-
sion. He told DunJ1 that if France should ir.ake a final decision not 
to 5ponsor the San Francisco· conference, he wan~ed the news relayed 
to him imn1ediately., Thus, a special raeeting of the latin American 
Foreign Ministers could be convened to interpret the situation 
properly before false rumors threatened hemispheric solidarity. To 
stettinius's amazement, the Assistant SecretarJ revealed that British 
diplomat Sir Alex Cadogan had successfu.lJ;r persuaded the French to 
hi 51 accept sponsors P• The acceptance, however, was conditional, 
based unon the ulacing of Paris amendments on the same footing as 
. . 
52 
the Dumbarton Oa.1<.s proposals. 
49.. stettL"lius1 Calendar Notes, February 28, 1945: p. 7, 
Box 285, Stettinius Papers~ 
50 .. Ibid., 
-
P• 2. 
51 .. Ibid .. , 
-
p .. 3 .. 
52 .. Ibid .. 7 
-
P• 4. 
The Secretary phoned Pad.ilL:l. to inform him that. the de Gaulle 
government had "fallen into line11 and would back the Um ted nations 
conference. He remarked to the Mexican Foreign Hinister that there 
would be no trouble and that: 
We can all go hand-in-hand, but I can• t :promise to 
make the announcements tomorrow (March 1), because 
we have to i'iOrk out the form of the invitations 
both in London and Moscow. However, I feel sure 
everytbir.g will be ready by Friday or_ Saturday 
(March 2 or 3) at the latest •••• ::>3 
Relieved to hear of French cooperation, Stettinius was in a 
happy mood until he received a second call from ~Jashington" Presi-
dential advisor Jonathan Danials notified him at 4:00 P.M .. that 
Hoosevelt i..ianted to annotmce the Secu.""i ty Council voting procedur~s 
in an add:ess to Congress the ne.."'<t day. 'l'he chief American delt..._ 
gate's credibility in Ne:dc~ City would be destroyed if thi3 occur~ed,. 
All along, he had promised the Latin American Foreign Hinisters that 
they would be informed of these voting procedures the first moment 
. . ·+ ~· . d bli 54 the San Francisco invit.a11ions were ma e pu c. The Secretar<J 
depicted this touchy situation to Daniels and added that consulta-
tions with London and Moscow were not completed yet. In concludi..~ 
the conversation, he told the White House aide that he preferred to 
be guided by Grew and Dunn in the final decision on the congressional 
address, for they were closer to the situation.55 
In the early evening, Stetti..."'lius again talked to DU.?),,,.'1 at the 
State Department. 
• ~ 1., " d l . . Describing how Dame.Ls .:act p.:-essure u!:l, na 
revealed. that the ultir..ate ans;1er would come from him a;:d Grew .. 
53. ~ .. , P• 3 .. 
54 .. Ibid. 
-
55 .. ~, ~ ~ p ... I .. , 4,. 
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nu.zm noted that the United States was obligated not to di.'.3cuss the 
voting procedures imtil the invitations itere issucd,.5b ~-iince the 
issua..~ce had not occurred yet, P~osevelt could not outJ.i.ne the 
functions of the Security Cou.."lcil to Congress without breaking an 
international agreement. Therefore, the Assistant Secretary prom-
ised his boss that he would oppose any premature announcement of 
the procedures, including Roosevelt's speech.57 Por the moment, 
it appeared the i."1Vi ta tions could be released without embarrassment,. 
i·lhile Stettinius was attempting to keep on top of the sponsor-
ship controversy, hi.s world organization study group i·.as voicing 
opposition toward the Dmnbarton Oaks proposals. Corrmi::>sion II 
Secretary Para-Perez had assembled his sub-committee at ll:CO A.H. 
to examine the slowly accumulated commentaries on the United Nations 
plan. At this gatheri.'1g, Hr., Gutierrez o.f Cuba acknowledged his 
responsibility for a resolution condemning the Dumbarton Oaks pro-
posals. After the meeting, he told Technical Expert John Cabot 
that the proposals were contrary to inter-American juridical concepts, 
-g 
failed to refer to international law, and lacked a preamble • .? 
For these reasons, the Cuban senate would never accept the pro-
visions. 
"By the time the sub-committee reconvened at 4:30 P.H .. , 
Gutiarrez had radically changed his thinki.. ... '1.g on the United ~Ia tions,. 
James Du:-:n - Stetti.>tlust T·-:!lephone Co!1.vers·3. t.icn, 
. . '.. . ,......._ 1, ·Box 28.5 1 Stec,r.i .. ruus t"apers. 
57. ~ .. 
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In. a contradictor-J rr.a..'1.!1.er, he was still cri tic3l of certain 
"poorly chosen principles" i'ihich allowed for a power g.:i.p between 
the General Assembly and the Security Council .:i.~ gave the whole 
organization a totalitarian character.59 Yet, he also stated that 
the Dumbarton Oaks program was a good basis for creating an· inter-
national peace-keeping body.60 At this second meeting, delegate 
Cordova of Mexico also introduced a resolution, which in effect 
recommended to the San Francisco Conference the common views of 
Iatin America regarding the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Gutierrez 
and other comrrri.ttee members supported this resolution as a means 
to communicate their disapproval of certain provisions. Cordova 
labeled it a preamble for the presentation of ideas, ~..;hich would 
protect the liberty of action of all the Axerican republics.61 
Stetti."li.us's representative at this session, Dr. Pasvolsky, re!l'.arked 
tP.at the delegates should study the resolution further and make no 
final decision on it until after the submission of Para-Perez's 
report.62 It appeared that the American representative was advo-
cating postponement in order to give his delegation enough time to 
study this new development. Thus, the concept of a United Nations 
was fast becomi."lg a tremendous thorn in the side of the Secretary 
and the state Department. Already beset by the sponsorship problem, 
stettinius now faced dissension within his o:.in commission. He 
59 .. Ibid~, 
-
P~ 1.., 
60. Ibid .. , P• ') ...... 
-61. Ibid .. 
-
62. Ibid .. 
-
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somehow had to disassociate his people from any proposal cri tici::i.ng 
a program they had helped create. The .t·~e;dc:in recommendation could 
only work to alienate the United States from the other co-author5 
of the Dumbarton Oaks provisions, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. 
Fortunately, the other commissions were not encountering the 
difficulties experienced by the world organization grouo. The war 
effort corrmi.ttee was studying ways to eliminate Fascist subversion 
within the hemisphere.. Comnri::;sion III on the i nter-Ar.:orican system 
v.ia.s revising the Pan American Governi..71g Board and the non-aggression 
pact in line ~dth Hasbington's policies., It also created an Inter-
American Economic and Social Council to help solve transitional 
problems. The economic bodies were also busy incorporating Cl.:iyton•s 
principles in.to their resolutions. They were in the process of 
drafting a proposal to lo:"fer trade barriers i;<l.th few exceptions ... 
Outside of the verbal opposition in Commission II, activities 
were proceeding without incident. At 5:30: stettinius went to 
Buena Vista rail.road station to welcome Senator Tom Connally. The 
Texas Democrat was an expert in Latin American relations. The 
secretary hoped his timezy arrival would strengthen the American 
delegation in its efforts to overcome criticisr.i.s aimed at the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Now that the French sponsorship issue 
was temporarily settled, these criticisrr.s were the only key issue. 
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MARCH 1, 1945 
Since the conference was not encountering any r.ajor diffi-
culties, the SecretarJ n:ay have assumed tbat his presence in the 
capital was not absolutely necess:u-.1. His papers do not suggest 
any other reason for his withdrawal to Cuernavaca for a lum:heon 
date on March 1. After attending a morning session of the United 
states steering committee, he departed at 12:30 P.H. for a recep-
tion at the Cuernavaca residence of Sanor Ser~ano, the Hex.i.can 
Economics ?1inister. iii.th this exit, Rockefeller, P:lsvol310J, and 
other top aides once again directed American foreign policy in 
Mexico City. They coordinated Washington•s interests in the com-
mission hearings and participated in the revision of certain resolutions. 
The American delegation began the day with a 9:00 A.M. brief-
ing on the activities of the world organization cormi.i.ttee. Pasvol8ky" 
reported that the compilation of vie~-s on the Dumbarton Oaks pro-
posals was almost completed. So far, only Haiti had expressed full 
agreement with the provisions. 
Despite Cuban criticisms, it appeared that all the republics 
were willing to use the-Dumbarton Oaks program as a basis for the 
creation of an international body. 63 After these introductorJ re-
marks, Pasvolsky outlined three complex issues within Corrmission II, 
''--. 
which threate."'1.ed Washington's postwar objectives. 
" · ,,.,..,,., ·1a'"' ~n· °' He-a.· can resoluti on The first matter 01 grea-r. cone ......... • ~ " ~ .·~ . _ 
· · · th U ·t du +~on~ p1 ~~ advocating alterations J...'1. e ru e ,,a.,_. ·" --"-·" 
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po_wers mianimously wanted to attaL'1 uni V:!rsJ.li t:l 0f r.:emoership aml 
changes in pu..~ses and prL""'lciples in order to include references 
to international law and respect for treaties. They al.so ~ought 
greater power for the. General Assemb},y and guaranteed L:iti..'1 Americ.:.n 
representation on the Security Coun.cil. The southern republics de-
sired, too, greater scope for the international court, the right to 
settle intei-American disputes through the regional system, and 
the establishment of a committee for cultural cooperation.64 Since 
these modifications were contrary to the "Big Three" conception 
of an international body, the United States had to separate itself 
from the Mexican resolution. The State Department.. could not ap-
preach the San Fran.cisco Con.f erence condemn.ing its own beliefs in 
a United Nations • 
. Another problem tied to Commission II dealt -:.dth the American 
proposal supporting the Dumbarton Oaks program. Accordi.."'.lg to a 
secret agreement, He.."Ci.co was supposed to introduce this recommen-
dation without reveal.i.--ig American authorship. At the time of 
submission (February 28), a Mexican delegate announced the move 
"on the behalf of the United states." Since this action violated 
the prior arrangement, the proposal was withdrawn and not immediately 
reintroduced due to differences within the Mexican delegation, The 
United states diplomats had to reach an u.11derstanding with their 
Mexican cotmtar:-....arts before tbis subjact could be brought up again 0 
• n l'- .~.;.:i,,. t ho··"'''"' .... ·tl-,.,i- ai.. ti" 
Am
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right moment Padilla would come through Hitn :in acceptable reso-
lution. 65 
A third comple.-< issue facL-ig the world organi~a ticn group was 
regional integration.· Brazil had dr.'.l.fted a proposal recognizing 
inter-American supremacy over the United Nations in hemispheric 
rratters. Unfortunately, this resolution had received widespread 
support from the I.a.tin delegates. American observers believed the 
recorrn1er.dation would promote regionalistic ra the:- th:m international 
attitudes to~rd world problems. Since the United States favored 
one u."ri.fied community of nations and not sever.:il loc.:J.l alliances, 
this resolution would require some revision too. Thusr the three 
issues involvin.g IE.tin American alterations, the .Mexican subr:rl.ssion 
controversy, and the Brazilian proposal revealed that !fnshington 
. 1 dif" . ' hi (' . . 66 definitely had to reconci-e ... erences m:r.,, n ~o;;:mission II. 
After Pasvolsky•s lengthy report, the Ar.ierican delegates dis-
persed to carrJ out their corr:mittee duties. At 10:00 A.H., Stettinius 
trade his first and onJy appearance of the day at a conference ftmc-
tion. He attended the United States steering cor.mittee meetin.g and 
received the Commission·II briefing he had missed an hour earlier. 
His advisors, particularly Senators Austin and Connally, went over 
• .j. 
in detail the proposed non-aggression ~c~. I.atin American countries 
had developed a great enthusiasm for this resolution because it 
would check the aggre.ssi ~re tendencies of ArgentL.1.a and also syrr~ 
Ibid., P• 2. 
-
Ibid,,, P9• 1-'2 .. 
-
b?lize their solidarity .. 67 Consideri..'1g the proposal one of the 
keystones of the conference, they had entitled it ti1e 11Decl3:.:-ation 
of Chapultepec.n The Secretary noted th..1t. .:is r:-.at.ters ::>toad, the 
non-aggression pact Has divided into measures to be ci'fective during 
the present hostilities and measures to be deternti.ned by a·treat.y 
for the postwar period.. Turn:in.g to the French sponsorship issue, 
he expressed confidence in the existing situation. 68 Now that 
the de Gau.lle regime i'l<lS backing the San Franc.i.sco Conference, it 
would not be long before the invitations ond voting procedures could 
be publicized. At 10:30 A.H., Stett.i.nius and his staf.f gathered 
around a· radio to listen to Roosevelt's congressional speech. Al-
though reception was poor, they heard no premature presidential 
announcement on tLe operations of the Security Council .. 69 Grew nnd 
Du.'1.11 had successfuJJ.y prevented the chief executive from breald.ng 
the Yalta agreement on simultaneous publication. 
With his departure for Cuernavaca, the Secretar.1•s role in the 
Chapultepec talks diminished temporarily. The major developments 
of March 1 took place not in the plenary sessions of the foreign 
ministers, but rather in the corrunittee meetL~gs of the lower-echelon 
diplomats. 
The war effort group was progressing with just a minimum of 
problems. It had already drafted and approved resolutions related 
67. ~~t P• 3• 
6S.. Green Hackt1orth, Conf e.rence SteerL1g Gonm.i. t tee L·Ieeti.:1g, 
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to further mi.li tary coopera lion, the eli.rain.:i t.ion of subversive 
activities, and the seizure of war c::-ir:rinals. These proposals nll 
aimed to stamp out Fascist influence within the ~'iestarn hemisphere. 
In fundamentals, Co:nmi.ssion I had made no departure from the United 
States point of view.70 
Ironically, the study group with all the ma.ior probleII'.s did not 
even convene on the first. Commission II supposedly po~tponed its 
meeting because Chairnn...'l Stettinius was preoccupied by a luncheon 
date at Cuernavaca with the Mexican Economics Hinister, Senor Serr-.J.no. 
In reality, the Secret.ar; 1~s in no position to assemble his com-
mission and release the San Francisco invitations. He still had to 
await the conclusion of consultations w:Lth the Soviet Union. l·iith 
the world organization group in an U."1set.tled state, Stettinius' s 
remarkable optimism surfaced. He wired Grew that: 11 on the whole 
confidence is felt that the work of this comrrci.ttee will result in 
a satisfactory conclusion.117l Since no ;;weting was scheduled until 
March 2, when Para-Perez was to issue his preli.minarJ report on 
Dumbarton Oaks, Pasvolsky decided to call on Padilla. The conference 
president informed him that the Mexican submission controversy was 
a "mistaken of some sort and that the desirable resolution would 
72 
emerge eventually. 
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Commission III com.11enced in tbe i7!0r:'ling of :-larch 1 a :µ::imgr.:iph 
by paragraph examination of the revised United States resolution 
on strengthening the inter-American system. Comprorai..ses had been 
ma.de along lines which trould preserve the Pan American Union and 
Washington as the seat of the Union. Among the principle changes 
i-Jas the prohibition against herai.spheric ambassadors to ~'iashington 
serving on the Union's Governing Board. A number of Iati.....-1 American 
republics had opposed this cban.ge due to the added expense of mrin-
taining an extra ambassador and the possibility of dissension among 
equals. Theorizing that too rr.any diplomats were under the thumb 
of Washir1gton, He..uco had supported this prohibition. ?J Another 
revision lirrrited the Director G~neral of the ~nion to a ter~ of 
ten years without re-election. A third provision directed the 
. Pan American Union in coD.aboration with the Lriter-Ameri.can Juridical 
Comrai..ttee to compose a "Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
Man and State." This charter was to be submitted at the l946 
hemispheric conference in Bogota, Columbia.. Consideration of 
Commission III's most important resolution, the regional non-
aggression pact, was deferred until March 2, in order to give 
senator Connally time to crJstallize his 'Views. So far, the prO-
ceedings and compronri..ses of Commission III were regarded as 
satisfactorJ to stettinius and the American delegation.74 
73. 
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In the economic field, there had been a r,er.dency unt.:il 
February 28 to mark time 1·;ai ting for Cl:l.yton' s address.. But 
fin.ally, Cornr:rl.ssions IV and V bega.."1. to negotiate problems and dr.'.lft 
resolutions. Sub-cor.im:.i..ttee r.:eetings were char3.cterize<l on the one 
hand by lat.in Ar...erican desires for a United States commitment to 
continue purchases and on the other by the United States• tmwi.1-
linc,o-ness to go beyond Cilyton• s statement. 75 One case i'1here the 
question of co;;-imitment a::::-ose revolved around coi'..fee prices. The 
southern republics sought postwar price increases for coffee prod-
ucts. Evading the question: Americ.:m diplomats just referred to 
the need for equitable prices for both the consumer and producer .. 
In general, there seemed to be no disposition to force issues over 
American opposition .. 76 The In.tin Americans •~i.shed to stay in line 
irl.th Washington on the fre.;dom o.f int~rnat.ional trade prL'"'lciple., 
They still wanted to insert individual ::>pacialized reservations 
to protect hemispheric bailnces of foreign e.:tchange <:h"1.d infant 
industries.77 
In comparison with economic questions, there was greater 
unanimity over social resolutions. A proposal caJling for inter-
American cooperation on proble~~ of health and sanitation had 
already been drafted. American delegate Katherine Lenroot was 
highly influential in corr..':li.ssion attempts to resolve soci~l prob-
lems. In one case, when Mex:L:o introduced a resolution recor.;mending 
., I s+et-+.i· ..... ; ~1S +o 1'-r?.l·/., 75.. Te.J..~:;r~m t v v - •w..-- v v - . 
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.that minimum salaries be tied to price fluctuations, Hiss Len.root 
led the opposition against this ur.just proposal. She final.J.J'" 
succeeded in revising the resolution to favor a constant rise in 
real irages. 78 
With Stettinius out-of-town and most of the American diploll'ats 
in committee sessions, the French sponsor issue re-emerged. In 
the late afternoon, Hayden Raynor received a phcne call from 
James Dunn in 1'/ashington. Du.rm infor:ned hie that the Soviet Union 
would not accept the changes in the San Francisco invitations de-
mantled by the de C--auJJ.e regime. Word had been relayed by the Eng) j sh 
that Moscow refused to perr:ri..t any alterations in the Crirr.ean agree-
ments. He suggested to Raynor that Ambassador Caffery be notified 
of the situation and instrticted to nresent an ultimatum to the French. 
The Technical Expert agreed that Paris should decide by Friday, 
March 2 either ta accept the original text or ckop out of sponsor-
ship. 79 Throughout the evening, P.a~or attempted to contact Stettinius 
at Cuernavaca. He final.J.y reached him at 8:30 A.M. the following 
day. The chief American delegate approved the Dunn proposal to 
80 
obtain a final answer from France. Once again, the sponsorship 
issue presented a messy situation. 
With the e."\:ception of the sponsorship question, acti vi tics 
throughout the middle of the conference's second week J:i.ad come off 
79+ 
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smoothly. Although uncomfortable scenes had developed ::iround ot.her 
. issues, Stett.ini.us and his colleagues were optimistic t.b~'lt various 
obstacles would soon disappear. Incidents like the Cuban criticism 
of the Dumbarton Oaks, program and the t·~e=dcan submission controversy 
were minor in comparison to the sponsorship struggle. ifoiJ.:e the 
Secretary successfulJy shaped conference resolutions in keeping 
·with Washington's foreign policy, he could make little headway id"t.h 
the stubborn de Ga;uJJ.e regime. 
CP.APTEH. VI 
TF.DUBLESOME ISSUES AND CONFERENCE PR.OC~F'DINGS 
MARCH 2, 1945 
As the second t-1eekend of the conference approached, 
Edward Stettinius concentrated on eliminating issues which hampered 
negotiations at Chapultepec. The French sponsorship controversy 
was his m:lin concern.. Paris !1:1d to commit itseLf before he could 
release the San Francisco invitations. Further delays in publi-
cation could only have a negative effect on United States - latin. 
American relations. The Secretar.r also had to iron out differences 
within Commissions II and III. He had to overcome hemispheric 
opposition to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, particularly the 
principle of regional integration. 
His schedule from Barch 2 to Harch 4 r~flected his preference 
to work behind the scene in resolving matters. Over this time 
span, Stettinius did not participate in the more rigid, structured 
meetings of the conference steering committee and the American 
delegation. He felt more comfortable discussing policy issues 
within the informal settL"lg of a luncheon or reception. 
Throughout the morning of the second, the Secretary was once 
more wrapped up in the sponsorship affair. B.ayden Raynor called 
cuernavaca at 8:30 A.H. to inform him of Hoscow' s rejection of the 
French reservations. Shocked by the news, he gave the Technical 
+ t l") • . +h , .. . ' l Expert .his approval vO pres en.., 3.rJ.S :JJ." an u.Li..J.c.:1 cu:n .. 
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When Ray:ior contacted Washington at ll:CO to relay Stettinius•s 
instructions, he learned of further devalopmcnt.s in the controversy. 
The State Department had r~cai. ved word from the British of Paris c 
refusal to accept the· Soviet decision as final. The .French had 
ordered their ambassador in Moscow to raise the issue there;. 
James Dunn told Raynor tha.t London had asked for a twenty-four hour 
postponement of all American diplomatic responses in order to give 
? 
the French one last chance to reconcile differ~nces,.-
This matter was referred to Stettinius on his return at noon 
to Mexico City. He discussed the British request with Messersrrd.th~ 
Rockefellar, Pasvolsk;r and Technical Expert Avra Harren. They all 
agreed that a postponement would involve consider3ble risk, but 
the only alternative 'il<lS French ~rithdr.:iwal and that would be dis-
astrous. The chief American delegate ;md his aides arranged a 
forty-eight hour delay but made a firm cornmitm~nt to announce the 
invitations no later than 10:00 .Monday morning, March 5. T'ne 
Secretary felt this schedule must be final and unalterable.3 He 
L"lstructed Raynor to have Dunn notify both the French and British 
of the postponement devised with great difficulty as a courtesy to 
Secretary Eden. Stettinius also tried to contact Padilla about-
the situation and seek his advice. Unfortunately, he could not 
reach the Mexican Foreign Minister before leaving for a social 
h gathering at :ifliich he was guest speaker~ 
2 .. Ibid,. 
-
3. Ibid,. 
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With the sponsorship issue still on hi::; m.:L-:.d, the Sec:::-et.3.ry 
attended a reception, in Rockefeller's and his honor, given by 
the American community -ln He;dco City. At this party, he made a 
brief good will address emphasizing that A.'"nerican policy aimed to 
encourage a system of diplomacy broadly representative of a compo-
site of United States interests and opinions. He praised the 
cordiality of American citizens in Mexico. Their amiable ways 
had helped to advance a spirlt of harmony at the Chapultepec talks. 
Stettinius hoped that in the future Americans abroad t.,rould accept 
a new responsibility~ He remarked: 
I look to this community a."ld to tha groups of 
United states citizens resident in other American 
republics, for their friendly interest and co-
oneration in realizing many of the aims of our 
:friter-American program • • • .5 
Reviewing the actiYities of the conference, he declared that the 
resolutions on public health, education, and nutrition were designed 
to br...ng the co~mon people of the hemisphere closer together. The 
wasses were a significant factor, since international relations 
were no longer confined to the relatively narrow policy interests 
and contacts of government officials. The chief American delegate 
declared: 
Diplomacy becomes more truly representative of 
the L~terests and welfare of peoples. It becomes 
an inter.lational vehicle for social and economic 
welfare, enabling nations to share responsibilities 
for cor..mon prog::-ess a:'ld securi t;'r. Ilow the broad 
representation of pub~c s~nti.ment. ?ecorn;s indis-
pensi?.~11-:; to d.iploaacy J_n t.ne e11olu-c.1ort er post-tla:r· 
intar::-'.ia tional :::-elations .. 
At t~e I:it~r-A;;:erican com··~renc~ no·,.1 in progress 
here, you :1.:·vre doubt.l2ssly 08Serred an .qt,t<~~;1pt by the 
5il' Stettini'f.isr ~t.-;;e.:~ca:i Co;r~1;l11ri.ty Spe!eChr ~·!arch 2, l9L1..5, 
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United States government to r..ake its diplomacy 
broadly representative. Our delegation cmb:rJ.ces 
representatives of commerce, labor, agriculture, 
industry and social welfare and the press.. It 
really represents a comcosite of national in-
terests and opinions • : •• 6 
Staying at the reception only long enough to deliver his 
address, the Secretary then hurried off to a 2:00 P.H. luncheon 
date at the Reforma Hotel. Under the guise of a social gatheri."1.g, 
he had invl ted Forei,gn t1i.Jil5ters .Alberto Lleras Ca:nargo oi' Columbia, 
Jacobo Varela. of Ur1.ioauay, Hildebrando Accioly of Brazil, and 
Luis Anderson of Cos ta Rica to dine wi. th his top aides,. Utili~ing 
the personal approach, Stel",tin.ius hoped to transform the dinner 
i.""lto a strategy sessio:i on the \wording of the Act of C.hapultepec. 7 
The. United States delegation disapproved of certai.'1 passages in 
part three of the Act.. This section dealt with the relationship 
of the regional system to non-hemispheric organizations., Foreign 
M:i...-ri.ster Camargo made some suggestions as possible substitutas, 
none of which were acceptable to the Secretary or Senator Connally .. 
The Columbian diplomat felt that it should clearly be understood 
that the maintenance of peace on the American continent was to be 
solely the responsibility of the American states. He argued that 
otherwise Great Britain and particularly the Soviet Union might 
intervene in the poll ti cal affairs of the .bericas to the detriment 
of the inter-Awerican system.8 Both Stettinius and Connally in-
' o 00 .... + 1'-."'r~·n 2. _1_91, =. •. ~' ... l. ;~,',)~-!' 2.?_r..:. 7,. Luncneon ..c"e.· ... "t -= - --, ,~/. ~ , -- .~ ._ ... ,_,., 
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_sisted that they could not enter into a regional agreer.:ent at this 
time which did not harr:ionize with the United Hations pl.:ln. C.::i.margo 
replied that: "if the United States is w:illing to allow l!.'uropean 
states to intervene in the settlement of political problems in 
this hemisphere, it would appear that the Nonroe Doctrine is being 
abandoned."9 
Connally emphatically denied this charge. Senator Austin 
finally ironed out differences by proposing that a compror.ri.se 
paragraph be inserted into the Act. The new section irould ackno-;..-
ledge that the regional arrangement was to be consiste.'1.t with the 
purposes and principles of the general international organization 
upon its creation.10 He drafted such a passage and it was immediately 
accepted by all present. 
Following the delicate situation at the Reforr..a, the Secret.--iriJ 
held an interv:iew with Hr. Akin of~ magazine at 4:15 P.H. and 
then retired at 5:00 P.M. to his Cuernavaca residence. He spent 
the evening reading daily committee reports and composing a long 
telegram to Joseph Grew. Some unusual observations were included 
in the cable to Washington. Stettinius noted that sor.ie American. 
journalists had been raising questions about delegation disagree-
ments over economic matters. In fact, no such disagreements e:dsted 
as complete unanimity linked the various government agencies and 
representatives of labor, industr.r and agriculture., He speculated 
9.. Ibid. 
-
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that the reporters irragined that there i.-Jcre difficulties because 
they had been barred from economic sub-committee hearings on ex-
tremely sensitive topics.11 
The Secretary related another s·tranga epi:3ode inYolving the 
Mexican press. Individual business groups within the c.:i.pital 
favored local protection for industr'J over free intema tional 
trade. To voice their opposition to the Economic Charter and its 
pri_nciple of f:-ee t.ra.de7 they had taken out full page advertise-
ments in the local newspapers. AnalyZL"'lg this situation, labor 
advisors to the American delegation could fL"ld no proletariat 
angle for the advertisements. StettL-U.us reported his colleaguest 
I 
belief that the action represented nationalistic feeling plus 
local poll tics, namely opposi tior. to l)adilla.12 Further dis-
cussion of the incident was postponed until George Heany had ·time 
to conduct an investigation. 
Host of the telegram to Grew highlighted the progress of the 
corrmissions. The Secretary felt tr.at issues were car.ring to focus 
as the tension molUlted. He revealed that: "today and tomorrow 
should bring forth the essential debate.1113 Events indicated tr.at 
the conference might be able to conclude its work by Tuesday, 
March 7. The war effort cormtl.ttee for instance, had almost finished 
its tasks. P...esolutions to create a permanent inter-American 
c.t. t' · · .._O ll.. Telegra.m1 J1..e ;:.::.nius ,, 
P• 7, Box 2$7, stattL"lius P3pers. 
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_Defense Board, eliminate the remaining centers of subversion, and 
prevent the immigration of Fascist undesirables had already been 
submitted and approved.14 
Stettinius•s dispatch pointed out however, that Commission II 
1.-ms bogged do...m by circumstances beyond its control. The world 
organization group could not draft a final proposal until the 
terms of the San Francisco invitations were publicized. He in-
formed Grew that certain representatives within his conmLssion 
were exercising individual prerogatives rather than those of their 
respective delegations. There were di~turbing signs that Padilla 
did not have full control of his people. The Cubans al3o were 
t f ti . . t 15 no unc oru.ng as a urn. • Consequently, the Guiterrez criticisms 
and Mexican submission controversy had occurred .. 
The telegram revealed tr.at within the economic con:m.issions 
discussion centered around the continuance of wartime purchases 
during the transition period, the export of capital goods, and the 
16 
elimination of wartime controls. These groups were also working 
on transportation and subsidy recommendations. Another interest 
of Commissions.Ti/ and v.was the hemispheric funds and property of 
the Axis powers. American delegate Oscar Cox :bad made a strong 
statement on the importance of returning looted property to its 
rightful owners and stopping the flight of Fascist capital to 
.. A . 17 Lat-in raeri ca. 
11+. Ibid .. ll P• 2. 
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Considering the length of Stetti.'lius' s t·:!legr3.m (::;even pa3es) :-
it \:as unusual tii.at no comment t•'<lS r:ud~ on the French sponsorship 
affair. Perhaps because of Po.ris' previous lack of cooperation" 
he was resigned to the fact that there would be no fifth sponsor 
of the San Francisco Conference. The weekend would at least give 
him an opportunity to rest before the Norub.y oorning publication 
of the invitations. 
MAP.CH 3 1 1945 
Stettinius reb.xed at Cuernavaca on the third and pursued a 
very light schedule. ~\cart from reading a few co:n:n:i.:;sion reoorts . . 
and arranging the post-conference trip ta Cuba, hls time ':<JaS de-
voted to social functions. He had lunch with Padilla and Camacho 
i.Il the early afternoon and later returned to ~·:e;dco City for a 
dinner given by the chiefs of delegations in their honor. 
DlL.-ing the day, the SecretarJ received a cable from Spruille 
Braden, the American Ambassador in t'.avana. Tnis wire advised t.he 
chief American delegate against stopping off in Cuba after the 
Ghapultepec talks. Braden believed that a Stettinius visit to 
Havana would be misinterpreted and over-emphasized.18 He sug-
gested.that Rockefeller make the good will trip in his place. The 
Secretar'IJ immediately relayed the Braden cable to Washington for 
Joseph Grew to exarni..'1.e. He also contacted Rockefeller and Av1:a 
\·Iarren for their analysis of the wire.. They .agreed that a decision 
18. stettinius, Cal2;:ciar trotes, ~"'..::ir 1~:1. 3r 194jt ?• 3? 
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_should come from the State Department, i·;here the Cuban situation 
could be studied in greater depth. Although Stetti..>Uus Hould m·;ait 
word from Grew, he felt at this point that any non-compliance wl th 
Havana's official L"lvitation trould create a r:ti.su."'lderstanding.19 
While the Secretary contemplated his trip to Cuba and· 
socialized, the American delegation also moved at a slower pace. 
Foreign Service personnel had few conference duties or sub-committee 
hearings on Saturday. The usual delegation bri~fing ~as he1d at 
9:00 A.M. with Rockefeller, Pasvolsk;'r and economic advisor 
Wayne Taylor reviewi ... ng the progress of different committees. 
Rockefeller observed that the inter-American study group had re-
conciled its differences and almost completed the Declaration of 
Chapultepec. Outside of a: Bolivian diplom:it• s criticisms, the 
Deeb.ration had been received with rr.arked enthu:3iasm. The Bali 11ian 
representative had voted for it but still believed the document 
to be incomplete as it failed to acknowledge his landlocked countr.1•s 
need for Pacific seaports.20 Pasvolsky informed the gathering 
that fifteen nations had .submitted commentaries on the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals. He speculated that Para-Perez's Commission II 
sub-comnti. ttee might be able to sumnarize the various views by 
March 5. Wayne Taylor reported that differences of opinion within 
Commission IV centered around the cotton subsidy program, moderate 
20. Telegr3 m, Stettinius to ,Jos~ph Gr2·.·r, :'.:n-:;h 3, l9l,_5, 
P• 2 , Box 287, stetti.nius ?a.pe:cs" 
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_protection for new industries, and the developraent of rr..:irketJ for 
synthetics.21 
In general, the discussions revealed that the !-le;d. co City 
Conference had very little U.'1finished. business. There 1vere some 
major rratters though to clear up. The world or-ganization group 
had yet to draft a final resolution on the. Dumbarton Oaks program 
or hear Stettinius' s s ta tarnent on Sacuri ty Council operations. 
The inter-American commission still had to r.iold rniscellan':!ous 
proposals into the "Declaration of ~·fe;dco. 11 This Declaration set 
forth some twenty principles including the right3 of man, the sove-
reignty of states, the ju..."'idical equality of states, and the 
repudiation of territorial conquest. Mex:ic .. :m diplomats attached 
great importance to this resolution and hoped .for its speedy :rnb-
?2 
mission and approval.~ Finally, the Economic Charter of the 
Americas had to be shaped to fit both the United States and Iatin 
American objectives in the transition period. Therefore, such 
issues as wartime controls and purchases had to be resolved. 
MARCH 4, 1945 
The fourth was a day of rest for the delegates to the Mexico 
City Conference. No delegation, commission, or plenary meeti.'1.gs 
were conv~ned. Ll..!<e his colleagues, Stettinius took the day off 1 
preparing for the publication of the &u'1 Francisco invitations 
on Monday.23 
21. ~ .. , n .. J .. 
22. Ibid .. 
-23.. stettinius, Caler:dar ~lotesr lsrc::1: !.-, 191,_5 1 ::i .. 11' 
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While the Secretary rested, State Departz:ient officinl B'Jiri~~ton 
called Mexico City to verify the text of the ::;ir:iultaneous Sa.'1. 
Francisco announcements. As previously agreed, Grew would release 
the bids to the United Nations conference at noon on March 5 in 
Washington. The Secretary ~'lould do the same in Mexico City. Both 
would reveal that the United States was co-sponsoring the meeting 
with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China. 
Byington suggested in his telephone conversat.i.on that there be no 
elaboration of the French sponsorship affair. The Department would 
merely state that ~·1hile the French Provi3ional Government had acknow-
ledged its willi..".lglless to participate in the San Froncisco Conference, 
conditions had been placed upon its sponsorship which were unaccept~ 
. . . 24 
able to the otner r.aJor powers. 
Stet tinius recei vad this las t-mi.nute proposal i-;.i th out conment. 
He must have looked forward to the Monday morning session of hi3 
Commission II. In less than twenty-four hours, the pressure to 
issue the invitations and reveal Security Council operations would 
be gone. His brief speech to the·world organization would satisfy 
the cu...-iosity of rrany I.atin American diplomats. 
MARCH 5, 1%.5 
stettinius's overwhelming interests on Monday were naturally 
directed to bis Commission II speech on the San Francisco invi t.a-
t . Both he and bis fellow delegates Here an.nous to .have the ions .. 
invitations released.. For the Secretar;J, th~ issuance :·101.lld .reli;;ve 
21.;. .. Ibid., p .. J., 
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.hir.i of a heavy burden. The n3gging problem of French Jponsorship 
would be permanently removed. For latin American diplomats, the 
publication t1ould hopefully quell their fears that the Security 
Council was not merely a rubber stamp for the foreig.J. policies of 
the 11 Big Three. 11 
The chief American delegate returned from Cuernavaca an hour 
before the Commission II session to r.ake the final preparations 
for his speech.. Promptly at 10:00 A • .11., he arrived at the long-
awaited world organization meeting in the salon of Chapultepec 
Castle. Stettinius's "Calendar Notes" give a candid description 
of the scene. As he entered the long, narrow room filled with 
delegates and newsmen, the Secretary was caught up in the impor-
tance of the gathe:ci"1g. He observed that t.he setting was appropriate 
for his his tori cal announcement vd. th the ~·ialls lin;;!d with portr.:ii ts 
25 
of He.xi.can statesmen. 
labeling it the 11most significant occasion of his forrral par-
ticipation" at the conference, Stettinius delivered his address 
standing at the end of a long horseshoe table. The meeting was 
marked by warm geniality as he began his speech emphatically and 
26 persuasively. The SecreW.r'J followed the B)ri~'1gton formula arid 
prefaced his message with off-the-record comments on the French 
sponsorship issue. :nthout elaboration, he si:nply stated that 
251» 
Box 2861 
26. 
Stettiniusr Cal:zndar I'fotesr 
stettini~s Papers~ 
Ibid .. 
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Paris' conditions for sponsorship we4e unacce9tablc to the four 
. ')7 
other major powers ..... 
Stettinius reviewed the steos t.J.ken to c..:;tablish an i:iter-
m.tional peace-keeping body. The allies rud pledged by :iigning 
the Moscow Declaration of 1943 to create a general securlty; org.:l-
nization. ~t the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, they had drawn up a 
vast program for postwar cooperation. "In Mexico City," he noted, 
11our t.:lsk has been to exch.:l.nge vie~1/S and to chrify our thoughts 
on essential features of the world organization of the future and 
on the relationship to it of our i.."1.ter-An:erican system, .:md thus 
to prepare ourselves rr.ore fully for the work to be undertaken at 
F . 23 San ra.'1.cisco., 11 
The Secret.:lrJ then issued the invitations to the United Nations 
conference and n:o·red on to the most critical section of his address, 
the Security Council voting procedures.. He revealed that each 
member of the Council would have just cne vote. Procedural matters 
of this body would be decided by the affirmative vote of seven 
members. All other business would be approved by a majority vote 
of seven including the concurring ballots of the perr.ianent members.29 
The Secretary stressed that any nation appointed to the Security 
council, whether temporarily or permane.'1tly, could not participate 
27 • Stettinius, Commission II Speech, rfarch 5, l945, P• 1, 
Box 285, Stettinius Papers~ 
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in council decision-making on an international dispute to which it. 
was a party. "This meant," he rell'.arked, "that no nat:Lcn .Ln ti1e 
world will be denied the right to hav3 a fair hearing of its case 
in the Secu.ri ty Cotmcil, and that the equal, demo era tic rights of 
all nations ivill be respected."JO 
More than half of Stett.inius 1 s twelve-minute speech was devoted 
to an explanation of voting procedures. He dafended the rights of 
the major powers to dictate council operations. The "Big Three" 
were nations which possessed iJ1 sufficient degree the industrial 
and mill tary strength to prevent future international coni'licts. 
Although the first class statzs had designed the genero.l security 
organization, he declared that the responsibility for the estab-
lishment and r..ai.."'1tenance of a peaceful itorld order was the obligation 
of all nations. Concluding on a note of high emotion, the Secretar'J 
stated: 
He have the opportunity. ;·fe have the will. Pay 
God grant us the vision and the strength to sustain 
us. It is rey faith that together we will build 
this world of freedom and security - a ~orld at 
peace at last.31 
Both Padilla and Ambassador Belt of Guba rose to generously 
congratulate Stettinius for his remarks. The Mexican Foreign Mini-
ster said the speech would i-1arm the hearts of all men of good trill. 
He praised the Secretary for his splendid work in building a better 
ll t 11' 1 ' 'h J. • ' (+-' world and appealed to his co eagues o wKe co c. a.., r:ieer,ing ..,ne 
31 .. ~-
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·San Francisco Conference) the high purpose of :~stabli3hi...'1g justice 
J'"l for which men are dying, that it may be giv<::n 1asting realit:r." "-
After these felicitations, Par3.-Perez presented his long 
report on the Dumbarton Oa.~s progr-3.m, together with a draft reso-
lution. T.nis co~.mission recommendation conceded. that the purpose 
of the Western hemispheric republics Has to cooperate with one 
another and ~dth all nations loving peace in netting up a general 
world organization based upon the DU;11barton Oaks propozials. The 
Cuban delegates, though they had previousl.y opposed the proposals, 
now moved for the adoption of the resolution. They believed that 
the recommend.at.ion would not only make clear the determination of 
the American states to st.rive for the establishment of an effective 
international body but also place on record certain criticisms 
which they had to offer with :::-esp~ct to the Dumbarton Oaks program..33 
.A Peruvian representative pointed out, however, that t.he resolution 
lacked a specific provision regarding the relationship between the 
inter-American arrangement and the world organization. He sought 
a..'"l amendment stipulating that th_e regional system would act only 
in accordance with the principles of the proposed United Nations. 
An Uruguayan diplomat, voicing similar sentiments, stated that · 
there should be no e;cclusion of the world organization from 
. tt 34 jurisdiction over Arne:rJ..can ~a ers~ In opposition to this line 
l945, 
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of thought, a Brazilian delegate argued that the intcrn.:i tional 
body should intervene .in herrrbpheric afl':iirs only when the regional 
system broke down. To reconcile divergent i.'ieiis, it \.:-ds agreed 
that Para-Perez would consult ~-i:ith the delegates and work out a 
formula of comprorni.se.35 
Following this debate, Stettinius placed the resolution before 
the Commission and it t·..a.s unanimously approved by acclamation .. 
Before adjourning the meeting, the 3ccretarJ thanked Para-?erez 
for his report and also expressed his hope that the members of 
Commission II would work together again in San Francisco. Finall,y, 
he announced: 
Gentlemen, our work is done; I nm sure we all 
agree that the results achieved in this Cow.mission 
will stand out as a truly historic contribution 
to the greatest cause in th~ world.. ;;e are all 
going on to the next stap im:nensel,y .fortified in 
our deter:rrination to ei chi eve the crea lion of a 
~iOrld organization and in our faith that the 
United Nations shall succe.:!d in t:us supreme 
endeavor .3 6 
Having instilled a feeling of cordiality and a belief that 
a real service was beiJ1.g rendered, Stettinius successfully achieved 
d . t• 37 his goal for the wurl orgaru.za ion group. At times, La tin 
American delegates had criticized the Dumbarton Oaks proposals· 
and even suggested a list of revisions in the form of a Mexican 
· · · ,, ~~i·--;on J6. Stctt.J..ntUSr vO'""'· .,.,.._ • 
B ?85 st.ettinius :Japers .. ox - '- -
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. resolution. In the end, ho:•evar, the Secretar.:r ~~as oble to per-
suade them to accept the proposals at least. a3 a b.:.l.;;is .for di::;cus 3 ion 
at the San Francisco Conference. Thus~ the ll~s tern hemispheric 
states could approach the United Nations t.:J.Ll.\:s as .::i. unified group 
desirous of peace. 
With his commission duties completed, Stettini.us turned to 
another conference problem - the Argentine issue. He invited 
diplomats from Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, P.aiti, and El Salvador 
to a 2:00 P.M. lu.."lcheon to consider their relationships with the 
Buenos Aires government. This meeti..'lg accomplished very little. 
But its significance lies in that it marked the Secretary's first 
attempt in Hexico City to cope with the alienation of Argentina.JS 
At 4:30 P .. M., the chief American delegate assembled his top 
aides for an important strategy session. Conna1ly, Austin, 
Messersmith, Rockefellar, and others met with Stettinius to dra~ 
up plans for bringing the Chapultepec talks to a successful con-
clusion.39 several topics were discussed, ranging from the pro-
priety of submitting a resolution of thanks to Dr. Padilla for 
his fine chairmanship to the possibility of drafting a formula 
for the eventual return of Argentina to the hemispheric fold. ·The 
secretary also brought up the subject of his post-conference trip 
to Cuba. Ambassador Hessersmith noted that American problems in 
Cuba were rooted i."'1 the sugar purcha3ing policies. Uni'ortuna tel.y, 
JS .. 
Box 286, 
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. over the past three years, tha State Departi:1ent fi..:.td bt:~n unable to 
exercise a stabilizing :L"'lfluence. ~Ievertl1eless, he believed th..:i.t 
a stop tr..ade strictly on a courtesy basis t·1ould be aooronriate.40 
. . .. 
Rockefeller supported thi:; view.. SL"'l.ce Ambassador Braden had 
already expressed his disapproval of such a "vi!lit, and Grew had 
yet to submit a judgment, a final decision was postponed. 
Follow.L.-rig the dialogue on the r<.avana trip, Assistant Secretary 
Clayton briefed the gathering on the development of the economic 
resolutions. He observed that Chile and Brazil had introduced 
proposals calling on the United Statas to close do;..n •,o1ar pl:mts 
in competition with the basic resources o.f L:l tin .America.. This 
recommendation was directed exclusively at Ar.:etlc:.m rubber and 
nitrate factories.41 Clajton revealed that whlJ.e Brazil had been 
influenced to iii thdraw its resolution on rubber prciduction, Chile 
had refused to cooperate. Stettir..ius stated at this point tti.at. 
neither proposal was within the proper scope of the Herico City 
Conference. The nitrate question was a private matter between 
the United states and Chila. He suggested that a letter be sent 
to the Santiago regime arranging for consultations at a later date.42 
Before endi..71.g the meeting, the Secretary commented on leaks 
to the nress concern:L!g the business of the delegation steering 
.. 
•tt James R0 ston and other cor:-espond~ts had published commi ee. .-... 
191+5, 
41 .. Ibid,., P• 2,. 
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42. Ibid .. 
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·unfavorable stories about internal disputes. E>t•:!ttinius decl.::i.red 
that "they would have to do better in San F'r.lnci::.co, 11 implyi.:ig 
perhaps, that unfounded rumors would h.:ne t.o be elir:Unated at 
the United Nations conference. 
Since his taJk with the delegation steering committee dragged 
on, the chief American diplomat missed most of the 5:00 ?.M. plenary 
session. In the early evening, he met briefly with Rockefeller 
and then retired to answer his correspondence. Writing to Grew, 
he related that the Act of Chapultepec was a meeting of the minds, 
where all the American republics signing the document had guaran-
teed the security and integrity of not just one or two nations but 
the whole Western hemisphere. 11It was a real step forward toward 
the success of the San Fr3.ncisco Ccnference.111+3 
The Secret.'.l.r"J also infor:ned his assi3t.:lnt in ';fashington that 
Corrrnission III had adopted the 11 Declaration of t-~exico .. 11 This 
resolution by the host country embraced seventeen broad social 
precepts and principles of international law. He noted that the 
"Declaration" had aroused little debate. "Evidently, the dele-
gates seem to feel it was a contribution to Mexican prestige and 
44 
did not examine it closely • • • •" 
Overall stettinius exhibited an optimistic mood in his dis-
patches of March 5. The conference proceedings continued to meet 
the objectives of .American foreign policy. The Latin American 
43. Ibid,. 
-
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. republics had finally agreed to accept th~ ilu:;;ba . .:-ton Oa~<s proposal::; 
as a basis for discussion in s~ Francisco. A r.:!giona.l. :.;ecuri ty 
pact had been drafted to become the keystone of hemispheric de-
fenses. Economic and social resolutions fores!'ladowed closer 
cooperation between Washington and its souther.1 neighbors dUring 
the transition period. With all these positive accomplishments, 
one critical issue still had to be resolved. The Secretar<J ob-
served that "the outstanding theme of press and delegate interest 
was the Argentine situ.a !:.ion, but it had not. yet reached the stage 
f bli di . 1145 o pu c . scussion. This lack of publici t..y would be remedied 
very soon. 
Ibid ... p .. /"' 
-· 
CP ..APTEii VII 
OVERCOMING FHL\L OBS'l'.:\CIES: ARGi!:iI'i'IN~ ISOU'l'10~1 
AND THE Ei'ID OF TifE CONFEIIB:iCE 
HARCH 6, 1945 
With the conference near cor.ipletion, Stettinius's duties 
at Chapultepec were greatly reduced. His only rell'aining najor 
responsibility ~.,as to oversee the final processing of resolutions. 
Most of the corr.missions had submitted their recommendations to 
the conference as a whole.. The status of these proposals had yet 
to be determined by the plenary sessions. Thus on !·'.arch 6, the 
SecretariJ spent considerable tine studying resolutions in prepa.!:"3.-
tion for the day's pl~nar; r::eeting. PL:lgued by the Argentine :i.ssue, 
he also scheduled a luncheon with IatLYJ. American diplor.nts to di::;-
cuss further relations with the Farrell regime. 
Throughout the r.:.orning, Stettinius reviewed conmssion reports 
written by his aides. Adolf Berle's paper informed him that Com-
mission I proposals were based upon the principle that the .American 
republics constituted an integrated defense zone.1 Therefore, the 
war effort committee suggested that a permanent hemispheric plan-
ning board be created for military affairs. The commit.tee also 
sought government control of the production and distribution of 
armaments. This did not mean the nat.ionaliza ti on of the mu.'1i tions 
industry but rather govern.':1ent regulation of it. Other resolutio~s 
'"t· · C" 1 er:d.:i.r !Jot es. I,;areh 6: J..·?45 r p .. 1, Do:c 286~ 1. Ste" J....'1.:.US~ u.- • • 
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dealt with protecting the hemisphdre fram Ax:i.::. ::;uoversion ~md \·w.r 
criminals. 3erle cited two difficulties that hi:.3 commission en-
countered. The first controversy centered around the cri teri.:i 
to distinguish political exiles from \-l<lr c:-im:inal::>. A method had 
to be instituted whereby the c:listi...-1ction could be made without 
eliminating the right of asylum. The second problem was defining 
subversive action so as not to interfere :iith revolutionarJ activi-
ties which sometimes occurr~ within an American r3public. This 
issue was debated without the intention of frustrating the possi-
2 bilities of political chaD.ge. 
In the Comrrd.3sion II report, Pasvolsky summarized only the 
key proceedings. This body had considered fifteen recorr.mendations, 
five of which had been submitted to the full committee and three 
approved.3 Stettinius's world or~ani:~ation group bad pa:.wed pro-
posals 1) accepting the Dumbarton Oaks program as a basis for 
discussion in San Francisco, 2) reaffirming the Atlantic Charter, 
and 3) acknowledging the right of 1·1omen to participate in inter-
. ~ 4 
national coruerences. 
As the Secretary analyzed the resolutions of Commission III, 
he noted three of broad public and internatior>...al interest. 5 The 
2 Tolorrram Stettinius to Josenh Grew, i-!.a.rco 6, 1945, • \,,oil' -o 1 .,lo 
P• 3, Box 286, stettinius Papers. 
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The recommendation for freedom of access of information had been. 
adopted unanimously by the comr:ri.ttee with fc;, minor changes. This 
action had been favorably received by Americ.'.4'1. journalists and 
radio commentators. The Haitian proposal against racial discrimi-
nation had been passed too. It reaffirmed the principle that all 
men are entitled to equal rights and opportunities. A third reso-
lution paid homage to the Domini.on of Canada for her contributions 
to the war effort. It also recognized that relations between the 
American republics and Canada were becoming closer daily.6 
The Commission IV paper presented to Stettin:i.us by Technical 
Expert August Maffry covered a wide variety of resolutions. Pro-
posals of commercial :interest dealt with the Economic Charter of 
the Americas 1 inter-American transportation systems, and hemis-
pheric development progra~s, Other measures sought to prevent 
unemployment and increase the sale and distribution of primar-.r 
products. In reference to social matters, Maffry revealed that 
his committee had produced suggestions for inter-American coop-
eration in the case of European war orphails, a charter for women 
and children, and a Declaration of Social Principles of the 
A . 7 mencas. 
The progress of Commission V was outlined by advisor 
Wayne Taylor. He observed that his group had approved eight pro-
grams geared to economic cooperation in the prosecution of the war. 
7,. Au,gust YE.i'f~r, Corr.mission IV Hzport, Hare~ br 1945, 
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-Of great interest to the delegatas was a war-ti;::e price control 
resolution. It recommended the continuous revision and review of 
controls, keeping in mind that price ceilings Ghould be appro-
priately related to the costs of production and transportation, 
and that the prices of raw and manufactured r:ia.terials should have 
a fair relationship.8 .Another proposal desired to make cap.ital 
equipment available to the underdeveloped south~rn republics on 
a fair and equitable basis. Tied to this suggestion ~.;as the con-
cept of an economic advisory committee. This proposed research 
body would compile data on economic problems from each hemispheric 
power and hopefully produce concrete oolutions. P.aving a strong 
interest in enemy financial and commercial holdings, Commission V 
passed three other resolutions. i·ii th respect to ~"d.s a~ts of 
dispossession,:ao transfers made during the period of enemy occu-
pation would be recognized. A declaration on gold policies would 
bind signatory nations to refuse to purchase gold having an enel'1\7 
taint. And finally, neutral nations were called upon to demobilize 
Axis assets.9 
Along with the five commission reports that the Secretary 
perused, he read a surYey of press reaction to the San Francisco 
invitations. A majority of the top American newspapers welcomed 
the Security Council voting procedures. The operations of the 
Council were labeled "constructive and reasonable" by the New York 
Times and characteri::ed as an "ingenious .fo:--r.1ul.J." oy the l'Ta»-1 Y:)rk 
8. Stetti:nius~ Calwdar i'Iotest 1-'a.:rch 6~ 19L,5r p .. 1, 
Box 286, Stettinius Papersa 
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. Herald Tribune.10 Of the few opponents to voting procedures radio 
commentators Earl Godwin and ~·!alter Kiernan were the most bi ttcr .. 
"Another victoi-.r for Stalin," declared Godwin, "and a swell way to 
bat sl'l'all nations around and let any one of the big nations act 
the bully." Kiernan described the invitations as 11 Russia gett:irig 
11 her way." France's failure to sponsor the San Francisco Con-
ference received only a rnodente amount of comr.ient - mostly to the 
effect that Paris missed an opportunity to increase its prest.ige.12 
After spending the first half of the day reading conference 
proposals, Stettinius hald a 2:00 P .. H. luncheon with latin American 
diplorrats~ He discussed the Argentine situation uith the Foreign 
Ministers of Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, and the 
Paraguayan Ambassador to i;Iashington. Unanimity existed among all 
delegations that the only alternative was to pass a resolution at 
the conclusion of the talks expressing regret at Argenti."1a 1 s ab-
sence but indicating hope that in the interest of continental 
unity she would adhere to the Act of Chapultepec and other con-
ference provisions as well as qualifiJ for United Nations membership.13 
In accordance with conference plans, Dr. Padilla was to bring this 
resolution to the attention of the Buenos Aires government through 
the machinery of the Pan American Union. The diplomatic language 
of the proposal would seek to make clear tr.at Argentina had to bind 
10. su.....-vey of Press Coverage of t..h.e I;:;su.ance of the San 
Francisco Invi ::.ations, g;irch 5, 1945, P• 11 Bex 286, Stattinius Papers., 
11 .. ~ .. , P• 2. 
12 .. ~~1 p .. 1 .. , 
lJ., Stettinius, Calenda!' Not.es: !hrch 6r V-145~ ? ... 3, Box 236, 
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_herself to Hex:i.co City and United Nations dt;icisions in order to 
join the American and world security systems. At the 5arne t.ii~e, 
the draft would attempt to avoid any sugg.~stion of nn 1Jltir.atum. 
The conference recommendation would thus obligate the Farrell regime 
to take explicit action against Axis agents, war crir.~nals,- finan-
cial and commercial concerns on one hand and abandon its aggressive 
tendencies on the other.14 Lo.tin American support for a resolution 
of this nature i;-rouJ.d appeal to the Secretary. This proposal would 
reflect hemispheric solidarity without pitting the United States 
against Argentina as individual adversaries. 
Following the luncheon, Stettinius attended the 5:00 P.H. 
plenary session at Chapultepec Castle.. At this meeting, more than 
twenty resolutions 1·1ere given .final approval by the conf'erence as 
a whole. Among the recommendations passed were those concerning 
a perrranent inter-American Defense Board, strengthening the regional 
system, and the Declaration of Mexico. \.Tith this session,conference 
. 6 d d 15 business for March en e • In the early evening, Secretary and 
Hrs. Stettinius hosted a black tie dinner for the heads of dele-
. Em' 16 gations at the Amen.can· • oassy. 
stettinius reviewed the day's activities in a cable sent to 
Joseph Grew later on that night. He noted that: 
14. James Reston, "Conferees Soften Tone On Argentina," 
New York 'l'i.:nes 1 ?-:arch 7, 1945, p .. 9 .. 
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Everyone f~els that not.eworthy progress has bcdn 
made toward cooperation of the Americ,:m republics 
with the world organization and no negative criti-
cism has been voiced beyond some irnllcations of 
disappointment that France is not among the nations 
sponsoring the San Francisco Conference. The 
resolution regarding Argentina is in draft form 
but is unlikely to be presented till th~ meeting 
of the Steering Committee on Thursday.l7 
The Secretary also revealed that while the Chapultepec talks were 
proceeding smoothly, there uould be an extension of the conference.18 
The delegations would not depart before Thursday evening because 
of difficulties in the coordinating committee. Over one hundred 
and fifty resolutions had to be edited, typed, and translated 
before a conference adjournment. 
MARCH 7, 1945 
Much like the preceding day, Stettinius spent his time on 
March 7 in strategy talks debating the Argentine issue and in a 
plenary session legislatirig resolutions. At this point, most 
delegations favored the proposed statement of regret as the best 
means to handle Argentine isolation. American diploirats, however, 
wanted to make sure that the document would not place the hemi.s-
pheric republics in an embarrassing situation at a later date. 
Therefore, when the Secretary was not at plenary sessions form-
lizing recommendations or attendi.11g to last-minute conference 
busi.--iess, he and his aides were e.xaming relations with Buenos Aires. 
17. ~· 
18.. Telegram, Stettinius to Gr<;Wr n">...r:ch 6, 1945: _o .. 4'1! 
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At both the 9:00 A.M. delegation meeting a:!d the 9:h5 A .. M. 
steering committee copJ'erence, State Department official5 studied 
the pros and cons of the Argent:.:ine resolution. Unable to attend 
these gatherings because of his brief courtesy call on President 
Caw.ache, Stettinius sent Hayden Raynor in his place. A mood of 
uncertainty existed at the first meeting. The question arose 
whether or not Argentina should be allowed to join the United Ma-
tions unless she declared war, in as r:ruch as some other Latin 
American nations had only decl.'.lred a state of belligerency •19 
Both William Clayton ~11d Hichael McDermott felt that public opin-
ion at home would not be satisfied unless the Farrell regime 
initiated hostilities against the A.us powers. They considered 
a war declaration absolutely necessary for A=ger.tina • s return to 
the "family of nati.ons.1120 Rockefeller pointed out, howe·.rerr that. 
according to the conference proposal, the Buenos Aires government 
need only abide by the United Nations• Pact and the Me..'Cico City 
decisions to be welcomed back into the hemispheric fold. This 
resolution did not specify that Argentina declare war, although 
there was such an implication. Rockefeller urged his colleagues 
not to push Farrell's regime into the pre.sent conflict. Warning 
against writing something into the resolution that was not expressed 
there, he perceived that outside pressure might create such a 
reaction in Argentina that its people would refuse to satisfy the 
19., Ibid .. 
20.. Havden Ra;1-nor~ ·Delegation. L·leati:ig Eeport, i·'.arch 7 1 1945, 
p .. 1, Box 2s6, Stattinius P::i.pers,. 
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21 
terms of the proposal. Senator Austin did not accept this line 
of thinking. He believed that the American delegation should 
publicly stress the need for an Argentine ...... ar clecl.:.l.ration. Though 
such comments would be popular, Rockefeller felt that t.hey would 
do a disservice to American foreign policy.22 
Immediately after this debate, a rump session of the steering 
committee convened. Following further polemics, this gathering 
agreed that the Argentine resolution should indicate that. the 
Me.'tico City conference viewed the Farrell regime as an integral 
part of the Ainericas. Consequently, Argentina should place her-
self in a position to concur with the work of the Chapultepec taJ.l<:s 
and strive to become a signatory to the United !Ia tions Declara lion • .2J 
Having found unanimity only in the belief that the Buenos Aires 
government belonged within the hemispheric bloc, Stettiniusrs top 
aides assembled once more at ll:JO A.M. to brief him on their 
earlier discussions. Before exarr~ning the Argentine controversy, 
the Secretary commented on the value of keeping congressional 
leaders informed on conference proceedings. Senator Austin and 
Representative Johnson replied that the dalegation had kept them 
abreast of diplomatic matters.. Hoving on to the Buenos .Aires ques-
tion, the debate reswned tihen Austin again stated that Argentina 
21. Ibid., P• 2. 
22. ~-
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. nust defini te:cy declare •~ar to be reinst.:ited. Accepting tiu::; vie:.;, 
Stettinius stated that: 
We should not even open the door a crack un.til she 
Argentina had declared war and that ~·;as the a tti tu.de 
all delegates would take ~hen they 1·;ent home.24 
Although there were conflicting opinions within the steering com-
rnittee on the war declaration rotter as evidenced by the Austin and 
Rockefeller positions, the group st.ill :mpported the proposed Ar-
gentine resolution. In other words, Stettinius and other America.'1. 
delegates may have privately desired Argentina's entrance into 
the war, but publicl,y they supported her adherence to the Hexico 
City resolutions and the United Nations Declaration for re-admi::;sion. 
The Secretary noted later on that the Argentine resolution was 11 the 
product of the draftsmanship of many delegates and seemed to have 
complete and enthusiastic acceptance.1125 Thinking perhaps of dif-
ferences idthin his own delegation he also observed tl"'.at., lacking 
consensus, some individuals might oppose the resolution when it 
came up for final approval.26 
To inform the newspapers and the general public of the American 
delegation's activities and views concerning the Argentine reso-
lution, Stettinius scheduled a 1:00 P.N. press conference. Surpris-
ingly, he made a few introducto~J remarks and then departed :for 
24.. Stettirtlu::;~ Calendar rrotes, i!arch 7 r 1945~ p. lr 
Box 286, StettL~J.us Papers~ 
25 11 Tel~gram~ Stet.tinius to Joseph Grew: Barch 7, 1945, 
P• 2, Box 286 1 Stettirlius ?apars. 
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·an "urgent appointment." Revealing hiG gratification uith the 
progress of the conference, the Secretary just hinted that hemis-
pheric solidarity >.Ja.S within sight and excused himself• 27 
Rockefeller conducted the rest of the conference and outlined 
off-the-record American responses to the Argentine resolution. He 
mentioned that Stettinius had held a series of luncheon rneeti.."lgs 
with latin American diplor:'.ats to exchange views on the Buenos Aires 
question. Considering these sessions "inspirational," the Assistant 
Secretary remarked that they 1-;ere characteri~ed by tremendous una-
nimity, frankness, and directness.28 He stated too that the 
Washington delegation had continuously encountered a unique prob-
lem at the conference. Argentine represent.:itives had worked behind 
the scenes w:i. th diplomats from every hemispheric power except the 
United States to ga:L-i quasi acceptance at Chapultepec. Rockefeller 
revealed that the United States ims attempting to eradicate this 
back door diplooiacy among the American republics. He declared 
that: 
One of the points we ~..anted to arrange at the con-
ference is to get a line back of which all the 
Americas would stand together, to get away from the 
problem of not knowing what other republics are 
think:Lng • • • • .And I think we have here something 
the Argentine Resolution which the Americas as a 
group -- twenty repuolics represented here ~ can 
stand together on a.~d subscribe to, so that for 
27.,. Stettinius, Press Conference St.:ite;:;ent, March 77 l945r 
P• 1, Box 286 1 Stettinius Papers .. 
28. Nelson A., Rockzfall•~r, Pr:;ss Cortfere!'.!ce Statement 11 
Harch 7, 1945, p .. 2 1 Box 2S6r Stettinit~3 Papers .. 
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the first time we rove got a uJlified position which 
eliminates all of this mnuevering mid r.:oving .:i.round, 
in which nobody can quite tell i·1here they nre.29 
After assuring the reporters that the Argentine resolution 
did not commit the United States to granting diplorratic recogni-
tion to the Farrell regime, Rockefeller introduced Adolf' Berle. 
The American Ambassador to Brazil explained Argentina's obligations 
if she signed the United Nations Declaration. The Buenos Aires 
government would have to devote all· its mill ta!"J and economic re-
sources to the struggle against the nations of the Tripartite Pact. 
Although this did not necessarily entail a declaration of war. 
Argenti.Yla would also have to pledge not to rrake a separate armi-
stice or peace ~ii th the Axis powers .30 
Following their for~al statements, both Berle and Rockefeller 
fielded questions from the press. One journalist inquired as to 
the most deplorable aspect of the Argentine situation. Rockefeller 
replied that "it was the Farrell regime's inability to put itself 
in a position to participate in the Chapultepec talks.•;Jl Before 
concluding, Berle announced that the Argentine resolution Would 
become a public document after the final plenarJ session on 
Narch 8. At that tirr.e, it would be attached to the final act of 
~ 32 
.the coruerence. 
29. ~ .. , PP• 3-4• 
30. ~ .. 1 P• 6~ 
31. ~ .. , P• 8 .. 
32.. Adolf Berla, Press Conf,'.'!rence SwL')r::e .. '1tr ?·'2:rch 7, 1945, 
P• 8, Box 286, St8ttinius Papers .. 
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From the press conference, the interest3 cf the American del(!-
gation shifted to the 5 :00 P .('!. plenariJ 50ssion. Stettinius re-
entered the picture as he participated in the final passage of 
various conference proposal3. VotLY?g 1·1as ::;o rapid that only with 
the utmost difficulty could one k~ep up vith what Has being- con-
sidered.3.3 Ten of the last recommendations were decided upon by 
title, without any debate of the individual clauses within each 
text. The Secretary and his latin American colleagues approved 
of measures ranging from guidelines for the progressive reduction 
of price controls to safeguards for democratic ctluca tionaJ. systems. 
As the final conference proceedings moved into high gear, 
stettinius spent part of the evening planning his schedule for the 
last day of the Chapultepec talks. He had to prepare himself for 
his plenary session address thanking Dr. PadiD...:l and President 
Camacho for their work. The chief Ar..erican delegate also had to 
arrange for his departure from Mexico City plus take care of last-
minute details concerning his radio broadcast the following evening. 
As these matters were attended to, the prospect of successfully 
concluding the Mexico City Conference must have defi..'11.itely pleased 
him. 
1-i<\RCH 8-, 1945 
Edward Stettinius was a v·erJ visible figure on the .last day 
of the Chapultepec tall-cs. Shift:L'lg scenes quickly, he basked in 
33. Hayden P..aynor1 ?l:;;nary Session Repoct, l·iarGh 71 1945~ 
p .. 1, Box 286, Stetti:rl.u:.:; Pnpt;:rs .. 
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. the limelight of the final delegation r::eei:.ing, plenary ::;es3ions, 
press conference, and radio broadc.:ist.. Pr.llsing h.b colleagues 
at these gatherings for their contributions in :·~e:cico Ci t:.y, he 
in turn was congratulated for hi::; efforts. Not only the sacrifices 
of la tin Ar.ierican diploma.ts, but also the friendly i·iays and· personal 
diplor:acy of the Secretary were acknowledged as instrumental in 
the successes of the conference. 
At the L3.st 9:00 A.H. delegation briefing, Stettinius depicted 
the Mexico City negotiations as a series of advances of real im-
portance. He expressed his appreciation to P.ockefeller, l1essersmith, 
a..-r1d their staffs for their part in attaining these positive results. 
Believing there had never been greater harmony between agencies 
of the United States government, starting with congressional 
representatives o.nd goL'l"lg through both old-line and emergency branches, 
he declared that: 11 this demonstration of unity has inspired many 
and been of tremendous assistance to the Defartment of State.1134 
Following these remarks of con:mendation, the chief American 
spokesman read an Associated Press disfatch from Argentina. This 
cable indicated that the Buenos Aires government was wiDing to 
take a conciliatory position. Farrell's Foreign Minister, 
Cesar Ameghino bad issued a statement endorsing the aims of the 
.Act of Chapultepec.35 Though it now appeared that the contra-
versy with Argentina might be near an er..d, Stettinius pointed out 
34.. stettirilus, Calendar Notesr ?·'.arch S, 191~5, P• lt 
Box 286, Stettinius P::ipe:rs. 
35.. Ibid. 
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the possibility of a new threat to Arr.erican foreign policy. HuI'.:ors 
persisted that some hemispheric republics r.d.ght establish a cor;lffion 
policy prior to the San Francisco Conference and thus form a L-itin 
American bloc at the rr:eeting. He charged hOckefeller with the 
responsibility of preventing such a situation..36 
L~ the absence of Tom ConnaJJs', the Secretary next called on 
Senator Warren Austin for a few remarks. The Vermont poll tician 
regarded the Mexico City Conf0rence 3S a "helpful experiment" 
toward peace. He noted that a great e.xmnple had been set biJ the 
cooperative action within the American delegation. Austin thanked 
the Foreign Service personnel for the treatment attributed him 
as a Republican opposition member of the United States Senate and 
especially the openness with uhich he had been dealt..37 
Before adjourning, Rockefeller rose to thank Stettin.ius on 
behalf of the delegation for devoting two weeks of his time to 
the Chapultepec talks. His subordinates appreciated his sacrifices 
at an important r..oment in world events to viOrk in Me..-d.co City in 
full equality with the representatives of the othar American 
countries. Rockefeller stated that the Secretary's leadership 
had been a real inspiration to the United States delegation.38 · 
From the Hotel Reforrm gathering, Stettinius went to the 
National Palace accorn:--...,anied by Rockefeller,. Hessersmith, and 
36. Ibid. 
37. Tb;d .:::-;::......!titf p .. 2 .. 
38. ~ .. 
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. Warren Pierson, head of the Export-Import Bank, for an ll:CO A.N. 
appointment with President Car.iacho. The chief :\rr:erican dalegate 
and the Mexican leadar held a thirty-five rai.nute conversa t.:ion 
which was marked by extrer.ie cordiality .39 During a previous talk 
at Cuernavaca on Harch 3, the Secretary had conveyed to Camacho 
President P~osevelt's greetings and hopes for a renewal of the 
pleasant exchanges initiated the year before at Corpus Cristi and 
Monterrey. Stettinius prai:>ed Camacho for the const-.ructive super-
vision he and Dr. Padilla had given the conference. He also commended 
the Ca!IBcho adrrd.n.istration for its progressive programs which had 
strengthened ties between the United States and its southern. neigh-
40 bor. 
The He.."ci..can president replied with great emotion as he spoke 
warr.Uy of Roosevelt and of the Secretary's efforts at Chapultepec,.41 
He felt that Hashington and Mexico City would no longer be fearful 
of each other as they solved mutual problems without :incident. 
stettinius later noted in his journal that Camacho spoke with ob-
vio~ sincerity and a certain amount of feeling. He observed that 
the President's manner of expression undoubtedly reflected his 
genuine attitude of friendship toward the United States.42 
After his conversation at the National Palace, the Secretar-.r 
proceeded to the plenary session scheduled for noon,. Padilla 
39 .. ~ .. , P• 4~ 
40 •. Ibid •• P• 5. 
-· 
41. Ibid$ 
-
42 .. Ibid,., P• 6. 
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opened the meeting by nzklng i-;hether there ~.yere an,y motions before 
the reading of the final act,. Sever3.l del~g.:itcs took this oppor-
tunity to make speeches compline;:iting the \'/Ork o.f P.J.dilla o.nd 
Stettinius. The chief fu~erican spokesman than rose to deliver 
his final plenary address. In a brief tiro-rn:i.nute talk, he "paid 
tribute to the hospitality, generosity, nnd goodwill of the Mex-
ican people and their leaders. The Secretary mentioned the deep 
interest and helpful influence of President Camacho in the labors 
of the conference. In reference to.Padill:l, he declared that "his 
outstanding work in organizing this historic assembly and brilliant 
manner in which he has conducted its deliber:J.tions h.'.l.ve contributed 
beyond measure to its ::;uccess.1143 Stettinius concluded by expres-
sing his hope that it :wuld be hi3 good fortune to welcome many of 
the delegates including the Me.xi.can hosts to the San Fr.'.lncisco 
Conf'erence in a few Heeks.44 
iT.nen Padilla regained the floor he unveiled the gratitude of 
his countr.r by interpreting the advances of the conference L'l'l terms 
of the diligence and efforts of the visiting delegates. Having 
paid this compliment, he directed the passage of the final act 
and some sixty resolutions covering almost everJ field of hunan 
endeavor. 
43. stetthnus1 Plena:rJ Sess-5..on Speech7 Earch 8, 19l·5!' 
p .. 1, Box 286, Stettinius Papers .. 
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After the plenary ses3ion, Stettiniu3 ottcnded a mid-afternoon 
luncheon for delegation heads and then went on to hold his lnst 
press conference at the Edificio Imperial at l+:JO. There he rrade 
just a brief statement revealing his intention to visit President 
Grau Sa..'1 Martin of Cuba after the conference. He also thanked 
the reporters for their cooperation at Chapultepec and bade them 
farewell until the United Nations talks.45 Nost of this conference 
was utilized as an opportunity for American advisors to publicize 
their views on the Chapultepec meetings. The Secretary looked on 
as his top aides - Rockefeller, AustLJ., Connally, and Hessersmith -
gave short speeches and fielded questions from reporters. P..ockefeller, 
speaking first, repeated his remarks of the earlier delegation 
briefing praising his boss. He comrr.ended St.ettinius for his policy 
of delegating authority to those around him and for his inspiring 
leadership. The Assistant Secretary also spoke highly of the 
journalists and regarded his ossociation with them as one of his 
· hi . If . C . t 46 happiest relations ps in vex:i.co ]. y. 
When a Venezuelan reporter asked if reactionarJ republicans 
would place obstacles in the way of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
senator Austin answered with an emphatic "No!" The Vermont poll-
tician went on to voice his adrn:i.ration for the conference practice 
of "open cove.11ants openly arrived at.1147 He and his fellow senator, 
C .~ ('.l- t . h5'* Stet.tiniu.sr Press on.!.'~reEce .J\,a er::em:.1 
1945, p .. 2, Box 236, Stettinius PapeYs. 
1·".arch 8, 
46 .. ~ .. , pp .. 2-,3 .. 
Con."lally, had participated in free and public Ui:::;cus3ion;:; of 
hemispheric problems. Austin regarded the conf~rence as a t:;reat 
"uplifting" for himself and declared that "~·1e have really accom-
plished tremendous progress toward the objective that is.of vital 
interest to evecy father and nother of a soldier • • ., and .we 
have discovered what warm sympathy there is ar.:ong L:ltin Americans 
and South Americans.1148 
Following his congressional colleague, Tom Connally tallted to 
the reporters about the Act of Chapultepec. He remarked that the 
regional pact had realized his hope of so~e day making the security 
and safety of the Western hemisphere the responsibility of all the 
American states. The Texas Democrat observed that this "act of 
co::J..aboration" consisted of two phases. In the first instance, 
the attack of a non-American country on ai~y hemispheric republic 
would be regarded as a..'1 act of aggression by all the regional 
powers, who would present a united front against the potential 
conqueror. Secondly, Connally declared that as a family of nations, 
the hemisphere had ta.J<en a great step in the interest of self-
preservation because "no American aggressor can, with safety, 
attack his neighbor7 or any other nation without incurring the. 
risk of unified hostility and resistance .. 1149 He concluded that the 
defense pa.ct r.arked an epoch or era in international relations and 
international law and was "a great milestone 3.long the high1ray which 
we hope is leading to peace and secw.~t.y throughout t.he 1·10rld .. "5o 
4s .. Ibid .. 
-
49 .. Ibid,., 
-
p .. 5 .. 
50 .. T'...,·d ~·, p .. 6 .. 
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George Messersmith issued the last :::;tatement at the press 
conference. He spoke of the significance of the Chapu.lt.epec talks 
to the inter-American scene as well as the world picture. The 
United States Ambassador also revealed that he never had any doubts 
about the outcome of the conference. "I had no fears at all as 
to the success of this meeting because I had the absolute confi-
dence that first of all the American delegation, headed by our 
dynamic and understanding Secretary of State, would come here with 
a full understand.:Ll'lg of the problems which we had to face."5l 
Messersmith believed tl>.at at no time in the history of the Amer-
ican republics had a gathering of this kind been held in an 
atmosphere of such complete cordiality a.r.d. seriousness., 
Having given his aidas the chance to voice their opinions on 
the Cli..apultepec talks, Stetti.."1.ius revealed similar sentiments in 
a radio speech over the CBS network at 9:15 P.H. He felt that the 
conference had achieved truly historic results. 
We r..ave reaffirmed our wartime coll.aboration in 
the struggle against the .Axis countries, strengthened 
our system of inter-Amer-lean cooperation, and 
assured the participation of the American republics 
in the effort to organize the world for peace and 
security.52 
The Secretary speculated that the conclusions reached in .Mexico 
City would contribute to the success of the upcoming Sa,., Francisco 
meeting and also foreshadow the complete a."'1d perfect organiza lion 
51. Jl?1£ .. 
52. stett:L!i.us, f'3clio Speechr .i>br~h Sr 1%5 7 p ... lr 
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of t~e regional system at the inter-A~erican conf crenca scheduled 
for Bogota in 1946.5J 
SlLm.arizing the accomplishments of the Cb.:i.pultepec talks, he 
outlined sL"'C agreements which he considered to be of extraordir..a!"IJ 
significance. First of all, the American st.ates were united in 
their effort to stamp out every vestige of Nazi influence L"l the 
~'lestern herrri.sphere. The delegates J:i..ad passed resolutions aiming 
to elimL"la te A.id..s subversion and prevent the escape of war crir.rl.-
nals. Secondly, after full deliberation, the hemispheric republics 
had endorsed the DUr:Jbarton Oaks proposals as a basis for discussion 
at the United Nations conference. Recommendations from the Hex:i.co 
City gathering Hould also aid :i.n the creation of :m international 
body. Stettinius an.--iounced that 11 the i;vorld co.n rest assured that 
the American states are prefCired to join 1rlth the other United 
Nations in the successful establishr.1ent and maintenance of the 
ld . . . 1154 wor orga.nJ.zaT.J..on • 
.Another great conference achievenent, according to the Sec-
retary, i-ms the adoption of the .Act of Cli.apultepec. The United 
states and its latin American neighbors NOuld band together in 
the future to resist aggression from without or within the herrri.s-
phere. Of comparable importance was the agreement to strengthen 
· +· .;.,.,ter ' .... e.,...; can "Y"'-'-em 11 C1 .; "'···...,~ring .Z.he steady and reorgaruze vne .....,_. -,'1.lh .J.- >>' ~ \, I.. ..L...L. .0-- ~ 
growth of inter-Arr.erican fraternity and cooper3tion during a cen-
53 .. 
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tury," Stettinius stated, "it is noi'i a,sreed that conferences of the 
American s~tes will be held regu.l:ll"'ly at four year intorvals; that 
there be regular annual and special emergency meetings of the For-
eign Hinisters; that .the Pan American Union ~1ill be given increased 
powers.1155 In addition, he pointed out that the functions .of numer-
ous existing inter-American agencies of juridic.:il, mi.li tary, social 
and econor:Ii.c character had been extended or reemphasized. 
The fifth advance made at Chapultcpec was in the :fields of 
economi.c cooperation and social welfare. The provisions of the 
Econorrd.c Charter of the AmeriC3.s and the Declaration oi' l1exico 
represented the delegates' attempt to rededicate themselves to the 
high principles of huma."li ty. Proposals had been designed to rai3e 
the standard of living of the hemispheric !T'.asses in an "environment. 
of peace, liberty, and security."56 
The Secretar.r regarded the Argentine resolution as the final 
significant agreement. In an act of solidarity, the twenty Amer-
ican republics had devised an equitable t·ray for the Buenos Aires 
government to return to the hemispheric fold. Under the just terms 
of this measure, the Farrell regime i·rould become a signatory to 
the United Nations Declaration and the final act of the Mexico. 
City Conference. 
For all these achievements, Stettinius paid tribute to the 
vision and steadfastness of statesmen like President Gamache and 
Dr. Padilla.. He also aclmo~iledged that Frank"lin RoosevelVs long 
Ibid ... p .. 2 .. 
-· 
and earnest efforts to foster irier.dsh.ip among the irnnti.spheric 
powers had been !7'.anif ested by the successes of the con.f crence. 
In closing, the Secretar; depicted the Ch.:ipult.epec agreerr.ents a3 
a "concrete expression to t:hat spirit of Good neighbor which has 
long since found acceptance among all the peoples of the Am"ericas."57 
Stettinius's participation in the CBS radio broadcast was his 
last public function at the Mexico City Conference. On Friday, 
March 9, he departed for a brief goodwill visit to Cuba and by 
Saturday afternoon, the American diplomt was back in ~·/ash.L.,.,.gton. 
In a final cable to Joseph Grew from Chapultepec, he exhibited hi:.> 
persistent optimism. With his conference duties fulfilled, the 
Secretary's dispatch portrayed the two and one-half Heek ga theri...ng 
as the culr.ri.nation of a good, neighbo~ly policy and an attit~de 
which the P..oosevelt ad.1ri.nistration had consi::::;t~nt.ly pursued during 
58 
the last twelve years. 
5S.. Telegram~ Stettinius to Jo::;cpi1 Gre,.,, ~:arch d, 1911-5: 
P• lr Box 286, stettinius Papers~ 
CHAPTER VIII 
conCLUSION 
Like Stetti...'"lius, the American public .:md press reacted quite 
favorably to the Hexi.co City Conference. The New Yorl< Tit:1es, 
Washington Post, and other leading newspapers labeled the assembly 
"as perhaps the n:ost successful ever held by representatives of 
the American republics." A life magazine cdi tori.al noted that 
"United States diplomacy had just colile through a ver:y tricky 
1 international conf~rence and corr.e through well .. " 
The passage of time has permitted the hi0torian td more 
clear];! analyze the CJ:i.apultepec talks. Thirty years after the 
conference, one can perceive that although the meeting was com-
2· para ti vely successful, it did not ::;ettlc verJ r.ruch. Most of the 
important policy decisions :rade ·,·1ere of a recorrmenda tor-.r or pro-
visional character. In order to rrake them definitive and effective, 
r.ruch still rerr.ained to be done by subsequent conferences.3 Several 
political rratters, including the further reorganization of the 
regional system, were to be ref erred to the ninth hemispheric 
meeting in Bogota in 1946. Concrete economic affairs would be 
discussed at the Inter-American Technical and Economic Conference 
scheduled for July, 1945. E.'ven the Act of Chapultepec was-merely 
1. AnalyGis of Conference Press Cov0rage, p. 1, Box 283, 
Stettinius Pape:-s,,. 
2.,. Gordon Connell-S:ni t:1, The I.nter-.;rr:eric::m S·rstem 
(New York: Oxford University Pressl' 1906):- p ... 133 .. 
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provisional pending the conclusion of a coll~ctive security treaty 
and constitutional adju;;tments by the sig:n.ato.q powers.h 
\fr1ile the Hexi.co City Conference tempori::ed on rn:m,y issue, 
there were other matters it did not consider at. all. The subject 
of Franco's Spain and the American activities of the Spanish 
Falange were termed irrelevant by the delegates. The i'uture of 
European colonies and United States naval and air bases in La tin 
Ameri~ was also not on the agenda. 5 
Though hi.'1dsight has shown the Chapultepec t.:ilks to be less 
a success than once thought, the negotiations still achieved some 
noteworthy results for Arnerican foreign policy. Stettinius and 
his aides helped to draw up a solution for elinri.nating .Argentine 
isolation. They also overcame la.tin American resentment toward 
the proposed United !ia tions and gained hemispheric acceptance of 
the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The Uashington delegation allayed too 
the fears of its southern neighbors, that the United States would 
not support their postwar development programs. 
For a rran not formally trained in the field of international 
affairs and considered by many just a "caretaker secretar.r," 
stettinius did an admirable job as the chief American delegate in 
Mexico City. Der.:-0nstra ting his ability to work under pressure, 
he surmounted the problem of French sponsorshlp and avoided any 
possible er.ibarr3.sscent stemming from the United States 1 dual 
interest i.1. t.he regional system ancl the world organiz.J.t.ion. The 
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Secretary's personal diplo:nacy won him the fricndshio of the Hexi-
can hosts, namely Ca:racho <!nd Padill.:i., o..."1d 3.l.so ir.:proved i·rorking 
relations wi. th Ia tin American diplorrat::;, r..any of >·:ham later col-
laborated with him on the United Nations Ch.:l.rter. In addition, 
Stettinius established good rapport with the press and consequently, 
received favorable publicity for his department. American ,journa-
lists endorsed his practice of having laymen, representative of 
different sectors of society, on the delegation. They also sup-
ported his efforts to obtain a freedom of information resolution. 
Utilizing the medium o.f radio, the Secret."lr:f brought into focus 
for the public ~lashington•s diplomatic goals and State Department 
operations. His policy of passing on responsibility to top aides 
could only have helped to improve the ~orale of the department. 
Besides this, perr:titting .Rockefeller, Pas•101sky, Eaynor, and others 
to direct certain activities in Mexico City must have impressed 
hemispheric representatives \d th the cohesiveness of the lunerican 
delegation. In view of these facts, Ech-iard Stettinius conducted 
himself and American foreign policy in a ver.r competent manner at 
the Mexico City Conference of 1945. 
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